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Jettisoning Fay v. Noia: Procedural Defaults
by Reasonably Incompetent Counsel
Yale L. Rosenberg*
Somewhat like a cantankerous, senile grandparent left to vege-
tate and finally to die in a sterile nursing home, Fay v. NoiaI the
Warren Court's seminal decision broadening the availability of fed-
eral habeas corpus for state prisoners, was for several years virtually
ignored and has now been all but completely overruled, another vic-
tim of the Burger Court's relentless quest for finality in criminal
proceedings. 2 Noia held, inter alia, that a criminal defendant's proce-
dural default in the original state court proceedings, which might bar
direct Supreme Court review by virtue of the adequate state ground
rule,4 would not preclude federal habeas relief unless the state proved
that the defendant, after consultation with competent counsel, per-
sonally participated, for strategic or tactical reasons, in an inten-
tional relinquishment (or deliberate bypass) of the procedure af-
forded by state law for vindication of the federal constitutional
claim.5
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Houston.
1. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
2. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (precluding federal habeas
actions by state prisoners asserting fourth amendment claims where the state has
provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation thereof); Tollett v. Henderson, 411
U.S. 258 (1973) (barring federal habeas relief in the case of defendant claiming racial
discrimination in grand jury selection process on the ground that a valid guilty plea
waives antecedent constitutional infirmities).
3. A procedural default is a failure on the part of the defendant to comply with
a state statute or rule governing criminal procedure, such as failure to object to an
allegedly coerced confession at the time and in the manner prescribed by state law or
a failure to file a timely notice of appeal from the judgment of conviction.
4. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 428-30 (1963). The adequate and independent
state ground rule precludes Supreme Court review of state court judgments based on
both federal and state law grounds, where a contrary resolution of the federal question
would not affect the judgment of the court below. The doctrine is presumably rooted
in the prohibition against advisory opinions. Id. at 430 n.40. In Noia, the Court left
open whether the adequate state ground rule was constitutionally mandated or
"merely a matter of the construction of the statutes defining this Court's appellate
review." Id. Compare Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-26 (1945) (stating that the
rule is constitutionally mandated).
5. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438-39 (1963). Although the Court did not explicitly
place the burden of proof on the state, it specified that the deliberate bypass test was
to be governed by "[tlhe classic definition of waiver enunciated in Johnson v. Zerbst,
. . . 'an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.'"
Id. at 439. In Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938), it was noted "that 'courts
indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver' of fundamental constitutional
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
In the early 1970's, the Burger Court initiated a policy of discreet
silence with respect to Noia, chipping away at the deliberate bypass
test and, at the same time, developing a parallel but completely
inconsistent body of law." The Court's primary analytical approach
during this period of uncertainty was to ascertain whether any con-
ceivable strategic or tactical advantage might accrue to defendants
in general by virtue of the particular type of procedural error that was
committed in the state court.' If so, defendant's counsel in the case
at bar was deemed to have acted on the basis of this consideration;
an "inexcusable procedural default" was thereby imputed to the de-
fendant;" and the federal habeas claim was barred absent a showing
of "good cause" and "actual prejudice." 9 In an analogous fashion, the
Court began to utilize a new test for waiver of constitutional rights
during trial. Rather than looking to whether defendant intentionally
relinquished a known right, the Court instead determined whether
the state had "compelled" the accused to forfeit his or her constitu-
tional right; absent such coercion, the ability to assert the claim in a
federal habeas action was lost.'0 Thus were the burden of proof and
focus of inquiry shifted. Instead of requiring the state to show that,
rights and that we 'do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.' "
Id. (footnotes omitted) (quoting in part Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393
(1937), and Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 307 (1937)). See
Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 527 n.8 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting). But see
Sandoval v. Tinsley, 338 F.2d 48, 50 (10th Cir. 1964) (once some evidence of waiver is
presented, the burden of proof shifts to the petitioner).
6. See Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S.
501 (1976); Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973).
7. See Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 540-41 (1976); Davis v. United States,
411 U.S. 233, 241 (1973) ("Strong tactical considerations would militate in favor of
delaying the raising of the claim [of racial discrimination in the grand jury selection
process] in hopes of an acquittal, with the thought that if those hopes did not material-
ize, the claim could be used to upset an otherwise valid conviction at a time when
reprosecution might well be difficult."). Although the Davis case involved a federal
prisoner seeking collateral relief in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970) rather
than a state prisoner bringing a habeas action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1970),
the Court had previously held Noia's deliberate bypass requirement applicable to
section 2255 actions as well. See Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 220 n.3, 227
n.8 (1969). See generally Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 15 (1963) (finding the
section 2255 action to be the "substantial equivalent of federal habeas corpus").
8. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 513-14 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) (quot-
ing Hart, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term-Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices,
73 HARV. L. REv. 84, 118 (1959)).
9. Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 542 (1976). The "cause" and "prejudice"
requirements were first referred to in Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233, 244-45
(1973). In the Davis opinion, however, the Court did not make clear whether both
elements had to be proved or whether these were alternative requirements. The neces-
sity for proving both was announced in Francis. See 425 U.S. at 542.
10. See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 512-13 (1976).
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for strategic or tactical .reasons, defendant, rather than counsel, de-
liberately bypassed state remedies for assertion of his or her constitu-
tional claims, the Court ascertained whether the defendant was
forced to forsake the federal claim; or, alternatively, if the Court
could conceive of any theoretical benefit inuring to the accused as a
result of the default, the defendant was required to provide an excul-
patory explanation and to show prejudicial effect.
Wainwright v. Sykes," a 1977 decision, sought to end the confu-
sion by overruling Noia insofar as it applied to defaults in the course
of trial. The Court held that, in order to secure federal habeas relief,
a prisoner whose federal claim had not been resolved on the merits
in state court, as a result of a procedural default during trial, was
required to prove "cause" and "prejudice."' 2 As one of the policy
bases for its decision, the majority suggested that there was a possible
strategic motive for every state court procedural default: as a result
of Fay v. Noia, defense counsel were encouraged to "sandbag," that
is, to commit procedural defaults with respect to constitutional
claims so that, in the event of conviction, such claims could be as-
serted in a federal habeas proceeding.'3 Also cast aside in Sykes was
the need for personal participation by the defendant in procedural
defaults in the course of trial. That requirement was swallowed by a
definition of assistance of counsel that made "decisions" of the trial
attorney, whether intentional or not, almost inescapably binding on
the client.
This Article will examine how and why the deliberate bypass
concept was converted from a doctrine requiring personal waiver by
the defendant to a rule retroactively elevating the possibly negligent
or inadvertent omissions of counsel to the exalted realm of dazzling
strategic maneuvers whose Darrowesque brilliance not only per-
versely backfires against the accused in state court, but also annihi-
lates access to the federal habeas court, notwithstanding defendant's
total unawareness of counsel's virtuoso nonperformance. It will then
analyze the possible institutional repercussions of the Sykes case, in
terms of the desirability of maintaining federal habeas as a safety
valve, the urgency of developing a meaningful body of law concerning
effective assistance of counsel, the implications of restricting habeas
in a manner that leaves federal rights and remedies in a skewed
relationship, and the potential danger of preserving habeas as a
11. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
12. Id. at 90-91. Although these concepts had been introduced four years earlier
in Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233, 244-45 (1973), the Court in Sykes left for
future cases the task of giving "precise content" to the terms. See 433 U.S. at 91.
13. See 433 U.S. at 89.
14. See id. at 91 n.14; id. at 91-94 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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mechanism devoted almost exclusively to remedying gross constitu-
tional violations.
I. FAY v. NOIA AND DELIBERATE BYPASS:
NOW YOU SEE IT, NOW YOU DON'T
A. IN THE BEGINNING: "THE CONSIDERED CHOICE OF THE PETITIONER"
The pre-Noia case law has been analyzed extensively and inten-
sively. 5 Noia thus provides a convenient starting point, not only be-
cause of this comprehensive literature, but also because it represents
the first attempt by the Court to provide a coherent doctrinal solution
to the problem of the effect of state procedural defaults on the availa-
bility of federal habeas relief. 6
15. See, e.g., Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for
State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441 (1963); Brennan, Federal Habeas Corpus and
State Prisoners: An Exercise in Federalism, 7 UTAH L. REv. 423 (1961); Hart, The
Supreme Court, 1958 Term - Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HAIWv. L.
REv. 84, 101-25 (1959); Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Impact of an Abortive State
Proceeding, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1315 (1961). See also Oaks, Legal History in the High
Court-Habeas Corpus, 64 MICH. L. REV. 451 (1966).
For discussions of Noia and its implications, see Wright & Sofaer, Federal Habeas
Corpus for State Prisoners: The Allocation of Fact-Finding Responsibility, 75 YALE
L.J. 895, 958-79 (1966); Note, Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners: The Isolation
Principle, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 78, 81-104 (1964) (student work written by Professor
Abraham Sofaer).
16. Professor Reitz described the pre-Noia judicial rules on procedural default
as follows:
There could be no more certain sign that the present judicial response to the
abortive state proceeding is unsound than the confusing babble of reasons
variously given to justify the result. The problem has been before the Su-
preme Court of the United States in two major cases, Daniels v. Allen and
Irvin v. Dowd. Whatever else may be said of the many opinions filed in those
cases, they demonstrate beyond any doubt that there is no acceptable unify-
ing rationalization for the present state of the law.
Reitz, supra note 15, at 1317 (footnotes omitted). In Daniels v. Allen, consolidated with
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953), petitioners were convicted of murder and sen-
tenced to death by a North Carolina court. Because defendants' counsel filed the
appeal one day late, the state supreme court refused to hear the case. In an ambiguous
opinion, the Supreme Court of the United States described this as a "failure to appeal"
and, utilizing a theory either of waiver or of failure to exhaust state remedies, id. at
485-87, or perhaps invoking the adequate state ground rule, id. at 458; see Fay v. Noia,
372 U.S. 391, 461 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting), the Court concluded that federal
habeas relief was unavailable.
The confusion was increased by the Court's decision in Irvin v. Dowd, 359 U.S.
394 (1959). As in Daniels, defendant was convicted in state court of murder and was
sentenced to death. There had been widespread pretrial publicity and an enflamed
community attitude against Irvin, apparently contaminating the jury itself. Defendant
escaped from jail the day before his counsel filed a motion for a new trial, which was
denied by the trial judge on the ground that Irvin was a fugitive. The denial was
[Vol. 62:341
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Noia arose in the following factual context. Solely on the basis
of their signed confessions, Noia and two codefendants were con-
victed of felony murder after trial in state court. 7 The codefendants
appealed and ultimately secured release based on the determination
that their confessions had been coerced." Because Noia failed to take
a direct appeal from the judgment of conviction," his subsequent
efforts to obtain collateral relief in state court were unsuccessful." He
then commenced a federal habeas action, in which the district court
conducted a hearing to ascertain the reasons for Noia's original fail-
ure to pursue state appellate remedies. The resulting testimony indi-
cated that, although Noia knew he had a right to appeal, he declined
to do so because of the expense and the apprehension that a success-
ful appeal and subsequent retrial might result not only in conviction
but in imposition of the death penalty.2 The spectre of capital pun-
assigned as error on an appeal to the Indiana Supreme Court, which, in affirming the
conviction, rendered a highly ambiguous opinion, prominently noting the procedural
bar created by the escape, but also mentioning that, "because of the finality of the
sentence in the case we have reviewed the evidence to satisfy ourselves that there is
no miscarriage of justice in this case." Irvin v. State, 236 Ind. 384, 392-93, 139 N.E.2d
898, 902, cert. denied, 353 U.S. 948 (1957). The state's highest court thus concluded
that Irvin had not been denied due process of law. Id.
Upon review of the federal courts' refusal to grant habeas relief, the majority of
the United States Supreme Court held that the state court decision was on the merits
and that defendant had consequently satisfied the requirement of exhaustion of state
remedies, thus allowing consideration of Irvin's constitutional claims by the federal
habeas court on remand. See 359 U.S. at 403-07. The dissenting Justices believed that
the adequate state ground rule precluded habeas relief, but suggested that in view of
the ambiguity of the state court opinion, the case should be remitted thereto for
clarification. See id. at 411 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); id. at 416-17 (Harlan, J..
dissenting). The fortuity seized upon by the majority, namely that the state court had
made some reference to the merits, plainly did not resolve the key question of the effect
to be given state court procedural defaults where the state court was unwilling to
consider the merits at all.
17. 372 U.S. at 395. Noia was convicted in 1942.
18. Codefendant Caminito secured relief in 1955. United States ex rel. Caminito
v. Murphy, 222 F.2d 698 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 896 (1955). Bonino, the other
codefendant, was granted relief in state court a year after Caminito's success in federal
court. People v. Bonino, 1 N.Y.2d 752, 135 N.E.2d 51, 152 N.Y.S.2d 298 (1956) (meri.).
The earlier direct appeals of the two codefendants had resulted in affirmances of their
judgments of conviction, People v. Bonino, 291 N.Y. 541, 50 N.E.2d 654, 38 N.Y.S.2d
1019 (1943), afrg per curiarm 265 App. Div. 960, 38 N.Y.S.2d 1019 (1942) (mem.),
notwithstanding the Second Circuit's subsequent characterization of the methods
employed to elicit the confessions as "satanic practices" that "do not comport with
the barest minimum of civilized principles of justice." United States ex rel. Caminito
v. Murphy, 222 F.2d 698, 701 (2d Cir.) (Frank, J.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 896 (1955).
19. 372 U.S. at 396 n.3.
20. People v. Caminito, 3 N.Y.2d 596, 148 N.E.2d 139, 170 N.Y.S.2d 799, cert.
denied, 357 U.S. 905 (1958).
21. 372 U.S. at 396 n.3.
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ishment was, in view of the trial judge's comments at sentencing, not
chimerical.22 Notwithstanding the state's stipulation that Noia's con-
fession was in fact coerced,13 the district court found that petitioner's
failure to appeal prohibited relief under the federal statutory require-
ment that state remedies be exhausted, even though such remedies
were no longer available.24
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Brennan,"5 rejected
all of the state's variant arguments that the single procedural default
precluded federal habeas relief. The Court interpreted the exhaustion
requirement as applicable only to currently existing state remedies,
and, more important, it held that although the adequate and inde-
pendent state ground rule might preclude direct appellate review by
the Supreme Court, it would not bar a federal habeas action."6
22. Id. at 396 n.3, 440. The trial judge told Noia at sentencing,
"I have thought seriously about rejecting the recommendation of the jury in
your case, Noia, because I feel that if the jury knew who you were and what
you were and your background as a robber, they would not have made a
recommendation. But you have got a good lawyer, that is my wife. The last
thing she told me this morning is to give you a chance."
Id. at 396 n.3. Noia's confession included a statement that he had committed the
shooting. Although the jury had recommended life imprisonment, the judge was not
required to accept its recommendation.
23. Id. at 396 n.2.
24. United States ex rel. Noia v. Fay, 183 F. Supp. 222 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), reu'd,
300 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1962) (exceptional circumstances of Noia's case warranted habeas
relief), aff'd, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
25. Justice Brennan wrote for himself and five other members of the Court, only
one of whom, Justice White, remains on the Court today. The primary dissenting
opinion was written by Justice Harlan, who was joined by Justices Stewart and Clark.
Justice Clark also wrote a brief separate dissent.
26. See 372 U.S. at 398-99. The Court asserted that the adequate state ground
rule was a barrier only to direct appellate review by the Supreme Court. The Court's
appellate jurisdiction over state court cases is dependent, inter alia, on the existence
of a state court judgment. Thus, if the Supreme Court attempts on direct appeal to
resolve a federal question notwithstanding the presence of a dispositive state ground,
such an interpretation of federal law would have no effect on the judgment and might
therefore constitute an advisory opinion. Habeas, however, is an original proceeding
to test the validity of the prisoner's detention and consequently does not require the
existence of a state court judgment to confer jurisdiction. The Court in Noia therefore
reasoned that in a federal habeas proceeding any action with respect to the writ
affected only the body of the petitioner and that, accordingly, the adequate state
ground rule was inapplicable. Furthermore, the majority stated that, as a matter of
policy, the state's valid interest in assuring adherence to its procedures was satisfied
by the forfeiture of all state remedies and of direct Supreme Court review as a result
of the procedural default. The additional loss of federal habeas remedies was consid-
ered to be unwarranted. See id. at 428-33.
Also rejected was the state's argument that Noia's failure to appeal was a waiver
of his right to do so. See id. at 399. The waiver, exhaustion, and adequate state ground
arguments may be viewed as alternative means of labeling the legal consequences of
the single procedural default.
[Vol. 62:341
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At the same time, in keeping with the equitable nature of the
writ, the majority recognized that federal judges possessed "a limited
discretion" to deny relief to petitioners who had "deliberately by-
passed the orderly procedure of the state courts and . . . forfeited
. . . state court remedies."' ' The test for a determination of deliber-
ate bypass was stated unequivocally to be the Johnson v. Zerbst
waiver definition, which required "'an intentional relinquishment
or abandonment of a known right or privilege.' " Although pointing
out that, "after consultation with competent counsel," a defendant
could, for "strategic, tactical, or any other reasons," commit such a
bypass, the Court took pains to specify that "the considered choice
of the petitioner" was controlling.?
Applying the deliberate bypass standard to the facts of the case,
Justice Brennan found "the grisly choice" afforded Noia-life impris-
onment versus a possible retrial and death sentence-did not amount
to a "merely tactical or strategic litigation step, or in any way a
deliberate circumvention of state procedures."' The conclusion that
Noia had not engaged in such a bypass raises serious questions as to
the meaning of that term.3 ' Noia knew of his constitutional right not
to be convicted on the basis of a coerced confession and of his right
to appeal on the basis of that constitutional claim, but he neverthe-
less made what can only be described as a tactical or strategic deci-
sion not to pursue this state remedy because of the possible adverse
As a final argument, New York urged that a defaulting prisoner had been given
all the process constitutionally due and thus was not restrained in violation of the
Constitution. Such a defendant was being held in custody as a result of the default
rather than the constitutional violation. These contentions were rejected on the
grounds that they misconceived the scope of due process, which included not only the
right to he heard but also the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights, and that the
default did not eliminate the underlying constitutional claim. See id. at 427-28.
27. Id. at 438. Justice Brennan also referred to the "exigencies of federalism" as
a basis for establishing the deliberate bypass rule. Id. at 433. Where, however, the state
courts have proceeded to decide defendant's constitutional claim on the merits not-
withstanding his or her procedural default under state law, the deliberate bypass
limitation on federal habeas has not been applied, since in such cases there has been
no forfeiture of state remedies, and thus neither the federalism nor the equity rationale
requires imposition of a forfeiture. See, e.g., Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283. 292
n.9 (1975); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 297 n.3 (1967).
28. 372 U.S. at 439 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).
29. Id. It is unclear what "other reasons," in addition to strategic and tactical
considerations, Justice Brennan had in mind as a basis for a finding of deliberate
bypass. Such "other reasons" would presumably have to afford some possible advan-
tage to defendant.
30. Id. at 440.
31. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Harlan analyzed the application of the
deliberate bypass test to Noia and concluded that the majority "in effect reads its own
creation out of existence." Id. at 471.
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consequences.12 His decision was thus tactical, but evidently not
"merely tactical."33 It was not "merely tactical" because the state
procedure permitting harsher punishment on retrial, though consti-
tutional at that time,3' discouraged presentation of federal constitu-
tional claims in state court;35 or because Noia was perhaps unaware
that failure to appeal could result in a complete forfeiture of both
federal and state collateral remedies for vindication of his consti-
tutional claim;3" or because the defendant had at least asserted his
coerced confession claim at trial, thus giving the state an initial op-
portunity to vindicate the federal claim.3 1 Whatever reason prompted
32. Id. at 396 n.3.
33. Id. at 440.
34. It was not until six years after its Noia decision that the Supreme Court held
that the due process clause prohibited the states from imposing vindictively harsher
punishments upon defendants who secured appellate reversals and were convicted
after retrial. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969). Indeed, in the Noia
opinion the Court stated that the possibility of harsher punishment in and of itself
would not preclude a finding of deliberate bypass. The significant distinguishing factor
in Noia was that the trial judge's comments at sentencing created a very substantial
possibility of imposition of the death penalty in the event of retrial. See 372 U.S. at
440.
The Court's reliance on the sentencing judge's comments seems inappropriate.
Since the only items of evidence presented against Noia and his confederates were the
coerced confessions, a finding that those confessions were invalid would appear to have
precluded successful retrial. Even if the state had been able to secure other, untainted
evidence against Noia, he could presumably have moved successfully to have his case
retried before another judge on the basis of the comments made by the original judge
at the sentencing proceeding. In any event, such fastening on the happenstance of a
garrulous trial judge seems somewhat reminiscent of the Court's seizing upon the
ambiguity of the state court opinion in Irvin v. Dowd, 359 U.S. 394 (1959), discussed
at note 16 supra. Such slips of tongue or pen seem to be inappropriate bases for
doctrinal resolution of the difficult problems presented.
35. See Note, supra note 15, at 89.
36. Nothing in the Court's opinion suggests either that Noia had such knowledge
or that it was a prerequisite for a finding of deliberate bypass. It is conceivable,
however, that, by focusing on the Johnson v. Zerbst standard of waiver, the Court
intended to require that the prisoner not only knowingly give up the particular state
remedy for vindication of a constitutional claim, such as appeal, but also that he or
she understand the collateral consequences of such a default.
37. The Supreme Court may have believed that the defendant's default with
respect to an appellate remedy was less consequential than a default at the trial level.
When a defendant fails to make any objection in the course of trial, the state has no
opportunity at the trial level to correct an alleged violation of constitutional rights and
thus to avoid the possibility of a subsequent retrial in the event of appellate reversal
on the constitutional ground. In such instances, it is arguable that the state's interest
in imposition of a forfeiture should be given greater weight. If, however, defendant does
assert a constitutional claim at trial and it is erroneously rejected, but the defendant
thereafter fails to appeal, the state's insistence that the prisoner utilize the more
refined appellate procedure for rectifying the error of the trial court and its demand
for a forfeiture of federal remedies are less compelling since defendant has at least
[Vol. 62:341
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the Court to find no deliberate bypass on the basis of these facts, it
is clear that the standard imposed for determining the availability of
habeas was a liberal one, intended to allow maximum federal review
of the constitutional claims of defaulting state prisoners.
The reason for such leniency may well lie in the difference be-
tween a true Johnson v. Zerbst waiver and a deliberate bypass of the
Fay v. Noia variety. Although these concepts have the same effect
and were used interchangeably by the Noia Court, there are signifi-
cant differences.? In the waiver situation, although the defendant
initially had a particular constitutional right, it has been determined,
after a hearing on the merits, that he or she affirmatively gave up that
right, so that one can say with some confidence that the defendant
is not being held in violation of the Constitution and that federal
habeas relief should accordingly be unavailable?' In the deliberate
bypass context, however, defendant has allegedly lost the right to
assert the constitutional claim because of a procedural default. Since
there has been no hearing on the merits of that claim, the court has
no way of knowing whether the defendant is being held in violation
of the Constitution. 0 Thus, because the merits can never be reached
given the original state tribunal the opportunity to remedy the constitutional defect
and thus to avoid the necessity of retrial. Compare Davis v. United States, 411 U.S.
233, 240 n.7 (1973), with Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969).
For the reasons set forth at notes 344-49 infra and accompanying text, however.
this distinction between trial and appellate defaults as a means of assessing the availa-
bility of federal habeas relief appears to be inappropriate.
38. See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501,523-25 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
39. For example, if a defendant gives an inculpatory statement to the police
following his or her arrest and thereafter, either through a pretrial motion to suppress
or an objection at trial, challenges the introduction of the statement on the ground that
there was no voluntary waiver of the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination,
a hearing is required to determine the voluntariness of the confession. See Jackson v.
Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964). After such a hearing, the trial court may find that the
police advised defendant in accordance with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
and that defendant, being aware of his or her rights, intelligently and voluntarily gave
up the right against self-incrimination. If defendant is subsequently convicted at a trial
at which the confession is introduced and if he or she thereafter files a federal habeas
action alleging that he or she is in custody in violation of the Constitution on the basis
of the involuntary confession claim, the state court record resolving the voluntariness
issue against the defendant will be presumed correct if it meets the criteria of 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)-(e) (1970). Thus, habeas relief will be unavailable because there has been a
fair and adequate resolution on the merits of the factual dispute underlying the consti-
tutional claim and a finding that defendant voluntarily relinquished ("waived") the
constitutional right in question.
For a comprehensive discussion of waiver and its doctrinal variants, see Dix,
Waiver in Criminal Procedure: A Brief for More Careful Analysis, 55 Tax. L. Ray. 193
(1977).
40. For instance, if a defendant who has rendered an inculpatory statement to
police following arrest makes no objection to admission of the confession at trial, it is
unclear whether defendant's failure to object is based on (1) a knowing and intelligent
1978]
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in the deliberate bypass situation, it is eminently reasonable that the
Court should be equally or more zealous in assuring an intelligent
relinquishment of the right to assert the constitutional claim in the
latter context. By requiring the state to establish an intentional,
tactical default carried out with the defendant's personal participa-
tion, the deliberate bypass rule set forth in Noia attempted to achieve
that result.
B. EARLY AMBIVALENCE: IMPUTING THE "CONSIDERED CHOICE" TO
THE PETITIONER
Two years after Noia, the Court provided in Henry v.
Mississippi4 what would ultimately become a theoretical framework
acknowledgment of the voluntariness of the out-of-court confession; or (2) a determina-
tion that, although involuntary, the statement is helpful to the accused; or (3) a
decision that, although the statement is involuntary, the trier of fact will disbelieve
defendant's version of the disputed facts relating to this claim and that it is therefore
a waste of time to object to its introduction; or (4) a mistake on the part of defense
counsel in assessing the legal consequences of facts underlying the constitutional
claim, for instance, counsel does not understand that deceit or psychological coercion
renders the confession involuntary; or (5) defendant's and defense counsel's ignorance
of facts indicating that the confession was involuntary, for example, unknown to defen-
dant at the time he or she made the statement, the police had administered a "truth
serum"; or (6) ignorance or negligence in failing to understand that an objection is the
appropriate procedural mechanism for challenging the admission of an involuntary
confession; or (7) an intention not to permit the state courts to resolve the disputed
facts and instead to litigate these facts in federal court. Whatever the reason for
defendant's default, the net effect is that the court cannot know whether the confes-
sion is in fact voluntary since no hearing on the merits of the voluntariness claim is
ever held. If such a defendant subsequently brings a federal habeas action and claims
that he or she is being detained in violation of the Constitution because the conviction
is based on an involuntary confession, a finding of deliberate bypass will make it
impossible to ascertain whether the confession was in fact involuntary.
Assuming that defendant has personally participated in the decision, has received
the advice of competent counsel, and is aware of all the legal consequences of the
default, a finding of deliberate bypass does not appear inequitable in situations 1 and
2 given above. Even making the above assumptions, a bypass finding seems less appro-
priate in situation 3 since there appears to be no strategic or tactical basis for the
default. In situations 4, 5, and 6, a finding of deliberate bypass seems clearly improper,
since there is no intent to circumvent state remedies, there is no strategic or tactical
basis for the default, and competency of counsel may be in doubt. Finally, although
situation 7 might appear to be a classic case of deliberate bypass, it seems clear that
competent counsel would never advise a client to proceed on that basis since failure
to present the claim in state court increases the possibility of conviction and results
in a forfeiture of both state and federal remedies as well, Therefore, no finding of
deliberate bypass should be made in situation 7. The deliberate bypass test thus
appears to be an appropriate mechanism for limiting forfeiture of federal habeas reme-
dies to those situations in which the defendant's statement is in fact voluntary or in
which defendant's failure to utilize the state procedure is intentional and is carried out
in a reasonable effort to gain some strategic or tactical benefit.
41. 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
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for dilution of the deliberate bypass requirement in the course of an
apparent attempt to circumscribe the adequate and independent
state ground rule as a barrier to direct review of cases involving proce-
dural defaults. The defendant, a black civil rights leader, 2 was con-
victed of disturbing the peace by making indecent proposals to a
teenage hitchhiker to whom the accused allegedly gave a ride. Under
Mississippi law, Henry could not be convicted on the basis of the
uncorroborated testimony of the complaining witness. To corroborate
the hitchhiker's testimony describing the interior of defendant's car,
the state called as a witness a police officer who had inspected the
automobile after obtaining consent from Henry's wife."
State law required that objections to illegally obtained evidence
be made contemporaneously with the introduction of the evidence.
When the police officer testified, Henry's attorneys made no such
objection, but at the conclusion of the state's case they moved for a
directed verdict and included as a ground the claim that the police
officer's search of the car violated the fourth amendment." The Mis-
sissippi Supreme Court initially reversed the conviction, on the
ground that defendant's nonresident attorneys were unfamiliar with
the contemporaneous objection rule. On rehearing,'5 however, after
being advised that defendant had also been represented by local
counsel, the court filed a new opinion reinstating the judgment of
conviction and ruling that honest mistakes of counsel were binding
on the client."
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court first considered
whether failure to comply with the Mississippi procedural rule was
an adequate state ground barring direct review. Although acknowl-
edging that the contemporaneous objection rule served a legitimate
state interest, the Court suggested that if defendant's motion for
directed verdict served the same interest, "settled principles would
preclude treating the state ground as adequate."" Notwithstanding
42. See Henry v. Williams, 299 F. Supp. 36, 40 (N.D. Miss. 1969).
43. The police officer testified, as had the complainant, that the ashtray was
filled with chewing gum wrappers and that the cigarette lighter did not work. See 379
U.S. at 444.
44. The underlying fourth amendment claim was that the defendant should not
be bound by his spouse's consent to a search. Id. at 449 n.6. But cf. United States v.
Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974) (woman who cohabited with defendant and who had
made statements that she and defendant were married had authority to consent to
search of bedroom).
45. Technically, under the Mississippi Supreme Court Rules, this was a
"suggestion of error," see Miss. Sup. CT. R. 14, reprinted in 29 Miss. L.J. 386 (1958).
which is the functional equivalent of a rehearing, see White v. State, 190 Miss. 589.
595, 195 So. 479, 482 (1940).
46. Henry v. State, 253 Miss. 263, 280, 154 So. 2d 289, 296 (1963), vacated and
remanded, 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
47. 379 U.S. at 449. There is some doubt as to how "settled" these "principles"
were. See id. at 464 (Harlan, J., dissenting); P. BAToa, P. MIsMuN, D. Sumnio, & H.
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these pronouncements, the Court declined to pass on the adequacy
of the state ground or on the merits of the underlying fourth amend-
ment claim because the record suggested "a possibility that peti-
tioner's counsel deliberately bypassed the opportunity to make
timely objection in the state court, and thus that the petitioner
should be deemed to have forfeited his state court remedies.",, Ac-
cordingly, the case was remanded to the state court for a hearing on
the deliberate bypass issue. 9
In a seemingly unambiguous fashion, Justice Brennan carved an
exception to the personal participation requirement of the deliberate
bypass rule:
Although trial strategy adopted by counsel without prior consulta-
tion with an accused will not, where the circumstances are excep-
tional, preclude the accused from asserting constitutional claims,
. . . we think that the deliberate bypassing by counsel of the con-
temporaneous-objection rule as a part of trial strategy would have
that effect in this case.'"
WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 557 (2d
ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as HART & WECHSLERI; Hill, The Inadequate State
Ground, 65 COLUM. L. Rv. 943, 987-92 (1965).
48. 379 U.S. at 450.
49. Justice Brennan reasoned that even the Court's dismissal of the appeal on
the basis of the adequate state ground rule would not end the matter since Henry could
then seek federal habeas relief. The opinion suggested that remanding to the state
court would permit the latter to make the initial determination of the deliberate
bypass issue and might thus possibly reduce federal-state friction and promote the
efficient administration of criminal justice. See id. at 452-53.
On remand, the Mississippi Supreme Court found that by virtue of his attorney's
failure to object defendant had committed a "waiver." See Henry v. State. 198 So. 2d
213 (Miss. 1967). Henry thereafter filed a federal habeas petition, which was granted
on the merits after the court found that there had been no deliberate bypass. Henry
v. Williams, 299 F. Supp. 36 (N.D. Miss. 1969).
50. 379 U.S. at 451-52. Although this statement in effect opened the door to
dilution and ultimately to elimination of Noia's requirement of personal participation
by the defendant with respect to trial defaults, see Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72,
91 n.14 (1977), the Court's opinion limited such waivers by counsel alone to inten-
tional, strategic decisions to bypass the contemporaneous objection rule. See 379 U.S.
at 451-52. Moreover, an argument can be made that Justice Brennan was intimating
that a default by counsel alone as part of trial strategy would bar only direct appellate
review of the underlying constitutional claim by the state court and by the United
States Supreme Court, but would not preclude federal habeas corpus relief without
petitioner's personal participation. Despite Justice Brennan's seemingly unequivocal
statement that counsel could bind the client without the latter's participation, the
immediately preceding sentence of the opinion stated that this binding omission by
counsel would preclude petitioner "from a decision on the merits of his federal claim
either in the state courts or here," id. at 451, omitting any reference to the effect of
such a default for purposes of federal habeas corpus. Furthermore, in the next para-
graph, when discussing the possibility that Henry might thereafter pursue such federal
collateral remedies, the opinion stated that "the procedural default will not alone
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Justice Brennan noted two indications in the record justifying an
evidentiary hearing with respect to whether counsel committed such
a bypass: (1) the prosecution's proposal to the Mississippi Supreme
Court that it would confess error on the waiver issue if any of peti-
tioner's three attorneys would submit an affidavit "'that he did not
know that at some point in a trial in criminal court in Mississippi
preclude consideration of his claim, at least unless it is shown that petitioner
deliberately bypassed the orderly procedure of the state courts." Id. at 452 (emphasis
added).
In view of Noia's unequivocal requirement of personal participation and its exposi-
tion of the deliberate bypass doctrine as one of limited discretion (thus authorizing the
federal district court to proceed to the merits notwithstanding a finding of deliberate
bypass), and in view of the fact that Henry was a direct appeal, Justice Brennan may
have intended to create different standards for establishing a bypass for purposes of
direct appeal as opposed to habeas. This position is given some support by the discus.
sion in Noia of the differences between the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction and
the habeas jurisdiction of the lower federal courts. On the one hand, direct appeal to
the Supreme Court can be viewed as an appellate stage of the state criminal prosecu-
tion, in which the Court must accordingly confine itself to the record made below,
including any procedural default, without being able to ascertain independently
whether defendant participated in such a default. By contrast,
the traditional characterization of the writ of habeas corpus as an original
• . . civil remedy for the enforcement of the right to personal liberty, rather
than as a stage of the state criminal proceedings or as an appeal therefrom,
emphasizes the independence of the federal habeas proceedings from what
has gone before.
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 423-24 (1963) (footnote omitted). In these independent
collateral proceedings, the federal court is free to take evidence concerning defendant's
participation in the default.
The Court's statement in Noia that a state prisoner need not petition for certiorari
prior to commencement of a federal habeas action, id. at 435, arguably suggests that
direct review by the Supreme Court is not a traditional appellate stage of the state
criminal proceeding, since habeas actions can only be commenced after the exhaustion
of state appeal procedures. The foregoing determination, however, was largely based
on pragmatic considerations, such as the discretionary nature of the writ of certiorari
and the need to conserve judicial resources. See id. at 436-37. When the Court does
grant certiorari, it is clearly performing an appellate function, and its resolution of the
matter is inextricably tied to the proceedings below.
Finally, it should be noted that, after the Mississippi Supreme Court in effect
found a bypass on remand, the Court denied certiorari "without prejudice to the
bringing of a proceeding for relief in federal habeas corpus," Henry v. Mississippi, 392
U.S. 931, 931 (1968), denying cert. to 202 So. 2d 40 (Miss. 1967), and that the federal
habeas judge from whom Henry ultimately secured relief questioned the applicability
of the Supreme Court's decision in Henry u. Mississippi concerning the requirement
of personal participation since the latter decision was on direct appeal and its state-
ments regarding waiver by counsel alone were in conflict with Noia in that regard. See
Henry v. Williams, 299 F. Supp. 36, 48 n.26 (N.D. Miss. 1969); cf. Henry v. Mississippi,
379 U.S. 433, 448 n.3 (1965) ("[W]here the state rule is a reasonable one and clearly
announced to defendant and counsel, application of the waiver doctrine will yield the
same result as that of the adequate nonfederal ground doctrine in the vast majority of
cases.") (emphasis added).
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that an objection to such testimony must have been made' ";5 (2) an
affidavit attached to the state's brief in the United States Supreme
Court alleging that one of Henry's attorneys "stood up as if to object
to the officer's tainted testimony and was pulled down by co-
counsel." 52 In pointing to the first factor, the Supreme Court ap-
peared to be saying that counsel's awareness of the state procedural
rule, although not conclusive, was a matter to be considered in deter-
mining whether the contemporaneous objection rule had been delib-
erately bypassed. Conversely, the Court also seemed to accept the
view that ignorance of the state rule would preclude such a finding.
The second item-the "jerk on the coat tail" affidavit 53-seemed to
be viewed as evidence bearing on counsel's knowledge of the state
rule, or perhaps suggesting a tactical maneuver," and as a sufficient
basis, together with the first indication, to justify a hearing on the
deliberate bypass question.
Having determined that the foregoing matters brought counsel's
ignorance of the state rule into question, the Court proceeded to
suggest two reasons why counsel's failure to object might have been
strategically motivated. First, counsel might have permitted intro-
duction of the evidence in question so that it could be impeached by
a defense witness, thus securing an acquittal. 5 Second, by delaying
their objection, Henry's attorneys might have been inviting error for
51. Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 450 (1965) (quoting the state's brief on
suggestion of error in lower court case). The Mississippi Supreme Court did not refer
to the state's proposal in its opinion. Id. In the subsequent federal habeas proceeding,
Henry's local counsel testified that, at the time the allegedly tainted testimony was
introduced, he was preoccupied with another matter, see Henry v. Williams, 299 F.
Supp. 36, 41 (N.D. Miss. 1969); there was also testimony that the failure to make a
contemporaneous objection was based on a misconception with respect to state law,
see id. at 48-49.
52. 379 U.S. at 450. At Henry's federal habeas hearing, the attorney who had
risen at the unpropitious moment testified that he did so in order to obtain ice water
from the judge's bench. He also testified that, at the trial, it was extremely hot and
pitchers of ice water were provided for the judge and the district attorney, whereas
defense counsel were advised that they could use a "for colored only" fountain outside
the courtroom. Henry v. Williams, 299 F. Supp. 36, 41 (N.D. Miss. 1969).
53. See 379 U.S. at 454 n.2 (Black, J., dissenting).
54. But see id. at 454 & n.2 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black opposed remand
of the case to the state court for a determination of the waiver issue and asserted his
belief that the state's affidavit, which was filed for the first time at the Supreme Court
level, afforded no basis for even a "suspicion" of waiver. Id. at 454 n.2.
55. See id. at 451. Defendant called as a witness a mechanic who had repaired
the broken cigarette lighter in Henry's car. The Court suggested that defense counsel
may have counted on the mechanic's testimony to contradict that of the complainant
and the police officer with respect to the condition of the lighter, thereby undermining
the necessary corroboration, see text accompanying note 43 supra, and convincing the
jury to acquit. See 379 U.S. at 451.
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purposes of securing reversal on appeal. Justice Brennan concluded
that "[i]f either reason motivated the action of petitioner's counsel,
and their plans backfired, counsel's deliberate choice of the strategy
would amount to a waiver binding on petitioner and would preclude
him from a decision on the merits of his federal claim either in the
state courts or here.
5 6
This entire conjectural discussion of what evidence might be
sufficient to justify a finding of deliberate bypass by the attorney,
although occurring in a case on direct appeal, nevertheless marks a
clear retreat from Noia's requirement of personal participation by the
defendant.Y Moreover, the significance of the retreat is enhanced by
the fact that defense counsel was aware of the search in advance of
trial l and thus could have discussed the crucial decision concerning
assertion of the fourth amendment claim with Henry prior to trial."
That the assertion was required to be made pursuant to a contempor-
aneous objection rule merely obfuscates the nature of the decision-
making process involved. 0
Furthermore, Henry may also have provided another part of the
analytical framework for later decisions eviscerating Noia because it
appears to sanction searches of the trial court record for any evidence
that might conceivably suggest a tactical or strategic maneuver by
counsel warranting a bypass determination. The fair import of
Justice Brennan's discussion was merely that the record be in-
spected to ascertain whether any possible basis for a strategic deci-
sion was present; the finding of such a basis would then trigger a
hearing to determine whether in the particular case counsel's action
was in fact strategically motivated. Later decisions, however,
dropped the second phase of the procedure for determining bypass,
making the initial determination as to the existence of any theoretical
strategic or tactical basis dispositive.1'
56. 379 U.S. at 451.
57. In the subsequent federal habeas proceeding, the state stipulated that Henry
himself had not waived his fourth amendment rights. Henry v. Williams, 299 F. Supp.
36, 48 (N.D. Miss. 1969). The evidence proffered at the hearing indicated that Henry
did not participate in defense strategy. Id. at 41.
58. Henry was originally tried before and convicted by a justice of the peace, at
which time the police officer did not testify concerning the car search. On the evening
before the trial de novo in a higher court, however, defendant's attorneys discussed the
search with Henry's wife. Id.
59. Even if the matter had been discussed with Henry, a finding of deliberate
bypass might still have been inappropriate in this case because counsel clearly in.
tended to make a fourth amendment objection and their failure to do so at the proper
time was apparently based on a misconception with respect to state law. See note 51
supra.
60. See generally text accompanying notes 283-304 infra.
61. See Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 540.41 (1976); Davis v. United
States, 411 U.S. 233, 241 (1973).
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C. INTERMEDIATE BACKING AND FILLING
Taken together, Noia and Henry may be construed in a variety
of ways. If one considers the apparent breadth of the Noia decision
and the Court's general expansion of the due process rights of defen-
dants in criminal cases during the Warren era, Henry can be viewed
as having no effect on the deliberate bypass test for purposes of ha-
beas since it was a direct appeal. Alternatively, it can be seen as
engrafting only a minor contemporaneous objection exception on
Noia's general requirement that the client personally participate in
the default,62 or as an example of overreaching by a liberal Court
intent on doing justice in a particular case by attempting to restrict
the adequate state ground rule as a barrier to direct review by the
Supreme Court. 3 On the other hand, if Henry is read broadly, it
arguably limits Noia's requirement of personal participation by the
defendant to posttrial defaults. If that is the appropriate reading,
any deliberate tactical decision to bypass a state procedure for the
vindication of a constitutional right made by counsel during trial may
be binding on the defendant."
The 1969 decision in Kaufman v. United States" can be inter-
preted to support either position. Kaufman expanded federal habeas
by holding that federal prisoners seeking relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 were entitled to collateral review of fourth amendment
claims." In addition, a bypass issue was presented. Defendant had
62. Such an exception would be minor if it were applicable only to true contem-
poraneous objections-those that must be made by counsel on the spur of the moment
during trial, with no opportunity to discuss them beforehand with the accused. See
generally notes 283-304 infra and accompanying text.
63. It is fair to say that, in view of subsequently decided cases, Henry has not
effected any dilution of the adequate state ground rule as a barrier to direct review.
See HART & WEcHSLER, supra note 47, at 558 ("Decisions in the years following have
done little to clarify Henry or reinforce its authority. Most appear to have ignored it,
even when it would have been relevant.").
As a result of the present Court's more restrictive interpretations of due process,
the adequate state ground rule is currently being viewed with considerably greater
enthusiasm by Justices Brennan and Marshall, who have stated that the majority may
be overreaching by deciding cases that rest on state as well as federal grounds, see
Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 726-29 (1975) (Marshall, J., dissenting), and who have
pointed out that state courts are empowered to impose more exacting standards of due
process under state law and that, if they do so, the adequate state ground rule will bar
Supreme Court review, see Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 120-21 (1975) (Brennan,
J., dissenting). See generally Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Indi-
vidual Rights, 90 H~Av. L. REv. 489 (1977).
64. Such an interpretation of Noia and Henry is given in the concurring opinion
of Chief Justice Burger in Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S, 145, 157 (1977).
65. 394 U.S. 217 (1969).
66. Id. at 231. There is considerable doubt as to the continuing vitality of the
holding in Kaufman after the Court's decision in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 481
n.16 (1976).
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asserted a search and seizure objection at trial and it was overruled.
Newly appointed counsel did not brief or argue this claim on appeal.
After oral argument, petitioner requested in a letter to his attorney
that the fourth amendment issue be included as a ground for reversal.
The attorney merely forwarded this letter to the court of appeals.,
The Supreme Court found that the failure to argue the fourth amend-
ment claim did not constitute a deliberate bypass,'8 but its rationale
for doing so is unclear. First of all, the default may have been inad-
vertent.68 If such was the case, then Kaufman may stand for no more
than the proposition that an attorney's acts must be deliberate to
constitute a bypass. 0 It is more likely, however, that the default was
In Powell, the Court held that where a state has provided an opportunity for full
and fair litigation of fourth amendment claims, federal habeas will thereafter be una-
vailable for litigation of such claims. Kaufman permitted federal prisoners to raise
search and seizure issues in proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970), see 394 U.S.
at 231, even though the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide a full and fair
opportunity to assert such contentions at or before trial, see Fan. R. Cus. P. 12, 41(f).
Since section 2255 is the functional equivalent of section 2254, see Sanders v. United
States, 373 U.S. 1, 15 (1963), and since the Court has, at least in the context of
challenges to grand jury composition, indicated that where habeas is unavailable for
federal prisoners it will be unavailable for state prisoners as well, compare Davis v.
United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973), with Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976), it
seems likely that the rule of Stone v. Powell will subsequently be applied to federal
prisoners notwithstanding the Court's explicit reservation of that issue, see 428 U.S.
at 481 n.16, and notwithstanding the absence of federalism concerns with respect to
federal prisoners.
67. See 394 U.S. at 220 n.3.
68. Id.
69. This inference is possible because the fourth amendment issue had been
raised at trial, new counsel had been appointed for the appeal, and the latter had failed
to include this constitutional claim in his brief. Id.
70. It is also possible that the Supreme Court found no deliberate bypass on the
theory that transmitting the prisoner's letter to the court was sufficient to preserve the
issue for appellate purposes, even though the appellate court's opinion affirming the
judgment of conviction did not appear to pass on the fourth amendment claim. See
id.; Kaufman v. United States, 350 F.2d 408 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 951
(1966).
In Smith v. Yeager, 393 U.S. 122 (1968) (per curiam), the petitioner had been
convicted of murder in state court. In 1961, he sought federal habeas relief. In the
course of oral argument before the district court, the petitioner's attorney suggested
that, although the judge was empowered to conduct an evidentiary hearing, it was
unnecessary to do so because the constitutional error involved was "overwhelming."
Id. at 123. The district court did not hold such a hearing and, relying on the state court
record, denied relief. See United States ex rel. Smith v. New Jersey, 201 F. Supp. 272
(D.N.J. 1962), af'd, 322 F.2d 810 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 928 (1964). In
1965, after the decision in Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963), mandating eviden-
tiary hearings in instances where they had previously been discretionary, petitioner
filed a new federal habeas action and requested a hearing, which was denied by the
trial court. See 393 U.S. at 124. In reversing, the Supreme Court held that counsel in
the 1961 action had not waived the right to a hearing, noting that it was doubtful
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
tactically motivated,7 perhaps based on a belief that the issue was
frivolous and that its inclusion would obscure more meritorious
claims. If the latter is the case, Kaufman may stand for the proposi-
tion that a bypass will not be found absent personal participation by
the defendant."2 On the other hand, the default took place during an
appeal, and Kaufman's personal participation requirement is, like
Noia's, arguably limited to that context.13
If one is in an expansive mood, Humphrey v. Cady" can be
interpreted as requiring participation by the defendant in waivers at
the trial level. The defendant had been convicted of a misdemeanor
and upon a finding of need for treatment was committed to a facility
for sex deviates for the one-year period authorized in the case of
misdemeanors: At the end of that time, the state custodial agency
petitioned for an order renewing the commitment for five years. At
the resulting proceeding, after defendant's appointed counsel an-
nounced her intention to make "a broad constitutional challenge to
the Sex Crimes Act,"75 the trial judge adjourned the matter to give
whether petitioner possessed such a right at the time and that "[wjhatever counsel's
reasons for this obscure gesture of noblesse oblige, we cannot now examine the state
of his mind or presume that he intentionally relinquished a known right or privilege."
Id. at 126 (citation and footnote omitted).
71. If the original omission had been inadvertent, the attorney would presumably
have filed a supplemental brief after Kaufman called the matter to his attention rather
than merely forwarding his client's letter to the appellate court.
72. Alternatively, the Court may simply have concluded that there was no stra-
tegic basis for the failure of appellate counsel to assert the fourth amendment claim.
It is also possible that counsel's failure to brief the search and seizure issue notwith-
standing his client's request was viewed as an attempt by the defense attorney to waive
a claim despite the client's contrary wishes. Cf. Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 (1966)
(direct appeal from a state habeas corpus proceeding; Court held that counsel was
not empowered to enter what was in effect a plea of guilty and carry out a waiver of
the right to a trial with confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, when such
a course of action was inconsistent with the client's express desire not to plead
guilty). The Court in Brookhart specifically rejected the contention that Henry v.
Mississippi permitted such action on the part of counsel. See id. at 7-8.
73. The default in Noia is distinguishable, however, since it involved a complete
failure to appeal rather than a failure to assert a particular claim on appeal. Thus,
Kaufman suggests that, even where the attorney's technical expertise and professional
judgment may be involved, the client's participation in the decisionmaking process is
still required.
In Kaufman, the Court also cited both Noia and Henry for the proposition that
the deliberate bypass doctrine was applicable at the pretrial, trial, and appellate
levels, without stating whether all of the bypass requirements articulated in Noia were
applicable at each level. See 394 U.S. at 227 n.8; cf. Anderson v. Nelson, 390 U.S. 523,
525 (1968) (per curiam) (state supreme court's refusal to entertain a petition for appel-
late relief because of late filing did not constitute a deliberate bypass precluding the
federal habeas action).
74. 405 U.S. 504 (1972).
75. Id. at 515. The underlying constitutional challenges were based on denials
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all parties time to brief these claims. When defendant's attorney
failed to submit such a brief or to take any other action on her client's
behalf, the trial court committed defendant on the basis of the bare
allegations-of the agency's petition, and no appeal was taken there-
from. 7 In the subsequent federal habeas hearing," relief was
denied on the ground that counsel's failure to file the state court brief
constituted a deliberate bypass.78
The Supreme Court remanded the case for a deliberate bypass
hearing9 after reiterating that "such a waiver must be the product
of an understanding and knowing decision by the petitioner himself,
who is not necessarily bound by the decision or default of his coun-
sel." The Court directed the hearing to determine "(1) the reason
for counsel's failure to file a brief or to take further action in the state
courts, and (2) the extent of petitioner's knowledge and participation
in that decision." 8' Arguably the purpose of the first of these inquiries
would be to determine whether there was a strategic basis for coun-
sel's inaction. It is difficult to imagine any conceivable advantage
that might accrue from such a default, however, and it is therefore
likely that this inquiry was necessitated by defendant's claim of inef-
fective assistance of counsel at the recommitment hearing. If inef-
fective assistance was proved, defendant's personal participation in
the decision to default could still not be considered a knowing waiver
of his rights.s
The Court's omission of any reference to Henry v. Mississippi
may be construed as a tacit disavowal of its imputation to defendant
of waivers by trial counsel."' Alternatively, the absence of such a
of trial by jury, due process, and equal protection, and on a double jeopardy claim.
See id. at 508-12.
76. Id. at 515.
77. Prior to the federal habeas action, the state's highest court had summarily
dismissed the prisoner's pro se petition. Id.
78. Id. at 506. In addition to its deliberate bypass finding, the federal district
court denied relief on the ground that petitioner's constitutional claims lacked merit.
Id. The Supreme Court found, however, that the prisoner's claims were substantial and
warranted an evidentiary hearing. See id. at 508-14.
79. The Court stated that the present record was insufficient to support a bypass
finding, but that the state should be afforded an opportunity to develop the relevant
facts. The Supreme Court thus remanded for an evidentiary hearing with respect to
both the merits and the bypass contention. Id. at 516.
80. Id. at 517.
81. Id. The Court made it clear that there must be "persuasive evidence of a
knowing and intelligent waiver on the part of petitioner himself." Id.
82. See id. at 512.
83. The Court noted that the ineffective assistance claim was "tied inextricably
to the question of possible waiver" at the commitment hearing. See id. at 512-13.
84. Depending upon one's perspective, the default in Humphrey can be con-
sidered to have occurred in the pretrial, trial, or posttrial stage of the proceedings.
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citation may be attributable to the Court's belief that the default
under consideration was either the equivalent of a guilty plea, rather
than a contemporaneous objection default of the sort involved in
Henry,s5 or was more akin to a posttrial appellate default than a
waiver in the heat of battle. Whichever of these interpretations is
more appropriate, Humphrey v. Cady may be viewed as the high-
water mark of Noia's deliberate bypass test since the Court emphati-
cally reinjected the element of personal participation and required
that evidence be taken with respect to both the possible strategic
basis for the alleged bypass and the competency of counsel.
D. THE DECLINE OF Noia AND DELIBERATE BYPASS
Murch v. Mottram,8 a 1972 per curiam decision of the Supreme
Court, appears silently to abandon the requirement that a deliberate
bypass have a strategic or tactical basis before it will preclude habeas
review. It also suggests that reliance on erroneous advice provided by
counsel of "unquestioned competence" with respect to state rules of
procedure can be used as a basis for forfeiture of federal habeas relief.
Finally, the decision makes it clear that where a defendant, even
though relying on counsel's incorrect advice, personally participates
in a default, the subjective intention of the accused not to circumvent
state remedies will not necessarily preclude a finding of deliberate
bypass.
Mottram had been convicted as a habitual offender and was
paroled after serving three years in prison, but two years thereafter,
his parole was revoked. In a collateral state proceeding, his attorney
Chief Justice Burger views the case as involving "post-trial omissions of a technical
nature." Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 158 (1977) (concurring opinion). It ap-
pears, however, that the postsentence commitment hearing, which required a finding
that defendant's discharge would be dangerous to the public because of mental or
physical disorders, is most properly viewed as a trial-type proceeding. Counsel's failure
to submit a brief to the trial judge with respect to the constitutional challenges may
be considered as either a pretrial or trial default, and her subsequent failure to take
any further action in the case would also appear to constitute a trial-type default. Her
failure thereafter to appeal the commitment order would amount to a posttrial default.
85. The suggestion that the default was the functional equivalent of a guilty plea
is buttressed by the Court's reference to a subsequent decision by the state's highest
court specifying that the prosecution had the burden of proof in such recommitment
proceedings. In the instant case, the prisoner had been recommitted notwithstanding
the state's failure to present any evidence supporting such action. 405 U.S. at 515 n.14.
Thus, leaving aside the prisoner's constitutional claims, had counsel simply appealed
on the above mentioned ground, the state appellate court may have reversed the
commitment determination. Cf. Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 (1966) (counsel prohib-
ited from waiving defendant's right to confront and cross-examine witnesses where
defendant expressly stated his desire to plead not guilty).
86. 409 U.S. 41 (1972) (per curiam). The Mottram decision was rendered eight
months after Humphrey v. Cady.
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attempted to withdraw the original petition, which attacked an un-
derlying conviction, and to substitute a petition challenging only the
parole revocation procedures." The state court judge and defense
counsel disagreed as to whether state law required defendant to con-
solidate all his claims in the instant action, the trial judge being of
the opinion that this was a statutory postconviction proceeding re-
quiring joinder, whereas -defense counsel contended that the petition
was one for common law habeas corpus not governed by statutory
joinder requirements." The trial judge specifically advised counsel
that failure to press all constitutional claims would, in his opinion,
amount to a waiver. After an off-the-record conference with the de-
fendant, counsel announced that he would proceed solely on the pa-
role revocation issue and attempted to reserve his rights "'as to
whether or not this is a post-conviction hearing.' "&q
The trial judge's adverse ruling on the parole revocation chal-
lenge was affirmed by the state's highest court." Defendant then filed
another petition seeking postconviction relief on the basis of his con-
stitutional challenges to the underlying conviction. That action cul-
minated in a determination by the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
that the failure to present such claims in the earlier proceeding con-
stituted a waiver under state law."
In the ensuing federal habeas action, the district court found a
deliberate bypass of the Maine postconviction procedures, determin-
ing that the defendant was a "cunning 'jailhouse lawyer'" whose
attorney was "of unquestioned competence and integrity" and that
it was "inconceivable that his counsel did not fully explain to peti-
tioner the possible consequences of his action." 2 The First Circuit
87. See id. at 42.
88. See id. at 42-43.
89. Id. at 43.
90. Mottram v. State, 232 A.2d 809 (Me. 1967).
91. Mottram v. State, 263 A.2d 715 (Me. 1970). Maine's highest court also held
that Mottram's failure to include his constitutional objections to the underlying con-
viction on the direct appeal therefrom constituted a waiver of the right to present those
issues collaterally. See id. at 725.
92. Mottram v. Murch, 330 F. Supp. 51, 57 (D. Me. 1971), reu'd, 458 F.2d 626
(1st Cir.), rev'd per cdriam, 409 U.S. 41 (1972). The district court conducted a four-
day evidentiary hearing on the deliberate bypass issue. Id. at 55. The attorney who
had represented Mottram at the state postconviction proceeding in question was by
that time deceased. Id. at 57. At the federal hearing, defendant testified that he did
not understand the state judge's warnings with respect to waiver and that during the
off-the-record conference in the foregoing state action his attorney had not fully ex-
plained the consequences of a failure to join all of the prisoner's claims. Id.
The federal trial judge's description of defendant as a person who "deserves his
reputation as a cunning 'jailhouse lawyer,' " id., was apparently based on Mottram's
litigiousness. One of the numerous state court opinions affirming the denial of relief
to the prisoner noted "the exceptional profluence of requests for review which has
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reversed, stating that counsel's advice was not unreasonable and
holding that, absent evidence that the defendant "was not acting in
good faith reliance on counsel's opinion," a finding of deliberate by-
pass was unwarranted."
The Supreme Court in turn reversed the First Circuit. It ruled
that defendant's subjective intent not to abandon his constitutional
claims was insufficient to preclude a bypass finding. The majority
reasoned that in view of the state judge's warning to defendant the
latter could not persist in his own interpretation of state law.' The
followed Petitioner's conviction." Mottram v. State, 263 A.2d 715, 717 (Me. 1970).
Defendant chose to represent himself in one proceeding, and in another "[tjhree
competent counsel were appointed in succession to represent Petitioner." Id. at 718.
The grounds for relief asserted by Mottram appear to have been multitudinous in
almost every proceeding he initiated. See, e.g., Mottram v. Murch, 330 F. Supp. 51,
54-55 (D. Me. 1971), rev'd, 458 F.2d 626 (1st Cir.), rev'd per curiam, 409 U.S. 41 (1972).
While all of the foregoing may be true and indeed may ultimately have been the
basis for denial of relief by the federal district court and the Supreme Court, it should
be noted that Mottram's activities may have been precipitated in part by the fact that
his original conviction in 1958 was subsequently vacated in a state collateral action
because of prosecutorial misconduct: the state had allowed false testimony to remain
uncorrected and had misled defense counsel into believing that recordings that would
have disclosed the falsity of the testimony were inaudible. See id. at 53. Moreover, the
state court collateral remedies were extremely complex, and one of Mottram's earlier
actions had been dismissed on the ground that coram nobis was not the appropriate
remedy. Mottram v. State, 160 Me. 145, 200 A.2d 210 (1964). Finally, although Mot-
tram was a seemingly knowledgeable jailhouse lawyer, he displayed a failing common
to members of that bar; namely, his understanding of legal proceedings was of the
shallowest nature, as demonstrated by his address to the state court judge concerning
joinder during the postconviction hearing in question. His so-called explanation, see
note 95 infra, can fairly be described as gibberish.
93. Mottram v. Murch, 458 F.2d 626 (1st Cir.), rev'd per curiam, 409 U.S. 41
(1972). In its analysis of Maine's complex and ambiguous postconviction laws, the First
Circuit's opinion makes clear why Mottram's attorney could reasonably have erred
in his interpretation of state law. See id.'at 629. Indeed, the state trial judge who had
warned defendant and his attorney of the perils of nonjoinder "entertained grave
doubts" as to whether the collateral procedure provided by state law could be utilized
to test the validity of parole revocations. Mottram v. State, 232 A.2d 809, 818 (Me.
1967). On the other hand, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine had "no such concern"
and proceeded to hold, apparently for the first time, that the postconviction proceeding
in question was the appropriate remedy. See id.
There was confusion with respect to Maine's postconviction proceedings notwith-
standing the state legislature's recent attempt to provide a single, exclusive remedy
for all collateral attacks on judgments of conviction. See Mottram v. State, 263 A.2d
715, 719 (Me. 1970). To the extent that the states retain a wide variety of sometimes
complex and confusing postconviction procedures and continue to impose defaults for
failure to utilize the "proper" remedy, there is a greater possibility that state prisoners
will attempt to use federal habeas as a means of securing a determination on the merits
of their federal constitutional claims. See Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336, 338-39 (1965)
(Clark, J., concurring); id. at 345-47 (Brennan, J., concurring).
94. Mottram v. Murch, 409 U.S. 41, 46 (1972) (per curiam). Justice Brennan,
joined by Justices Douglas and Marshall, dissented, stating only, "I dissent and would
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difficulty with this analysis is that it ignores the role of Mottram's
attorney in the decision not to consolidate all of defendant's claims.
Although defendant himself addressed the state trial judge in an
attempt to explain why certain of the claims were being withdrawn"
and although there was an off-the-record discussion between Mot-
tram and his attorney prior to the decision to proceed solely on the
parole revocation claim, it seems likely that defendant was relying on
counsel's assessment of the law and that his attorney's mistake of law
resulted in the default."
Noia, however, provides that a deliberate bypass can only be
made "after consultation with competent counsel" and, generally
speaking, requires that such waivers be prompted by strategic or
tactical considerations." Neither the Supreme Court's opinion nor
any of the lower court opinions, state or federal, suggests a possible
strategic or tactical basis for Mottram's decision not to consolidate
all claims.98 At the time the procedural default was committed, the
affirm because in my view the Court of Appeals reached the correct result on the facts
presented." Id. at 47.
95. Although the Supreme Court did not discuss Mottram's address to the state
tribunal, his statement was quoted in the federal district judge's opinion. As suggested
previously, defendant's explanation was virtually incomprehensible; but since the
state judge responded thereto, this may well be a case requiring one to be there in order
to appreciate it. Mottrain stated the following in response to the judge's ruling that
this was a statutory postconviction hearing requiring joinder:
"Well, I didn't understand that and there is a reason for my'withdrawing the
other argument. I had two petitions and one is I recently have recovered
some files that show the appeal carried to the Supreme Court in 1963 was
based on an impartial record and I want to go back before the Court on. That
was a Writ of Error Coram Nobis that I last appeared before the Court on,
and it wasn't my understanding this was a post conviction act. This type of
Writ of Habeas Corpus-I thought this was for the plain Writ of Habeas
Corpus."
Mottram v. Murch, 330 F. Supp. 51, 56 (D. Me. 1971), reu'd, 458 F.2d 626 (1st Cir.).
rev'd per curiam, 409 U.S. 41 (1972).
96. See Mottram v. Murch, 458 F.2d 626, 629 (lst Cir.), rev'd per curiam, 409
U.S. 41 (1972).
97. See notes 27-29 supra and accompanying text.
98. It is conceivable that devotees of the Maine postconviction procedures would
be aware of some possible strategic or tactical benefit in a case of this sort. An interlo-
per in this esoteric area of Maine law could hazard these guesses: (1) by litigating the
issues piecemeal there may be a possibility that each argument will be given more
careful consideration; (2) the prisoner may hope that a more lenient judge will hear
the subsequent claim; or (3) petitioner may believe that each writ will require his or
her attendance in court, thus providing a respite from the possible rigors and monotony
of state prison. Query whether the latter is either a tactical or strategic consideration.
Like the federal government, the states have the power to prevent piecemeal
litigation of constitutional claims. In Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963), the
Court ruled, inter alia, that a federal prisoner who abuses the writ by deliberately
withholding a ground for federal collateral relief may be deemed to have waived the
right to a hearing on the subsequent application. The test established for determina-
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state statute concerning the scope of postconviction proceedings was
ambiguous on its face, and there had been no definitive appellate
court interpretation thereof." Given the complexity and uncertainty
of state law, the trial court's dire warning, and the absence of any
known strategic benefit that could accrue to defendant by refusing to
join his claims, serious question is raised as to whether Mottram's
attorney was acting responsibly in insisting on a separation of claims.
Thus, the Supreme Court's apparent acceptance of the federal dis-
trict court's conclusion as to the "unquestioned competence" of coun-
sel is somewhat puzzling. Moreover, putting the question of counsel's
competence aside, the absence of any finding of a strategic basis for
the default would, under Noia, appear to preclude a bypass finding.
Furthermore, if counsel's action in this case was the result of an
honest mistake rather than incompetence, then the net effect of the
Mottram decision is to construe an attorney's reasonable, good faith
determination to obtain a definitive ruling on the interpretation of an
ambiguous state law by the state's highest court as an intent to
bypass state remedies. Finding a waiver on the basis of a trial judge's
admonition effectively makes trial judges the final arbiters of state
law unless counsel is willing to risk forfeiture of his or her client's
right to assert constitutional claims. What counsel did was not to
"bypass orderly state procedures,'" but to seek a definitive ruling
by higher authority. To consider such action a deliberate circumven-
tion of state remedies with an attendant forfeiture of the federal
habeas forum distorts the comity doctrine beyond recognition and is
wholly at odds with the Court's repeated admonition that criminal
trials are not sporting contests.''
One year after Mottram, the Court decided two cases dealing
with pretrial waivers-Tollett v. Henderson'" and Davis v. United
States'0"-that eroded Noia's bypass standard even further. Tollett,
a federal habeas action, held that a plea of guilty precluded an in-
quiry into the merits of petitioner's claim of discrimination in selec-
tion with respect to deliberate withholding appears to be the Noia bypass standard.
See id. at 18. Although the Court in Mottram cited the Sanders opinion for the proposi-
tion that the states also have the right to establish orderly procedures for the assertion
of constitutional claims, this invocation of Sanders is not dispositive of the deliberate
bypass issue since a finding of bypass must, at the least, be based on a determination
that the default in question was strategic or tactical.
99. See Mottram v. Murch, 458 F.2d 626, 629 (1st Cir.), rev'd per curiam, 409
U.S. 41 (1972).
100. Murch v. Mottram, 409 U.S. 41, 47 (1972) (per curiam).
101. See, e.g., Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 416-17 (1977) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 106 (1970) (Burger, C.J., concurring);
Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 485 n.8 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
102. 411 U.S. 258 (1973).
103. 411 U.S. 233 (1973).
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tion of the state grand jury that had indicted him, even though nei-
ther defendant nor his attorney was aware of the facts underlying the
constitutional claim at the time the plea was entered. The Tollett
majority viewed this ruling as a mere extension of its holdings in the
Brady trilogy of 19704 that guilty pleas barred the assertion of known
antecedent constitutional claims, such as those involving coerced
confessions.
In McMann v. Richardson,'°5 one of the cases comprising the
Brady trilogy, tle Court appeared to view the guilty plea as a
"waiver" of both the right to trial and the right to challenge allegedly
unconstitutional evidence that might have been introduced by the
state against the defendant at trial; thus, the Court required that the
plea "be an intelligent act 'done with sufficient awareness of the
relevant circumstances and likely consequences.' "I"c At the same
time, however, the Court considered the defendant's plea of guilty to
be a deliberate bypass of state procedures for determining the valid-
ity of antecedent constitutional claims. The Court suggested that a
defendant who believed that his or her confession was coerced and
that the state's case without the confession would result in acquittal
would normally go to trial and contest the issue of voluntariness. If
the defendant pleaded guilty, however, the majority reasoned that
104. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); McMann v. Richardson. 397
U.S. 759 (1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970).
Brady concerned a 1959 guilty plea to a kidnapping charge under a statute that
the Supreme Court held unconstitutional nine years later on the ground that it need-
lessly discouraged assertion of fifth and sixth amendment rights by permitting only
the jury to impose a death penalty. The Brady Court held that the plea of guilty was
voluntarily and intelligently made, even though defendant may have been motivated
in part by a desire to escape the death penalty.
McMann was a case in which defendants alleged that their pleas of guilty were
involuntary because induced by coerced confessions. The Court held that a plea of
guilty based on reasonably competent advice of counsel concerning admissibility of a
confession would not be rendered involuntary although, at the time the plea was
entered, the state had no constitutionally valid procedure for determining the volun-
tariness of confessions.
In Parker, the defefidant, who pleaded guilty to burglary, alleged that the plea was
involuntary (1) because state law, like the federal statute involved in Brady, permitted
only the jury to assess a death penalty; (2) because the plea was the product of a
coerced confession; and (3) because the selection procedure with respect to the grand
jury that indicted him was unconstitutional. The Court held that an otherwise valid
guilty plea was not involuntary because defendant wished to limit the maximum
penalty, that defendant was not entitled to attack the plea on the ground that counsel
misjudged the admissibility of his confession, and that, since the state court had
refused to consider the grand jury claim on waiver grounds, the adequate state ground
rule precluded Supreme Court review in the case of a direct appeal from a judgment
rendered in a collateral state proceeding.
105. 397 U.S. 759 (1970), discussed at note 104 supra.
106. Id. at 766 (quoting in part Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970)).
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the plea could not have been motivated by the confession since defen-
dant regarded it as inadmissible and not properly a part of the state's
evidence. Therefore, a guilty plea in such circumstances was consid-
ered to be
nothing less than a refusal to present his federal claims to the state
court in the first instance-a choice by the defendant to take the
benefits, if any, of a plea of guilty and then to pursue his coerced-
confession claim in collateral proceedings . . . . [W]hether his
plain bypass of state remedies was an intelligent act depends on
whether he was so incompetently advised by counsel concerning the
forum in which he should first present his federal claim that the
Constitution will afford him another chance to plead.'1
The Court went on to assert that the more likely explanation for the
plea was that the hypothetical defendant "mistakenly assessed" the
admissibility of the confession.' 8 Because some risk of miscalculation
is inherent in any decision to waive trial, however, the Court rejected
this as sufficient justification for voiding the guilty plea.' 9 Instead,
the plea was vulnerable only if defendant's attorney did not give
"reasonably competent advice," which was in turn defined as advice
"within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal
cases.""0
Thus, the Brady trilogy engrafted upon Noia an almost conclu-
sive presumption that all defendants pleading guilty are making stra-
tegic or tactical choices, rather than focusing on the particular defen-
dant in each case and ascertaining whether his or her plea was stra-
tegically motivated. The trilogy also appears to dilute Noia's require-
ment of competent counsel. Although acknowledging that defendants
are entitled to effective assistance of counsel, the Court in the Brady
trilogy ultimately left the determination of competency to the "good
sense and discretion of the trial courts" and required only that coun-
sel's advice be within the general "range of competence" of criminal
defense attorneys."'
The Brady trilogy, however, at least appeared to retain the re-
quirement that the claim relinquished as a result of the guilty plea
107. Id. at 768-69.
108. Id. at 769.
109. Id. at 770.
110. Id. at 770-71.
111. Id. at 771. In his dissenting opinion in McMann, Justice Brennan noted that
even the most competent defense counsel would be of no value because in both Parker
and Brady there was nothing that counsel could do to counteract the unconstitu-
tionality of the death penalty scheme and its possibly coercive effect in inducing guilty
pleas. Similarly, he observed that the advice of counsel in the McMann case could not
remedy the unconstitutionality of New York's procedure for determining the voluntari-
ness of confessions insofar as that procedure may have resulted in the improper induce-
ment of guilty pleas. See id. at 782-83.
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be known to the accused and to defense counsel."' The same cannot
be said with respect to the 1973 decision in Tollett v. Henderson.' 3
Although defendant's guilty plea in that case may have been a waiver
in the sense that it was a knowing and intelligent relinquishment of
the right to trial, the Court acknowledged that, under a Johnson v.
Zerbst definition, Henderson's grand jury claim could not possibly be
deemed waived since neither Henderson nor his attorney was aware
of the facts relating to the grand jury selection process."' It thus
would be impossible to conclude that the failure to challenge the
grand jury evidenced an intent to bypass state procedures for initial
determination of the merits of the claim. The Court nonetheless de-
cided, as in the Brady trilogy, that the guilty plea precluded a direct
determination on the merits of defendant's constitutional challenge.
The only relevance of the antecedent constitutional claim was its
bearing on whether the plea was knowing and voluntary, which in
turn depended on whether the advice of counsel was "'within the
range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.' ",i
The Court admitted that "[c]ounsel's failure to properly evalu-
ate facts giving rise to a constitutional claim, or his failure properly
to inform himself of facts that would have shown the existence of a
constitutional claim, might in particular fact situations" demon-
strate incompetence." 6 The Supreme Court intimated that, because
the lower federal court had relied on a state judge's conclusion that
" '[n]o lawyer in this State would have ever thought of objecting to
the fact that Negroes did not serve on the Grand Jury in Tennessee
in 1948,' "v it was improbable that Henderson could sustain the
112. Justice Brennan took the position that the guilty pleas in the McMann case
did not constitute the relinquishment of a "known" right since they were entered at a
time when the state's procedure for testing the voluntariness of confessions was consti-
tutionally inadequate but had not yet been so declared by the Supreme Court. Thus,
there was "no sense in which respondents deliberately by-passed or 'waived' state
procedures constitutionally adequate to adjudicate their coerced-confession claims."
Id. at 78t5 (dissenting opinion). A basic difficulty with the majority's decision in Mc-
Mann is that the Court's decision in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), which
invalidated the existing New York procedure and instead required a separate pretrial
hearing on the voluntariness of confessions, was held to be retroactive; thus, had the
petitioners in McMann, who were prosecuted prior to the Jackson v. Denno decision,
proceeded to trial rather than pleading guilty, their judgments of conviction would
have been invalid. See McMann v. Richarcason, 397 U.S. 759, 783-85 (1970) (Brennan.
J., dissenting).-Compare Smith v. Yeager, 393 U.S. 122 (1968) (per curiam), discussed
at note 70 supra.
113. 411 U.S. 258 (1973).
114. Id. at 266.
115. Id. (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)).
116. Id. at 266-67.
117. Id. at 269 (quoting State ex reL Henderson v. Russell, 459 S.W.2d 176, 179
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1970) (Galbreath, J., concurring)). In his dissenting opinion, Jus-
tice Marshall asserted that, even if attorneys in Tennessee in 1948 did not generally
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burden of proving that his attorney's advice was not within the re-
quired range of competence. The Court also suggested that a
"principal value" of an attorney in criminal cases lies in the prag-
matic ability to effectuate a good plea bargain rather than to advise
the accused of all possible defenses and the underlying factual sup-
port therefor."'
In the foregoing manner, without mentioning either Noia or de-
liberate bypass, the Court either significantly modified Noia's bypass
requirements or eliminated them altogether in the plea context. Al-
though the Court in the Brady trilogy viewed pleas as both waivers
and deliberate bypasses of state remedies, the inference of a deliber-
ate bypass was perhaps not completely unjustified since the defen-
dants were at least aware of the antecedent constitutional claim.
Thus, the decision to plead guilty could be viewed as evidencing an
intention not to utilize the state procedure for vindication of that
claim on the merits."9 In Tollett v. Henderson, because of the lack
make such objections to grand jury composition,
[dietermination of whether counsel is competent should not turn on the
fact that many attorneys in a particular place at a given time would not
think of raising certain claims. The test must be whether the advice was
competent in light of the law of the time, and without regard to local pecu-
liarities.
Id. at 216-77 (citations and footnote omitted). Applying the above test, Justice Mar-
shall found that the state's practice of grand jury discrimination was so blatant that
it would have been extremely simple to ascertain the relevant facts and that even
"[aln attorney of minimal competence would have realized that, where no Negroes
had been summoned for service over many years and where racial designations were
used, the Tennessee Supreme Court would very probably have held the selection
system unconstitutional." Id. at 277.
118. Id. at 267-68. Justice Marshall in dissent took issue with the majority's
suggestion that, because there were so many constitutional objections that could be
raised, requiring counsel to discuss each one of them with the defendant would be
impractical. He contended that, in most cases, only one or two meritorious objections
could be raised, and these were "after all .. objections bottomed on constitutional
guarantees." Id. at 272.
Justice Marshall also reflected the deep philosophical division on the Court with
respect to the duties of criminal defense counsel. He stated,
In the end, the Court seems to adopt a concept of professional responsibility
that I cannot accept .... "[Fjaithful representation of the interest of his
client" . . . means, I believe, that an attorney must consult with the client
fully on matters of constitutional magnitude. Without such consultation, the
representation of criminal defendants becomes only another method of ma-
nipulating persons in situations where their control over their lives is pre-
cisely what is at stake.
Id. at 272-73 (quoting in part the majority opinion). Compare notes 289-304 infra and
accompanying text.
119. But see Tigar, The Supreme Court, 1969 Term-Foreword: Waiver of Con-
stitutional Rights: Disquiet in the Citadel, 84 Haav. L. Rsv. 1, 21-22 (1970):
[Tihe notion that a guilty plea cures prior procedural defects creates an
arbitrary distinction since the decision to plead guilty is not based solely on
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of knowledge, there is no basis for making that same assumption.
Although the guilty plea may have been a knowing and intelligent
relinquishment of the right to trial, it cannot support an inference
that defendant, by the same act, intended to circumvent state proce-
dures for vindication of a constitutional claim of which he was una-
ware and that related not to the right to trial, but to the antecedent
right to be indicted by a grand jury not infected by racial discrimina-
tion.
Thus, without explicitly saying so, the Tollett Court appeared to
create a distinction between the standards governing waiver and de-
liberate bypass. Since the Court did not even refer to bypass, there
is no way of knowing whether this concept exists at all in the guilty
plea context. If bypass is applicable to plea cases, it is impossible to
ascertain from Tollett what standards are to guide the inquiry. De-
fendant and his attorney were unaware of the facts underlying the
claim, thereby precluding any possibility of personal participation by
the defendant after consultation with competent counsel. Moreover,
since defendant could not use as a bargaining tool a claim of which
he had no knowledge,2 0 there was no conceivable strategic or tactical
benefit to be gained by pleading guilty in exchange for bypassing
state remedies.' 2 ' Therefore, unless the waiver rule announced in
Tollett is considered to be.applicable only in plea cases and is viewed
simply as part of a continuing effort to insulate guilty pleas from
attacks based on antecedent constitutional claims, the effect of
Tollett is to nullify Noia's deliberate bypass doctrine.
If Tollett is read as eliminating the bypass rule in plea cases,
the prospects for excluding evidence or challenging the indictment process.
The decision may turn upon such factors as the defendant's insistence upon
trial, the willingness of his attorney to press the matter to litigation, and the
entire network of irrational pressures which experience shows dominate the
decisions of a criminal defendant from the moment he enters the criminal
process.
120. In the Brady trilogy, a strategic benefit can be inferred from the guilty plea
since the state, knowing a coerced confession was inadmissible, would at least theoreti-
cally be willing to make a concession in plea or sentence to avoid litigation on the
admissibility of the confession. In Tollett, however, no quid pro quo on the part of the
state was possible, since the state claimed that a motion to quash the indictment would
have been futile, thus indicating its belief that it had nothing to lose and no reason to
bargain concerning the grand jury claim. See Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 277
n.10 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
121. As noted by Justice Marshall, had defendant's attorney challenged the
grand jury selection process, Henderson may very well have received a sentence less
than the 99 years that was in fact imposed. By requiring the state to defend its
blatantly unconstitutional practices, defendant might have embarrassed the prosecu.
tion into offering a lesser sentence, or, in any event, Henderson could have thereby
secured additional time to prepare his defense. See id. at 273 & n.3 (Marshall, J..
dissenting).
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Davis v. United States,'2 2 decided on the same day in 1973, can be
said to have accomplished the same result with respect to cases in
which collateral relief is sought by federal prisoners. In Davis the
Court found the bypass requirement inapplicable where a Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure provided that objections to grand jury
composition not asserted prior to trial were "waived" absent a show-
ing of "cause" for the default.' 23 The Court interpreted the rule to
mean that a constitutional claim was waived if not timely asserted,
regardless of whether there had been a conscious decision to relin-
quish the right. Accordingly, there was no need to determine whether
defendant personally participated in the default.'2 1 Indeed, counsel's
omission was imputed to the defendant even though this was clearly
not a situation in which a contemporaneous objection during trial was
required. Thus, whereas the personal participation requirement was
presumably dispensed with in Henry because of the ostensible need
for immediate action on the part of counsel, no such urgency was
122. 411 U.S. 233 (1973).
123. The Davis opinion distinguished Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217
(1969), discussed at notes 65-73 supra and accompanying text, on the ground that the
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure involved in the latter case-Rule 41(e)-did not
contain an express waiver provision as did Rule 12(b)(2).
Subsequent to the Davis decision, Rule 12 was amended to include a waiver
provision relating to motions to suppress evidence such as that involved in Kaufman.
See FED. R. CruM. P. 12(b)(3).
As pointed out in the dissenting opinion in Davis, however, Rule 41(e), the rule
dealing with motions to suppress illegally seized evidence in effect at the time
Kaufman was decided, was similar to Rule 12(b)(2) in requiring a timely motion and
providing for an excuse where cause was shown, except that it did not contain the
"magical" word "waiver." See 411 U.S. at 248 (Marshall, J., dissenting). For discus-
sion of an additional distinction between Kaufman and Davis, see note 37 supra.
In Davis, the majority also relied on Shotwell Mfg. Co. v. United States, 371 U.S.
341 (1963), in which defendants, four years after trial, moved in a section 2255 action
to set aside their indictments on the ground that the grand jury was improperly se-
lected. The motion was denied on the basis of Rule 12(b)(2). As the Davis Court noted.
however, at the time the motion was made in Shotwell, defendants' direct appeal was
still pending. Thus, the Shotwel case is distinguishable on that ground since resolution
of the appeal may have obviated the necessity of making the constitutional determina-
tion sought in the section 2255 action. Davis, on the other hand, had no remaining
remedy other than his section 2255 suit.
124. The majority noted that Davis "was represented throughout the trial by
competent, court-appointed counsel, whose advocacy prompted the Court of Appeals
to compliment him." 411 U.S. at 234 n.l. Taking into account this emphasis on
counsel's competence as well as the Court's suggestion that defendant's failure to
make the grand jury claim was not prejudicial in view of the indictments returned
against Davis' white codefendants, it remains unclear why a hearing could not have
been conducted at which Davis' trial attorney presumably would testify that he dis-
cussed the possibility of an attack on the grand jury with his client, and they decided
on the basis of tactical considerations not to assert it. See id. at 255 n.11 (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
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present with respect to the pretrial motion to challenge a grand jury
indictment. Adopting the lower court's position, Justice Rehnquist
found that the requisite showing of cause was not made since "'no
reason [was] suggested why petitioner or his attorney could not have
ascertained all of the facts necessary to present the objection to the
court prior to trial.' "12 A further or alternate requirement of "actual
prejudice" was introduced and found to be wanting.1'2
Although the Court did not employ a deliberate bypass theory,
because of the express "waiver" provision of the Federal Rule, and
accordingly did not feel obliged to determine whether the default in
Davis was attributable to a tactical maneuver, it did introduce the
issue of tactics as an abstract policy consideration. The majority
reasoned that failure to assert challenges to grand jury composition
in a timely manner so that errors could be cured before trial might
be motivated by "strong tactical considerations" with a view to
securing reversal on this basis in the event of conviction.' Thus,
regardless of the general validity of this policy consideration,' its
effect is to impose forfeitures without making any determination of
125. Id. at 243 (quoting district court opinion).
126. The Court in Davis did not make clear whether failure to make a pretrial
motion challenging the grand jury pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) could be excused by a
showing of either good cause or prejudice or whether proof of both elements was re-
quired. See id. at 243-45. At least a showing of prejudice alone arguably would have
been sufficient to demonstrate cause as required by Rule 12.
In overruling defendant's contention that prejudice need not be demonstrated
since racial discrimination in the grand jury selection process was inherently prejudi-
cial, the Davis Court distinguished Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972). where the Court
held that a white defendant had standing to challenge the composition of a grand jury
from which blacks had been excluded on the theory that prejudice could be presumed
in the case of racial discrimination. By requiring Davis to show actual prejudice, the
Court created a distinction between the proof needed to demonstrate the existence of
a constitutional right and the proof required to excuse a default in failing to assert such
a claim at the proper time. Applying this actual prejudice test, the Court accepted the
district judge's finding that the case had no racial overtones, that the same grand jury
had indicted two white codefendants, and that there was sufficient evidence to warrant
the indictment.
127. See 411 U.S. at 241. The United States argued that permitting such be.
lated challenges would make reprosecution extremely difficult. The dissent countered
that, if the grand jury indictment was sdt aside and a new trial ordered and if witnesses
who had testified in the original proceedings were no longer available, the entire case
could be presented by introduction of the transcript of the first trial. The dissent
contrasted a finding that evidence was illegally seized, noting that in the latter situa.
tion the prosecution might be required to restructure its entire case, whereas it would
not have to do so if a grand jury challenge was successful. Acknowledging that retrials
were costly, the dissenters noted that the logical extension of the Government's argu-
ment would be to preclude reversal even in the case of plain error where no objection
had been made. See id. at 250-52.
128. See text following note 345 infra.
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whether Davis or any other particular defendant was so motivated. 9
It soon became clear that under the Court's emerging view of
federalism the waiver doctrine and underlying policy analysis articu-
lated in Davis, although based on an interpretation of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure,'30 would inevitably spill over into the
law of federal habeas for state prisoners.
E. THE FALL OF Noia AND DELIBERATE BYPASS: Francis v.
Henderson AND Estelle v. Williams
Like the Davis case, Francis v. Henderson'3 ' involved a failure to
challenge as racially discriminatory a grand jury selection method.
This time, however, the case arose in the context of a state prosecu-
tion in a jurisdiction whose procedural rules provided that such de-
faults were deemed waivers.'32 In a remarkable demonstration of judi-
cial dispatch, Justice Stewart's five-page opinion accepted Loui-
siana's contention that defendant's failure to lodge a timely chal-
lenge as required by state law precluded federal habeas relief, with-
out mentioning either deliberate bypass or the underlying facts of
the case. In an Orwellian twist, the majority's single citation of Fay
v. Noia was in support of the proposition that "in some circum-
stances, considerations of comity and concerns for the orderly ad-
ministration of criminal justice require a federal court to forgo the
exercise of its habeas corpus power."'3 Quoting extensively from
129. See Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233, 249-51 (1973) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting).
130. The majority in Davis relied heavily on congressional intent, concluding
"that the necessary effect of the congressional adoption of Rule 12(b)(2) is to provide
that a claim once waived pursuant to that Rule may not later be resurrected, either in
the criminal proceedings or in federal habeas, in the absence of a showing of 'cause.'"
Id. at 242. The Court's reasoning concerning the effect to be given the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure appears to be circular. First, Justice Rehnquist asserted that
the Rules do not govern section 2255 habeas proceedings, and, as a result, the Court
in Kaufman had been able to interpret section 2255 so as to impose its own doctrine
of waiver-deliberate bypass. The majority proceeded to find that Congress, having
provided by its adoption of Rule 12 for waivers absent cause in federal criminal pro.
ceedings, could not have intended to permit circumvention thereof by permitting a
claim barred by Rule 12 to be raised in a section 2255 action. Thus, Rule 12 seems
to apply to habeas actions by federal prisoners even though the Federal Rules do not
apply.
In any event, regardless of the validity of this interpretation of congressional intent
with respect to Rule 12, if this interpretation formed the underpinning of the Davis
decision, it should have had no effect on section 2254 since state rules of criminal
procedure obviously cannot modify or limit federal statutes (absent Congress' incorpo-
ration of state law by reference).
131. 425 U.S. 536 (1976).
132. See id. at 537.
133. Id. at 539. In similar fashion, the Court cited Kaufman v. United States,
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Davis, which involved a federal prisoner, and Michel v. Louisiana,'3'
a 1955 case also inapposite because it was a direct appeal, the Court's
only original contribution was its bald assertion that both "cause"
and "actual prejudice" must be present in order to excuse a failure
to challenge the'grand jury composition.' s
The facts, as disclosed in Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion
and in the joint Appendix submitted to the Court, make it absolutely
clear that the majority could not have addressed the deliberate by-
pass test articulated in either Noia or Henry, since such a discus-
sion would have necessitated an analysis of the defendant's personal
participation, or imputation of counsel's default to defendant, or
strategic and tactical considerations underlying the default, or, per-
haps of most importance, the effectiveness of counsel. If the Court
had considered any one of these factors, it could not have found a
deliberate bypass in Francis' case.
On December 10, 1964, Abraham Francis, a black seventeen-
year-old youth, was indicted on a charge of felony murder based on
a grocery store robbery of a white couple in the course of which a
coconspirator was killed.' 3 Utilization of the felony murder theory
394 U.S. 217 (1969), discussed at notes 65-73 supra and accompanying text, for the
proposition that defaults by federal defendants should not result in the imposition of
greater forfeitures than defaults by state prisoners. See 425 U.S. at 542. This state-
ment in Kaufman was made in response to the Government's argument that, while
the Noia rule may have been appropriate in the case of state prisoners who have never
had an opportunity to litigate their federal claims in a federal forum, the underlying
considerations involved were inapplicable to federal prisoners. The Kaufman Court
rejected this contention and held that federal prisoners should have the same right as
state prisoners to assert constitutional claims collaterally. 394 U.S. at 225-26.
Thus, the Francis Court invoked Noia, which had tremendously expanded the
availability of federal habeas for state prisoners, as authority for the imposition of
almost absolute forfeitures in the name of comity; it also invoked Kaufman, which had
enlarged the scope of habeas for federal prisoners, as authority for curtailing the habeas
rights of state prisoners. Cf. G. ORWELL, The Principles of Newspeak, in 1984, at 303
app. (1949) (In describing the principles of Newspeak, Orwell noted that a favored
technique was to purge words of their undesirable meanings. "To give a single example.
The word free still existed in Newspeak, but it could only be used in such statements
as 'This dog is free from lice'.... It could not be used in its old sense of 'politically
free' or 'intellectually free'.... .
134. 350 U.S. 91 (1955).
135. In support of these dual requirements, the Court cited Davis v. United
States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973), discussed at notes 122-30 supra and accompanying text.
See Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 542 n.6 (1976). In Davis. however, it was
unclear whether a showing of prejudice was a separate requirement or simply one
means of satisfying the cause requirement of Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. See id. at 552 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
136. Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 554 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
At the time of the offense, defendant was sixteen years of age. Record. Louisiana ex
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where a robbery victim killed a perpetrator was so unusual that one
of the prosecuting attorneys could not recollect it ever having been
used in that county." 7 Francis' counsel, who was uncompensated, was
not appointed until February 9, 1965, two months after the indict-
ment.11 In addition, he was a civil lawyer who had not handled any
criminal matters for years and had not defended a capital case in
fifteen years. 139 Presumably because of his inexperience, several
months after his appointment he asked another attorney to assist him
in the trial of the case. "' The newly retained cocounsel had been
formally representing one of the codefendants and informally repre-
senting another, who was his relative.' These codefendants, who
rel. Francis v. Henderson, No. 187-385-G (Crim. Dist. Ct., Orleans Parish, La., Dec.
20, 1971), reprinted in Appendix at 22, 56, Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Francis Appendix (state habeas proceedings)]. One of the vic-
tims of the robbery was also shot, but not killed. Although the Appendix to Francis is
ambiguous in this regard, see Francis Appendix (state habeas proceedings), supra at
70-71, according to counsel representing Francis before the Supreme Court, Francis
himself did no shooting; instead, the deceased coperpetrator shot one of the robbery
victims, who in turn shot and killed the deceased. Telephone Interview with Bruce S.
Rogow, Attorney for Defendant Francis (July 22, 1977).
137. See 425 U.S. at 554 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Francis Appendix (state
habeas proceedings), supra note 136, at 71.
138. Francis v. Henderson, No. 72-719 (E.D. La., Sept. 20, 1973), vacated and
remanded sub nom. Newman v. Henderson, 496 F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1974), aIJ'd sub
nom. Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976), reprinted in Appendix at 87, Francis
v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Francis Appendix (federal
district court opinion)]; Application and Assignment of Counsel, State v. Francis, No.
187-385-G (Crim. Dist. Ct., Orleans Parish, La., June 29, 1965), reprinted in Appendix
at 12, Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976).
139. Francis Appendix (state habeas proceedings), supra note 136, at 23, 31.
Both the federal district court and Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion refer to the
failing health of defendant's attorney at the time of trial. See 425 U.S. at 554; Francis
Appendix (federal district court opinion), supra note 138, at 90 n.4. This appears to
be an error, however, perhaps stemming from the testimony of cocounsel at the state
habeas proceeding that Francis' chief attorney at the original trial was, by the time of
the collateral proceeding, very old and too sick to attend the habeas hearing. See
Francis Appendix (state habeas proceedings), supra note 136, at 27. The state habeas
action took place in 1971, six years after the trial. At the time the case was argued
before the Supreme Court, chief counsel was dead. See Brief for Petitioner at 8 n.l,
Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976).
140. Francis Appendix (state habeas proceedings), supra note 136, at 26-27, 38.
141. Id. at 27-28, 40, 62. Cocounsel felt that there was no conflict of interest. See
id. at 28. He testified, "We were sort of like co-counsel for everybody. That's the way
it was in those days." Id.
Both attorneys representing Francis at his trial in 1965 were black, id. at 47, a fact
seized on by the state in its brief to the Supreme Court a decade later. Louisiana
contended that black attorneys "would have felt no hesitation about urging the jury
discrimination issue had they felt it was warranted." Brief for Respondent at 7, Francis
v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976). In the same brief, the state conceded that, at the
time in question, "[flor sound reasons black attorneys were often appointed to repre-
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were 21 and 22 years of age, were permitted to plead to manslaughter
charges, and each received an eight-year sentence.' For reasons that
are unclear, Francis was not allowed to enter a similar plea, and
Louisiana sought imposition of the death penalty in his case."
On the day before trial of this capital case, Francis' chief counsel
filed his first motions, which did not include a challenge to the grand
jury. 41 Without a hearing, the court denied a motion to suppress
defendant's confession.' Defendant's trial lasted one day, with nei-
ther defense counsel making a summation.' Francis was found guilty
and sentenced to life imprisonment."'
sent black accuseds in capital cases in Orleans Parish .... Pertinently, the three
attorneys who represented [the defendant in a leading Louisiana grand jury discrimi-
nation case decided in 1964] ... were all black." Id. at 7 n.3. That statements of this
sort would be included in a brief submitted to the Supreme Court of the United States
in 1975 suggests that the Louisiana Attorney General was oblivious to the tacit ad.
mission that white attorneys might not represent black defendants with zeal, or that
the state was appointing defense counsel in criminal cases on a racially discriminatory
basis, or that Louisiana believed that the Supreme Court would be reluctant to find
that black attorneys had rendered a black defendant ineffective assistance in deter-
mining that the cause or prejudice requirements had been met.
142. 425 U.S. at 554 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Court Document, State v.Fran-
cis, No. 187-385-G (Crim.Dist. Ct., Orleans Parish, La., June 29, 1965), reprinted in
Appendix at 8, Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976); Francis Appendix (state
habeas proceedings), supra note 136, at 62.
143. 425 U.S. at 554 n.5 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Francis Appendix (state
habeas proceeding), supra note 136, at 29. At the state habeas proceeding, when co-
counsel was asked why Francis had not also pleaded to manslaughter, he responded
that "the State was out to put him in the electric chair." Id. Francis' attorney at the
state habeas hearing intimated that state law might have precluded a minor from
pleading to manslaughter charges, which, he said, "in itself might be a denial of cer-
tain Constitutional rights." Id.
144. 425 U.S. at 554 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see Defendant's Motions, State
v. Francis, No. 187-385-G (Crim. Dist. Ct., Orleans Parish, La., June 29, 1965), re-
printed in Appendix at 13-20, Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976). These were
the only motions filed on Francis' behalf. They were a motion for production of copies
of statements made by the defendant, an application for a bill of particulars, a motion
to quash the indictment on vagueness grounds, a motion to suppress evidence, and a
motion for a continuance. There is some question as to whether the motion to suppress
was filed the day before trial or the day of trial. See 425 U.S. at 554 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Francis Appendix (state habeas proceedings), supra note 136, at 19-20, 29.
32, 34. Justice Brennan referred to these motions as elementary. 425 U.S. at 554.
According to Francis' attorney at the Supreme Court level,
[tihe Motions were merely copies of motions which had been filed for an-
other defendant with the name of that defendant struck through in pen and
Francis' name substituted. The Motion for a Continuance was a form used
by the District Attorney which [defense counsel], by striking through with
a pen, adapted for his own use.
Brief for Petitioner at 8 n.2.
145. Francis Appendix (state habeas proceedings), supra note 136, at 31. 52.53.
146. See id. at 34, 72.
147. 425 U.S. at 554 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Record Appended to Bill of
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Apparently no attack was made with respect to the composition
of the grand jury because defendant's chief attorney did not believe
in "wasted effort.""14 Similarly, although the defendant "kept holler-
ing for an appeal,"'49 none was taken because Francis' attorneys be-
lieved that a successful appeal might subject Francis to retrial and a
possible death sentence5 ' or that, if he appealed, the state would
successfully prosecute him for the underlying robbery, and a consecu-
tive thirty-year sentence would be imposed.'-" Furthermore, in the
words of cocounsel, "I am not going to kid, we didn't want to be tied
up with the rest of our lives with a Court-appointed case."'5 2
Indictment, State v. Francis, No. 187-385-G (Crim. Dist. Ct., Orleans Parish, La.,
June 29, 1965), reprinted in Appendix at 9, Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976).
148. Francis Appendix (state habeas proceedings), supra note 136, at 26. Co-
counsel for Francis at the trial subsequently testified, "I would believe and not trying
to pass the buck that [chief counsel] didn't want to do it. There were blacks on the
Grand Jury and black [sic] in the Petit Jury panel and he has his own ideas about
things, you know." Id. When asked whether the two defense attorneys had discussed
a challenge of the grand jury, cocounsel stated,
I don't recal [sic] but like I said, if we did I am of the opinion he
wouldn't have done it because [chief counsel] is a man that doesn't believe
in what he calls wasted effort ...
I wasn't in the case at the outset. . . . When you come into a case
like that sort of haphazard things that have been done, you don't question
them and apparently I didn't.
Id. But see id. at 25 (cocounsel testified that "all the decisions [of counsel] were joint
decisions").
The fact that there may have been blacks on the grand jury that indicted Francis
did not preclude a finding by the district court in the subsequent federal habeas
proceeding that the grand jury was selected in an unconstitutional manner, in that
daily wage earners were systematically excluded, resulting in the exclusion of a dispro-
portionate number of blacks. See 425 U.S. at 555 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Indeed, cocounsel for Francis at the original trial also testified that he knew that
challenges to the grand jury were being made at that time and that he himself had
made such challenges. See Francis Appendix (state habeas proceedings), supra note
136, at 26.
149. Francis Appendix (state habeas proceeding), supra note 136, at 36. At the
sentencing, the defendant "waived" his right to appeal as a result of the following
colloquy:
The Court: Does the defendant state at this time he does not intend to take
an appeal?
The Defendant: I am not.
Id. at 21.
150. See id. at 38.
151. See id. at 35, 37. One of the assistant district attorneys who prosecuted the
defendant testified thereafter that the "general consensus" was that such a sentence
consecutive to life imprisonment could not be imposed and that he knew of none ever
having been imposed. See id. at 67. Nor could he recall any "appeal bargaining" in
the Francis case, that is, any agreement not to prosecute on the basis of the underly-
ing robbery if defendant agreed not to appeal. See id. at 66.
152. Id. at 36.
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The foregoing evidence concerning the reasons for not appealing
the conviction was secured in a state habeas proceeding held in 1971
for the purpose of obtaining a transcript of the trial. The transcript
was denied on the grounds that both attorneys were competent, that
defendant had waived his right to appeal upon advice of counsel and
parents, and "that the attack on the grand jury venire was considered
by his attorneys who chose not to make such an attack."'"
After all state remedies were exhausted, Francis instituted a
federal habeas action, in which the United States District Judge
granted the writ, finding that defendant had not waived his rights
either to an appeal or to challenge the grand jury and that the grand
jury selection process was unconstitutional.'5 ' Although the court
thought the Davis decision inapplicable because of Noia's deliberate
bypass ruling, it assumed that, even if Davis were controlling, cause
had been shown by virtue of defense counsel's inadequacy.'" Revers-
ing the district court, the Fifth Circuit held that Davis was disposi-
tive and that, since the Louisiana rule did not contain an exception
to the waiver provision excusing defaults upon a showing of good
cause, actual prejudice must be proved by defendant.'5 Accordingly,
153. Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Henderson, No. 187.385.G (Crim. Dist. Ct..
Orleans Parish, La., Dec. 20, 1971), reprinted in Appendix at 78, Francis v. Henderson,
425 U.S. 536 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Francis Appendix (state district court opin-
ion)]. The judge who presided at the state habeas action was the same judge who
conducted the trial. See Francis Appendix (state habeas proceedings), supra note 136,
at 33. He took pains to specify that defendant had been ably represented by competent
counsel of many years of experience. See Francis Appendix (state district court opin-
ion), supra at 78; cf. Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REv.
1, 16 (1973) ("Some [trial judges] are not only willing but insistent on papering over
the inadequacy or indifference of the lawyers practicing before them."). See also M.
FRED.ns, LAwYm' ETmcs iN AN ADvERSARY SysTEi. 89 (1975) ("[It was the practice
of members of the prosecutor's office [in the District of Columbia] to put favorable
comment about defense counsel into the trial record whenever they were concerned
that the issue of ineffective representation might legitimately be raised on appeal.").
The state judge's high estimation of counsel's competence was not always reflected
in the transcript of the state habeas proceeding. At one point, the judge accused
cocounsel at Francis' original trial of guessing, see Francis Appendix (state habeas
proceedings), supra note 136, at 42, and at another point he implied that counsel might
distort the truth, id. at 48.
154. See Francis Appendix (federal district court opinion), supra note 138, at 87-
92.
155. See id. at 90-91.
156. Newman v. Henderson, 496 F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1974), af'd sub noma. Francis
v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976). The Fifth Circuit was thus apparently taking the
position that a state rule of criminal procedure that contained no provision excusing
defaults on a showing of good cause could in effect amend the federal habeas statute
so as to make the writ available only to state prisoners who could prove actual preju-
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the case was remanded for a determination of that issue. On appeal,
the Supreme Court affirmed, but went a step further, requiring that
both good cause and actual prejudice be shown.' 7
The record thus indicates that none of Noia's deliberate bypass
requirements was met. It is unclear whether Francis' attorneys ever
even considered the possibility of challenging the grand jury selection
process. If they did, their determination against making such a chal-
lenge was apparently based on a desire not to waste time on what they
seemingly considered a futile gesture, 8 and there was no strategic or
tactical motive prompting this inaction."' Moreover, it is plain both
that defendant did not participate in the "decision" to refrain from
attacking the grand jury6 ° and that this kind of determination was
not a "trial-type" choice requiring an immediate utilization of legal
expertise. Finally, defendant received what can only be described as
ineffective assistance of counsel. Indeed, even taking into account the
time and place of trial and the racial overtones of the crime, a fair
reading of the Appendix submitted to the Court in Francis reveals
157. Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 542 (1976). Justice Brennan in his
dissenting opinion stated that the prejudice requirement was unwarranted. See id. at
551-52. He also expressed the fear that the majority had erected a barrier that could
very rarely be overcome; that is, according to the majority, petitioner would have to
prove he would not have been indicted had the grand jury been selected in a constitu-
tional manner. Further, Justice Brennan suggested that, if a prejudice requirement
were to be imposed, the burden of proving that the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt should be placed on the state. Utilizing this standard, he found that,
in view of defendant's age, the racial overtones of the crime, and the peculiarity of the
felony murder involved, the state could not meet its burden of proof. See id. at 557-
58.
158. See note 148 supra.
159. The absence of any strategic or tactical basis is clear since nothing could
be lost by challenging the state on this issue. The prosecution was apparently unwilling
to engage in any plea bargaining in Francis' case, see note 143 supra and accompanying
text, and, indeed, was seeking imposition of the death penalty against a seventeen-
year-old who had not himself committed the shooting, see note 136 supra, and whose
older codefendants had been permitted to plead guilty to substantially lesser charges.
Moreover, the felony murder theory being utilized was, to say the least, unusual. In
such circumstances, counsel for the defendant would have everything to gain by assert-
ing all conceivable defenses on behalf of their client. The presentation thereof would
also possibly have afforded Francis' attorneys the additional time that they obviously
thought they needed in view of their motion for a continuance.
160. At the state habeas hearing, Francis testified as follows:
Q. Were you informed either by your Counsel or by anyone that your attor-
neys had not attacked the make-up of the Grand Jury or Petit Jury on the
basis of systematic exclusion of negroes [sic]?
A. No, I wasn't.
Q. Did you know anything about that at that time?
A. At that time, no.
Francis Appendix (state habeas proceedings), supra note 136, at 61.
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counsel's inability to handle this capital case properly,"' Though
keeping in mind the dangers of judgments based on hindsight and the
reality that Francis' attorneys were able to prevent imposition of the
death penalty," the level of effectiveness of assistance that the Su-
preme Court implicitly found sufficient to support a waiver"3 in
161. It should be noted that defendant's chief counsel, who was appointed two
months after the indictment and who did not file any pretrial motions until the eve of
trial four months later, was described by his cocounsel on the case as "a great civil
lawyer," although chief counsel "hadn't handled any criminal matters for years." Id.
at 31. Cocounsel described himself as "an expert criminal lawyer in capital cases," id.
at 43, but his major role on Francis' behalf was in jury selection, id. at 41, and it was
chief counsel who "did all the questioning and whatnot" at the one-day trial, id. at
31. In addition, cocounsel testified, "I came in as a trial expert to help [chief counsell
to select juries and whatnot. Things done previous thereto was [chief counsel's] busi-
ness. .. .I can't question what he did four or five months before I came in as a trial
expert and that's my job." Id. at 27.
Although cocounsel believed that Francis' confession was unconstitutionally ob-
tained, id. at 34-35, he advised against an appeal, primarily because he believed that
in the event of appeal defendant would be prosecuted on the underlying robbery and
would receive a consecutive thirty-year sentence in addition to the sentence of life
imprisonment already imposed. When asked whether defendant could have received
such an additional sentence, cocounsel stated, "I don't know, I honestly don't know.
You might think I am kidding you. I don't know. We thought so at this time." Id. at
37.
Finally, when asked whether in failing to appeal he and chief counsel thought they
had been acting in the best interests of their client, cocounsel replied, "At that time
[in 1965], yes." Id. at 46.
The point is not that Francis was represented by indifferent or incompetent attor-
neys. Chief counsel may well have been a "great civil lawyer," but that does not really
bear on his ability to represent the defendant in a capital case. Cocounsel may have
been "an expert criminal lawyer," but it was chief counsel who filed the pretrial
motions and conducted the trial defense on behalf of Francis. As Judge Bazelon has
noted, "[lit is important to stress that the issue in ineffectiveness cases is not a law-
yer's culpability, but rather his client's constitutional rights . . .. Even the best
attorney may render ineffective assistance, often for reasons totally extraneous to his
or her ability." United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1202 n.21 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(citations omitted).
Indeed, if anyone is a culprit in this instance, it is the State of Louisiana, which
neglected to appoint defense counsel until two months after the indictment, provided
no compensation for court-appointed counsel in a capital case, and admittedly as-
signed defense attorneys on the basis of race, see note 141 supra, rather than expertise
in trying criminal cases. Finally, it was Louisiana that violated the Constitution by
establishing a racially discriminatory procedure for grand jury selection.
162. Cocounsel for Francis testified that "everybody felt that the jury had been
lenient on him because of his youth and he got a break that they didn't find him guilty
as charged." Francis Appendix (state habeas proceedings), supra note 136, at 36. The
additional factors of the bizarre nature of the felony murder charge and Francis'
noninvolvement in the shooting may also have contributed to the jury's "leniency."
163. To be sure the majority studiously ignored the concept of waiver articulated
in Noia and its requirement of consultation with competent counsel. By its reliance
on Davis, the Court was finding a waiver by inaction and imputing counsel's omission
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Francis meant, as suggested by Justice Brennan in dissent, either
that the deliberate bypass doctrine was dead or that the right to
challenge racially discriminatory grand jury selection procedures was
an inferior constitutional claim.3 6'
Without discounting the possibility that both of the foregoing
hypotheses were correct, in light of contemporaneous decisions of the
Court, the death of deliberate bypass seemed the more likely prob-
ability. First of all, in what might be considered a close case on the
merits, the Court subsequently upheld a challenge to a racially dis-
criminatory grand jury.'65 More significantly, in Estelle v. Williams, "I
a case decided on the same day as Francis, the Court determined for
the first time that it was a denial of due process to "compel" a
defendant to be tried in prison garb, but proceeded to rule that "the
to the defendant. Although the majority did not disturb the federal district court's
finding that the cause requirement had been satisfied by virtue of inadequate assis-
tance of counsel, see note 155 supra and accompanying text, it held that actual preju-
dice was also required to be shown, affirming the Fifth Circuit, which had remanded
for a determination on the prejudice issue. See Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536,
542 (1976), aff'g sub nom. Newman v. Henderson, 496 F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1974).
164. See id. at 546, 551-53 & n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For cases suggesting
that constitutional claims relating to the grand jury are given low priority by the
majority of the Court, see Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973), discussed at notes
102-21 supra and accompanying text; Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973),
discussed at notes 122-30 supra and accompanying text; Parker v. North Carolina, 397
U.S. 790, 798-99 (1970). In Parker, the defendant had failed to object to the composi-
tion of the grand jury. In a state collateral proceeding, the appellate court refused to
consider his claim on the merits because of the default. On direct appeal therefrom,
the Supreme Court stated,
This state rule of practice would constitute an adequate state ground pre-
cluding our reaching the grand jury issue if this case were here on direct
review . . . .We are under similar constraint when asked to review a state
court decision holding that the same rule of practice requires denial of collat-
eral relief. . . .Whether the question of racial exclusion in the selection of
the grand jury is open in a federal habeas corpus action we need not decide.
Id. at 798.
165. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977). In this 5-4 decision, the Court
held that charges of racial discrimination in the grand jury selection process, supported
by proof of gross underrepresentation of Mexican-Americans on the grand jury, were
not rebutted by the fact that the governing majority of the Texas county in question
was itself Mexican-American. See id. at 499-500. Although defendant had not made a
timely challenge to the grand jury, the Court reached the merits because the state
courts had done so. See id. at 485 n.4. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Powell stated,
A strong case may be made that claims of grand jury discrimination are not
cognizable on federal habeas corpus after Stone v. Powell . . . . [Tihe
prisoner in this case challenges only the now moot determination by the
grand jury that there was sufficient cause to proceed to trial. He points to
no flaw in the trial itself.
Id. at 508 n.1.
166. 425 U.S. 501 (1976).
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failure to make an objection to the court as to being tried in such
clothes, for whatever reason, is sufficient to negate the presence of
compulsion necessary to establish a constitutional violation."'1
By its decision in Williams the majority drastically altered the
law of waiver, which, as previously noted, is the analogue of deliber-
ate bypass. 6 ' In a concurring opinion, two members of the Court in
effect suggested counterpart modifications concerning the effect to be
given state procedural defaults formerly governed by the deliberate
bypass standard.'69 Noia was seemingly lost in the shuffle.
Because he was unable to supply bail, Williams was held in
custody pending trial on an assault charge. Prior thereto, Williams'
request to wear his "civilian" clothing at the trial was denied by the
jailer. 70 No objection was made by defense counsel or the defendant
at the trial."' In the course of an evidentiary hearing in the subse-
quent federal habeas action, the state court trial judge submitted an
affidavit asserting that he would have granted a request to be tried
in street clothes had one been made.' The United States District
Judge found, however, that this practice of the trial judge was not
well-known, that it was standard practice to try jailed defendants
in their prison uniforms, and that "'the evidence [pointed] to the
strong likelihood that the trial climate at that time acted as a natural
deterrent to the raising of objections to what was commonplace.' ""
Indeed, Williams' state court attorney testified at the habeas hearing
that he made no objection at trial since he deemed such action fu-
tile."4 The Supreme Court majority suggested a possible strategic
motive for such failure-eliciting jury sympathy' 5-and in that
167. Id. at 512-13.
168. See notes 39-40 supra and accompanying text.
169. 425 U.S. at 513 (Powell, J., joined by Stewart, J., concurring).
170. Id. at 502, 510.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 511 n.6. As Justice Brennan pointed out in dissent, the defendant had
objected to introduction of the judge's affidavit since it gave counsel no opportunity
to cross-examine the judge concerning the number of times such objections had ac-
tually been made. Id. at 534 n.15.
173. Id. at 530 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting the district court opinion)
(emphasis deleted).
174. See id. at 531 (Brennan, J., dissenting); cf. id. at 511 n.7 (defense counsel
had been overruled by a different state judge on such an objection and had seen other
defendants in prison uniform in the courtroom where his client was tried).
175. See id. at 510 n.5. Chief Justice Burger observed that since the defendant
was a "Caucasian in his sixties" and since the evidence was "clear and consistent...
a desire to elicit jury sympathy would have been a reasonable approach." Id. But see
id. at 533 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("I do not share the Court's view of the strength
of the trial evidence .... "). In its opinion, the Fifth Circuit implied that defendant
could have been either acquitted or convicted of a lesser included assault since
1978]
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connection noted that defense counsel had himself called attention
to the jail uniform during voir dire. 7 ' Apparently, however, the latter
action by trial counsel had been taken only after the prosecutor had
raised the matter with the prospective jurors.'" In any event, at the
federal habeas hearing, the state conceded that trial tactics were not
involved in defendant's failure to object. 7 ' The federal district court
denied relief on the ground that the error committed was in this case
harmless.'79 The Fifth Circuit reversed, agreeing with the district
court that there had been no voluntary waiver by defendant of the
implicated right, but disagreeing with the determination that the
error was harmless.'80
The Supreme Court, reversing the Fifth Circuit, acknowledged
that prosecution of a defendant wearing prison garb was a denial of
a fair trial because it impaired the accuracy of the fact-finding proce-
dure by undermining both the presumption of innocence and the
standard requiring proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.'' Hav-
ing made this determination, the Court nonetheless found that the
right to appear in street clothes was "waived" by defendant's failure
to object at trial, notwithstanding the trial judge's failure to apprise
Williams of his "right." The test thus established for violation of the
right not to be tried in jail clothing was whether the state had
"compelled" defendant to appear in such a uniform. 2 Although, as
noted, the majority suggested possible strategic motives for waivers
of this kind, the Court found it unnecessary to determine whether
failure to object "was a defense tactic or simply indifference. In either
"Williams faced a heavier opponent who was accompanied by an armed ally." The
Court of Appeals determined that "[tihe evidence in this case is not so strong as to
warrant the conclusion that the constitutional error of trying Williams in prison garb
was harmless." Williams v. Estelle, 500 F.2d 206, 210-11 (5th Cir, 1974), rev'd, 425
U.S. 501 (1976).
176. See 425 U.S. at 510.
177. Id. at 532 & n.12 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 531 n.11 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
179. Williams v. Beto, 364 F. Supp. 335, 343-44 (S.D. Tex. 1973), rev'd sub nom.
Williams v. Estelle, 500 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 425 U.S. 501 (1976).
180. See Williams v. Estelle, 500 F.2d 206, 208, 211-12 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 425
U.S. 501 (1976). Although the Supreme Court majority opinion cited a prior Fifth
Circuit decision, Hernandez v. Beto, 443 F.2d 634 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 897
(1971), in support of the proposition that the accused must object to being tried in jail
clothing, 425 U.S. at 508, in fact, the defendant in that case had made no objection at
the trial level, and the Fifth Circuit nonetheless reversed his conviction. See 443 F.2d
at 636.
181. See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503-06 (1976). The Chief Justice also
found it "troubling" that the defendants who were "forced" to stand trial in jail
clothing were those who could not post bail, thus raising equal protection concerns.
Id. at 505-06.
182. See id. at 512.
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case, respondent's silence precludes any suggestion of compulsion."'=
In promulgating this compulsion test for waiver, the Court, in an
otherwise cryptic footnote,""* was necessarily obliged to announce
that waiver of the due process right to be tried in street clothing was
not governed by the Johnson v. Zerbst standard requiring intelligent
relinquishment of a known right. According to the majority, that
standard applied only to "a fundamental right," leaving unclear
whether the Johnson test was limited solely to the right to counsel,
which was the right involved in Johnson itself, or whether it applied
to other unspecified "fundamental" rights.' In view of the present
Court's preoccupation with factual guilt and innocence,'' the Chief
183. Id. at 512 n.9.
184. Id. at 508 n.3. The footnote reads in relevant part:
-We are not confronted with an alleged relinquishment of a fundamental
right of the sort at issue in Johnson v. Zerbst. . . .There, the Court under-
standably found it difficult to conceive of an accused making a knowing
decision to forgo the fundamental right to the assistance of counsel, absent
a showing of conscious surrender of a known right. The Court has not, how-
ever, engaged in this exacting analysis with respect to strategic and tactical
decisions, even those with constitutional implications, by a counseled ac-
cused. See, e. g., On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 749 n.3 (1952).
CL Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11.
Id. (citation omitted).
185. See id. Presumably through his "cf." citation to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure, see note 184 supra, the Chief Justice intended to suggest that
guilty pleas involved fundamental rights that could not be relinquished unknowingly,
even by a counseled defendant.
Elsewhere in the opinion, however, Chief Justice Burger stated that the trial judge
was under no obligation to determine from -defendant or defense counsel whether the
former was "deliberately going to trial in jail clothes." He noted,
To impose this requirement suggests that the trial judge operates under the
same burden here as he would in the situation in Johnson v. Zerbst ....
where the issue concerned whether the accused willingly stood trial without
the benefit of counsel. Under our adversary system, once a defendant has the
assistance of counsel the vast array of trial decisions, strategic and tactical,
which must be made before and during trial rests with the accused and his
attorney.
Id. at 512 (citation omitted).
In his concurring opinion in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), the Chief
Justice made it clear that he thought counsel was empowered to make all decisions
regarding assertion of constitutional rights at trial, see id. at 93, except that the client
had the ultimate right to determine whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, or testify in
his or her own behalf, id. at 93 n.1.
186. See, e.g., Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233, 242 (1977) (applying
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), which implemented the reasonable doubt
standard, retroactively; "the rule was designed to diminish the probability that an
innocent person would be convicted"); Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 84 (1977)
(Powell, J., concurring) (commenting on our "uniquely elaborate system of appeals
and collateral review, even in cases in which the issue presented has little or nothing
to do with innocence of the accused"); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 415 (1977)
1978]
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Justice's announcement of the waiver-absent-compulsion rule seems
particularly inappropriate in the context of a case involving a due
process right whose loss, the Court acknowledged, may undermine
the accuracy of the fact-finding process.187
Stranger still, in light of the majority's determination that tac-
tics were irrelevant to the decision in this case, was the Court's asser-
tion in the same footnote that it had not previously utilized the
"exacting analysis" of the Johnson waiver standard in regard to
"strategic and tactical decisions, even those with constitutional im-
plications, by a counseled accused."' In support of this proposition,
the Chief Justice cited a footnote in On Lee v. United States, "I a 1952
fourth amendment misplaced trust case in which the Court held it
permissible for a government agent to testify to a conversation be-
tween defendant and a wired informant who was simultaneously
transmitting the incriminating statements to the agent.' -
The On Lee footnote contains a discussion of counsel's failure to
make a specific objection raising defendant's constitutional claim at
trial. ' The On Lee Court concluded, however, that the federal inter-
mediate appellate court's apparent treatment of this issue as one of
plain error justified a determination on the merits."' Although reiter-
ating the importance of timely, specific objections, the Court in On
Lee made no reference to strategy or tactics as a possible basis for the
failure to object."3 Thus, as primary authority for a novel interpreta-
(Burger, C.J., dissenting) (urging that Stone v. Powell be applied to fifth and sixth
amendment claims, where, as in this case, the evidence is reliable and where the
constitutional claim is irrelevant "to the criminal defendant's factual guilt or inno-
cence"); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 490 (1976) ("[Tlhe physical evidence sought
to be excluded is typically reliable and often the most probative information bearing
on the guilt or innocence of the defendant."). But see Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S.
197, 208 (1977) ("Due process does not require that every conceivable step be taken,
at whatever cost, to eliminate the possibility of convicting an innocent person.").
187. See 425 U.S. at 504-05. Apparently, however, the Chief Justice believed that
the evidence against Williams was so strong that there could be no doubt as to his guilt.
See id. at 510 n.5. But see note 175 supra.
188. 425 U.S. at 508 n.3.
189. 343 U.S. 747, 749 n.3 (1952).
190. The On Lee decision was 5-4 with Justices Frankfurter, Black, Douglas, and
Burton dissenting. In a wide-ranging, philosophical exposition, Justice Frankfurter
stated, "Loose talk about war against crime too easily infuses the administration of
justice with the psychology and morals of war. It is hardly conducive to the soundest
employment of the judicial process." Id. at 758.
191. Defense counsel made a general objection that the Court found insufficient
to preserve the specific constitutional claim. The Court also indicated that the proba-
ble basis for the attorney's objection was irrelevance. See id. at 749 n.3.
192. See id. (citing FED. R. CalM. P. 52(b)).
193. See id. It was reasonably clear that the failure to object stemmed from
counsel's inability to make a proper objection rather than from strategic or tactical
motives. See note 191 supra.
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tion of the Johnson v. Zerbst waiver rule, the Williams Court relied
on a footnoted aside in a pre-Noia case involving a direct appeal by
a federal prisoner in which the Court decided the constitutional issue
on the merits without mentioning Johnson v. Zerbst.
The majority's newfound and unprecedented waiver theory is
disturbing on several counts. First, as noted above, it seems calcu-
lated to limit the Johnson v. Zerbst standard for in-court waivers of
constitutional rights to the right to counsel and other "fundamental"
rights, but it gives no guidelines for determining which rights are to
be deemed "fundamental." The implication is that any other consti-
tutional rights not asserted at trial are waived,"' either because the
state has not compelled the relinquishment of the particular right or
because, once an attorney has been appointed or retained, rights may
be lost by virtue of counsel's inaction, regardless of whether counsel
or defendant is aware of the existence of the right or intends to give
it up.
Second, the waiver-absent-compulsion test announced in
Williams dilutes due process rights by making their existence depen-
dent on the actions of the defense attorney,"5 even in a case in which
194. It is not clear what rights the Williams Court considered "fundamental"
other than the right to counsel and the right not to plead guilty. See notes 184-85 supra.
While it might seem appropriate to apply the Johnson v. Zerbst standard of waiver to
all rights affecting the fairness or accuracy of the fact-finding process and to apply the
new standard of waiver absent compulsion to all other constitutional rights (even those
enumerated in the Bill of Rights), the line cannot be drawn in that manner because
the right involved in the Williams case itself was one affecting the accuracy of the fact.
finding process. Thus, for example, it is unclear whether defense counsel's failure to
object to the omission from the trial judge's instructions to the jury of any mention of
the reasonable doubt standard would constitute a waiver of that constitutional right
clearly affecting determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. Compare
Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 521 n.5 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting), with Hen.
derson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 157-58 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring). Conversely,
while the right to a jury trial is "fundamental to the American scheme of justice,"
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968), it has not been deemed "a necessary
component of accurate factfinding," McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543
(1971) (plurality opinion). Yet, Chief Justice Burger would apply the Johnson v. Zerbst
standard of waiver with respect to the right of trial by jury. See Wainwright v. Sykes,
433 U.S. 72, 93 n.1 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring). Thus, although waiver of federal
constitutional rights is a question of federal law, see Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 439
(1963), the Williams case gives no analytical framework for determining which of the
two standards for waiver will be applied to any particular constitutional right.
195. While Chief Justice Burger stated in Williams that "the vast array of trial
decisions . . . rests with the accused and his attorney," 425 U.S. at 512, and that
neither defendant nor his counsel raised any objection, id. at 502, the implication is
that the decision whether to assert an objection at trial is ultimately one for the
attorney to make. If the accused does have a role to play in objecting to trial in jail
uniform, it would appear that Williams asserted this claim in the only way that a
layperson could be expected to bring out the matter, that is, by asking his jailer if he
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the defendant had been asserting ineffective assistance of counsel.'"
The majority in Williams conceded that there was sufficient author-
ity to alert defendant's attorney to the existence of the forfeited
right,' 97 and the state had stipulated at the federal habeas hearing
that counsel's inaction was not tactically motivated.'" The Court
stated, however, that even if the failure to object resulted from indif-
ference, the right would be deemed waived.'99 The implication of this
holding, therefore, is that a constitutional claim affecting the accu-
racy of the fact-finding process could be waived notwithstanding
could be tried in his street clothing. See id. at 502.
If, on the other hand, counsel is responsible for asserting the right in question and
fails to make the objection at trial or to consult with defendant in this regard, and if
such failure to object need not be based on strategy or tactics, it is unclear how the
right to counsel secures defendant any benefit with respect to the implicated constitu-
tional right. Indeed, when the Court held in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975),
that the sixth amendment included the right to self-representation, the Chief Justice
dissented, stating that "both the 'spirit and the logic' of the Sixth Amendment are
that every person accused of crime shall receive the fullest possible defense; in the
vast majority of cases this command can be honored only by means of the expressly
guaranteed right to counsel." Id. at 840. The "fullest possible defense" is not re-
ceived by a defendant who represents himself since in all but an extraordinarily small
number of cases an accused will lose whatever defense he may have if he undertakes
to conduct the trial himself. Id. at 838. Query: If Williams had proceeded to trial
without an attorney, would the trial judge have had an obligation to inform him of his
due process right not to be tried in jail clothing, and absent such advice by the court,
would Williams be deemed to have waived his constitutional right? As the Chief
Justice observed in Faretta,
the reported cases are replete with instances of a convicted defendant being
relieved of a deliberate decision even when made with the advice of counsel.
• . . It is totally unrealistic, therefore, to suggest that an accused will always
be held to the consequences of a decision to conduct his own defense.
Id. at 845-46 (citation omitted).
196. See 425 U.S. 501, 534 n.15 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The ineffective assis-
tance claim had not been addressed by the Fifth Circuit, apparently because of its
determination with respect to the prison uniform issue. See id. The district court had
rejected the contention in a one-paragraph discussion. See Williams v. Beto, 364 F.
Supp. 335, 339 (S.D. Tex. 1973), rev'd sub noma. Williams v. Estelle, 500 F.2d 206 (5th
Cir. 1974), rev'd, 425 U.S. 501 (1976). The Texas appellate court had rejected the claim
because "the record as a whole" showed that the trial was not "a farce or mockery of
justice" or the representation "perfunctory, in bad faith, sham, pretense, or without
adequate opportunity for conference or presentation." Williams v. State, 477 S.W.2d
24, 27 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
197. See 425 U.S. at 511 n.8 ("[Tihese [Texas] cases provided ample grounds
for objection to the procedure, since they at least implicitly recognized that reversible
error could result from the practice."). The foregoing statement buttresses the sugges-
tion that the Court intended to make counsel responsible for asserting the right in
question since a layperson would normally not be familiar with case law. See note 195
supra.
198. See 425 U.S. at 531 & n.11, 534 n.15 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
199. See id. at 512 n.9.
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ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to the particular
claim. 1 Having granted the right to counsel in criminal cases, the
Court may deem it appropriate to establish guidelines concerning the
extent to which counsel's action will bind the accused. If this is the
goal, the Court's groping attempt to do so without addressing the
relationship of a waiver of a constitutional claim to the issue of com-
petence or to the circumstances in which an attorney's actions may
be properly imputed to his or her client ' is clearly unacceptable.
Even more disquieting, at least with respect to development of
the law of federal habeas corpus, is Justice Powell's concurring opin-
ion, which ostensibly distinguished between true waivers, in which
the substantive right is extinguished because defendant voluntarily
gives it up, and procedural defaults, which preclude determinations
on the merits of the claim.2 2 In fact, the concurrence blurs the dis-
tinction and virtually collapses the two doctrines into one, making it
impossible to distinguish waivers from defaults.2 The doctrine that
200. Even if counsel were thoroughly effective during the remainder of the trial,
his or her indifference with respect to assertion of the constitutional right in question
would amount to ineffective assistance with respect to that right. The Court in
Williams appears to be saying that even in such circumstances the right not to be tried
in jail clothing is waived.
Utilization of the alternate theory of compulsion suggested by Chief Justice Burger
does not obviate the need to discuss how, when, and by whom the right can be given
up. The only reference in the Bill of Rights to compulsion is with respect to the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Even in that context, the defendant's
loss of the right is premised on a knowing and intelligent relinquishment thereof. See
id. at 516 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Indeed, in each of two recent decisions find-
ing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), inapplicable, the Court noted that al-
though full Miranda warnings had not been given, the defendants had at least been
advised generally of their rights under the fifth amendment. See United States v.
Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976); Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976).
201. For example, an objection to wearing a jail uniform can be discussed in
advance with the defendant, who is fully capable of understanding the consequences
of not asserting the claim. On the other hand, there may be instances when the
attorney will be required to decide instantaneously, without consulting the accused,
whether to object to unanticipated hearsay evidence that implicates the sixth amend-
ment rights to confrontation and cross-examination. See generally notes 289-304
infra and accompanying text.
202. See 425 U.S. at 513-15 (Powell, J., concurring); cf. notes 38-40 supra and
accompanying text (distinguishing waivers and deliberate bypasses).
203. Justice Powell never stated whether he viewed the loss of the right in Wil-
liams as a waiver or as a default. On the one hand, he began his opinion by stating,
"I concur in the opinion of the Court," thus suggesting his acceptance of the majority's
waiver theory, whether based on compulsion or inaction. On the other hand, his discus-
sion of inexcusable defaults can be read as adopting a theory of procedural default with
respect to loss of the right to assert the implicated constitutional right. Justice Bren-
nan found it "puzzling" that Justices Powell and Stewart could concur in the majority
opinion and, at the same time, utilize in their own opinion a procedural default theory
that, in his view, "obfuscate[d] various issues." Id. at 523 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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emerges is that, absent plain error, counsel's failure to make an objec-
tion as to curable "trial-type" constitutional errors is, as a matter of
federal law, an "inexcusable procedural default" that precludes later
assertion of the right.
20 4
The concurring opinion apparently found the default in question
to be inexcusable because Williams was "represented by retained,
experienced counsel" who knew that trial of a defendant in jail
clothing raised a constitutional question and whose objection to the
state trial judge would have permitted the constitutional infirmity to
be cured25 and who failed to object because he thought it would be
futile to do so.01 Additionally, the failure to object with respect to the
"trial-type" right involved was "susceptible of interpretation as a
tactical choice. 20 7
Since the concurring opinion effectively merged the concepts of
waiver and deliberate bypass into a procedural default theory, there
was a clear obligation to discuss Fay v. Noia meaningfully, instead
204. Id. at 513 (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting Hart, supra note 15, at 118).
Since the error involved was one affecting the integrity of the fact-finding process and
was clearly observable by the trial court, see id. at 516 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting),
and since both the majority and concurring opinions viewed the constitutional right
in question as one that should have been well-known to the attorney, it is unclear why
the trial judge should not have been charged with the same degree of knowledge and
responsibility as defense counsel and should not have been obliged to inquire as to
defendant's reason for appearing in a jail uniform. Furthermore, such an inquiry by
the trial judge would have occurred before trial and would not have disrupted the
proceedings.
205. See id. at 514 (Powell, J., concurring). The concurring opinion thus ac-
cepted at face value the state trial judge's affidavit that he granted all requests to be
tried in street clothing. While the federal district court accepted the judge's affidavit,
the court went on to note that the state judge's practice was not well-known, that it
was standard practice at the time to have defendants in custody tried in their jail
uniforms, and that the trial climate acted as a natural deterrent to making such
objections. See Williams v. Beto, 364 F. Supp. 335, 343 (S.D. Tex. 1973), rev'd sub
nom. Williams v. Estelle, 500 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 425 U.S. 501 (1976).
206. Justice Powell's refusal to accept "experienced" counsel's statement that an
objection would have been futile as a basis for not imposing a forfeiture is arguably at
odds with his concern that attorneys clog up the courts with unwarranted objections.
In Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), which held that defendants in misde-
meanor cases could not be sentenced to jail unless they were offered the assistance of
counsel, Justice Powell, although concurring in the result, opposed such a per se rule,
contending that the issue should instead be resolved on a case-by-case basis. He
observed that
the Court's rule may well exacerbate delay and congestion in these courts.
We are familiar with the common tactic of counsel of exhausting every possi-
ble legal avenue, often without due regard to its probable payoff . . ..
[Tihe omnipresent ineffective assistance of counsel claim, frequently pro.
duces a decision to litigate every issue.
Id. at 58.
207. 425 U.S. at 514 (Powell, J., concurring).
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of citing it in a footnote for the proposition "that a federal-law bar
can be raised to the untimely presentation of constitutional
claims."' ' 8 1 Noia's deliberate bypass test placed the burden of proof
on the state to show that defendant, after consultation with compe-
tent counsel, made a personal, tactical decision to forgo state reme-
dies for assertion of his or her constitutional claim. In Williams,
however, defendant had attempted to assert his constitutional right
by asking the jailer for his regular clothes, he had claimed ineffective
assistance of counsel, and it was conceded there was no tactical basis
for the default.
While the concurring Justices properly cited Henry as authority
for the proposition that "an attorney's conduct may bind the
client," 209 they failed to come to grips with the considerations that
may have prompted the Henry Court to conclude that imputation of
the attorney's omissions to the client might be proper under the facts
of that case-considerations that were not present in Williams. Thus,
no attempt was made to distinguish Henry, even though that case
involved a fourth amendment claim about which counsel might
arguably have had no opportunity to consult with the client before
trial,2 10 whereas the claim involved in Williams was one that could
have been discussed fully with the accused prior to the decision
whether to assert it. Furthermore, the effect of nonassertion of the
constitutional issue in Henry might be deemed more difficult to ex-
plain to a layperson than the straightforward nontechnical claim in-
volved in Williams. Stated another way, the necessity for immediate,
midtrial, unilateral action by counsel possessing expertise with re-
spect to the claim may have been present in Henry, but was clearly
absent in Williams. Moreover, in the Henry situation a trial judge's
inquiry as to whether a fourth amendment objection was being
waived could conceivably be viewed as an uninformed interference
with counsel's handling of the case, whereas no such considerations
would preclude a judge who saw defendant going to trial in prison
garb from making a pretrial inquiry as to whether the accused wished
to give up his or her constitutional right to be tried in street clothing.
Finally, under Henry, counsel's default is binding on the client only
if there is a finding that the attorney's failure to assert the constitu-
tional claim was a tactical decision; yet, as already noted, in
Williams it was stipulated that counsel's default was not tactically
motivated.
In place of the Noia-Henry standard, Justice Powell suggested
that, in regard to most trial-type rights, "counsel's failure to object
208. Id. at 515 n.3 (Powell, J., concurring).
209. Id. at 515 n.4 (Powell, J., concurring).
210. But see text accompanying notes 58-59 supra.
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in itself is susceptible to interpretation as a tactical choice." 2 This
suggestion is clearly contrary to the requirement of both Noia and
Henry that the Court focus on the particular case in order to deter-
mine whether, in fact, the default was strategically or tactically moti-
vated. 12 Thus, here, as in Francis, the failures of counsel are effec-
tively converted into legal strategems that form the justification for
imposing forfeitures.
Substitution of such a rule of procedural default for Noia's delib-
erate bypass test has an undesirable impact on federalism. The pur-
pose of the bypass doctrine was to assure that defendants utilized
orderly state procedures for vindication of their constitutional rights
by directing the federal habeas court to look initially at whether the
state courts had refused to consider the merits of the federal claim
because of a state procedural default. If, however, a state proceeded
to determine the merits of the claim notwithstanding a default, fed-
eral habeas would lie because defendant's procedural error had not
cut off his or her state remedies.212 If a state court did not wish to
impose a forfeiture, considerations of federalism, comity, or equity
did not require the federal court to refuse to entertain the petition .
22
While it is true that, as in Williams, the same omission or failure to
object can amount to either a true waiver of the right or a procedural
default under state law (which is the reason the two are often con-
fused), 2 5 the rockbottom test for determining which one is involved
is an examination of how the state court treats the omission in ques-
tion.2 1 1 In Williams, the state court had treated the issue as one of
211. 425 U.S. at 515 (Powell, J., concurring).
212. As noted in Justice Brennan's dissent, the concurring opinion "directly
repudiate[d] Fay [v. Noia]," rendering the deliberate bypass test "a hollow shell."
Id. at 525-26.
213. See, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 297 n.3 (1967); Lussier v. Gun-
ter, 552 F.2d 385, 388 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 171 (1977).
214. Conversely, if the state court did wish to impose a procedural default on the
basis of state law without reaching the merits of the federal claim, the federal court
would apply the deliberate bypass test to determine the appropriateness of reaching
the merits in the federal habeas action.
215. Confusion between the concepts of waiver and procedural default is made
more acute by the majority opinion in Williams, which finds a waiver on the basis of
either noncompulsion or inaction, rather than on the basis of intentional relinquish-
ment of a known right. Whereas prior to the Williams decision a state court was obliged
to discuss waiver in terms of a knowing relinquishment, it can now apparently do so
in terms of inaction, which can also constitute a procedural default under state law.
It thus becomes more difficult to ascertain the theory on which the state court has
proceeded.
216. Indeed, even when the state court has refused to consider the constitutional
issue on the merits because of a procedural default under state law, but the state
attorney general has declined to raise the default as a defense in the federal habeas
action, instead seeking a determination on the merits, the federal court has determined
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waiver rather than procedural default by going to the merits of
whether, under federal law, Williams had voluntarily given up his
right to be tried in civilian clothing. 17
Justice Powell's analysis of procedural default thus seems at
odds with his own concept of federalism 2l8 since the analytical frame-
work he suggests has the effect of disregarding the state's decision to
treat the error on the merits-that is, as a waiver-rather than to
treat it as a procedural default under state procedural rules. In Stone
v. Powel,2l 9 for example, Justice Powell emphasized the "constitu-
tional obligations" of state and federal courts to "safeguard personal
liberties and to uphold federal law,"" found the state courts fully
capable of doing so, and held that so long as a state "provided an op-
portunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim"
federal habeas would not lie.?' This willingness to place consider-
able confidence in state court determinations contrasts with Justice
Powell's insistence in Williams on treating the question as merely
one of procedural default notwithstanding the state court's willing-
ness to resolve a federal constitutional waiver claim. The effect of
merging the doctrines of waiver and bypass into a new theory of
inexcusable procedural default is to encourage state courts not to
make decisions on the merits concerning waiver of constitutional
claims, but instead merely to find defaults. Indeed, according to the
concurrence, even if the state court wishes to resolve an issue on the
basis of the federal law of waiver, as it did in Williams, that determi-
nation is given no effect in the federal habeas action. Any federal rule
that "[tihe interest-of the state in protecting its procedural rules seems somewhat
diminished here by the fact that on this appeal the Attorney General of New York has
not even argued or briefed the theory that [defendant] deliberately bypassed his right
to object to the trial judge's charge." Kibbe v. Henderson, 534 F.2d 493, 496 n.4 (2d
Cir. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 431 U.S. 145 (1977).
217. See Williams v. State, 477 S.W.2d 24, 26-27 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972). Al-
though also citing a state court decision on this issue, the court relied on a Fifth Circuit
decision, stating, "Absent an objection, it is presumed that [defendant] was willing
to go to trial in jail clothing." Id. at 26; see Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501,526 (1976)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals did not render its
decision on state procedural grounds but on its view of federal waiver doctrine ....
The issue of procedural default was never raised by the State or addressed by any court
below .... ").
218. While Justice Powell's views on federalism can hardly be boiled down to a
few cliches, compare Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 216 (1977) (dissenting
opinion), with Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), it is probably fair to characterize
his concept of federalism as including a greater respect for state court determinations
and a more expansive view of the role of the states in the federal system. See. e.g..
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
219. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
220. Id. at 493 n.35.
221. Id. at 494.
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that implicitly sanctions disregard of a state court's decision to grap-
ple with the merits of a constitutional waiver claim hardly fosters full
participation by the states in the adjudication of federal constitu-
tional issues.
Taken together, the majority and concurring opinions in
Williams suggested, to say the least, a rather bleak future for both
the law of waiver in the Johnson v. Zerbst sense and the law of
deliberate bypass. The majority did not deign to cite Fay v. Noia,
perhaps because it was proceeding on a straight waiver theory. Since
waiver is the analogue of deliberate bypass, however, any change in
the law of waiver necessarily implicates deliberate bypass.
Noia's bypass test was tied to the Johnson v. Zerbst waiver stan-
dard to assure symmetry between relinquishment of a substantive
right and loss of the right to assert the claim by failure to comply with
state procedural rules. There is every reason to maintain such sym-
metry because, whether a waiver or a deliberate bypass is found, the
constitutional right is lost."' To have a less stringent test than delib-
erate bypass in the case of state procedural defaults would in effect
permit a state, by its procedural rules, to amend the federal law of
waiver.m For example, assume that a state required an indigent de-
fendant at arraignment affirmatively to request the appointment of
an attorney and provided that absent such a request the right to
counsel was lost. The state's imposition of a forfeiture for failure to
abide by this procedural rule would, if accepted by the federal habeas
court, constitute a change in the federal law of waiver, which under
Johnson requires a voluntary relinquishment of a known right.2 1' If
222. See Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 548 n.2, 553 n.4 (1976) (Brennan,
J., dissenting); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 527 n.8 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing); text accompanying notes 38-40 supra.
223. See Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 548 n.2 (1976) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting):
If, as a matter of constitutional law, a substantive constitutional right (for
example, the right to counsel or the right to a speedy trial) may not be lost
unless it has been knowingly and intelligently waived by the defendant, ...
it is difficult to fathom how the existence vel non of a state procedural rule
that a claim to that right must be asserted at a particular time can in any
way dilute that constitutional waiver standard.
To the extent that the Johnson v. Zerbst standard remains applicable with respect
to particular constitutional rights, such as the right to counsel, presumably Noin's
deliberate bypass standard will continue to apply in assessing the effect of a state
procedural default.
224. Id. If the majority's modification of the law of waiver is limited to 'trial-
type" rights lost after counsel has been appointed and if the effect to be given state
law defaults is similarly limited, see Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 512 (1976); id.
at 514 (Powell, J., concurring), it remains unclear whether, for example, a state law
requiring a request to charge with respect to the reasonable doubt standard and provid-
ing that the right to such jury instruction is lost absent a request therefor will be given
preclusive effect in a federal habeas action. See id. at 526-28 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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federal law is modified to permit such a waiver by inaction or omis-
sion, the parallelism between waiver and state procedural defaults
resulting from failure to object is restored. The cost of achieving this
symmetry, however, is to dilute the standard by which federal consti-
tutional rights can be lost.
Accordingly, when the majority in the Williams case changed the
federal law of waiver, the concurring opinion sought to bring the law
with respect to state procedural defaults into line with the new waiver
law, thus restoring symmetry between the two doctrines. In view of
the substantial alteration of the law of waiver and the law of deliber-
ate bypass in Williams, however, there was an obligation on the part
of both the majority and the concurrence to examine the relationship
between these two doctrines and to acknowledge the effect of
Williams on Noia and deliberate bypass, instead of giving Noia "the
silent treatment."' '
In sum, beginning as early as the Henry opinion in 1965, the
Court had made inroads on Noia's strict deliberate bypass require-
ments. With its decisions in 1972 and 1973 of the Mottram, Tollett,
and Davis cases, the Court substantially expedited this erosion. Fi-
nally, by the end of its October 1975 Term, with the decisions in
Francis and Williams, the Supreme Court had developed a rather
substantial body of habeas law, which imposed forfeitures in the
absence of any showing of a strategic basis for the default in the
particular case or of personal participation by the defendant in the
decision to forgo state remedies for assertion of constitutional claims.
Yet Noia's deliberate bypass requirement had not been explicitly
overruled.
II. WAIN WRIGHT v. SYKES: THE DOCTRINE IS DEAD,
LONG LIVE THE... ?
Fay b. Noia could not be ignored forever. Justice Brennan's
stinging dissents,"' as well as expressions of mystification from legal
225. See HART & WEcHSLER, supra note 47, at 257.
226. See Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 542-58 (1976) (Brennan, J.. dis-
senting); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 526-28 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Justice Brennan was concerned not only with the merits of the changes being effected,
but also with the failure of the majority "to develop and explicate the law in a reasoned
and consistent manner" and "to face squarely our prior cases interpreting the federal
habeas statutes and honestly state the reasons, if any, for its altered perceptions of
federal habeas jurisdiction." Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 547 (1976). He
added, "I, for one, do not relish the prospect of being informed several Terms from now
that the Court overruled Fay [v. Noia] this Term .... when the Court never comes
to grips with the constitutional statutory principles and policy considerations under-
pinning that case." Id. Justice Brennan was overly optimistic.in suggesting that Noia's
specific overruling would not take place for several Terms; Wainwright v. Sykes, 433
U.S. 72 (1977), was decided the following Term.
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scholars, including those who could hardly be described as enthusias-
tic proponents of broad federal habeas jurisdiction,"7 could not go
unheeded indefinitely. More important, depending in part on their
predilections, lower federal court judges were left to opt for Noia or
for the Davis-Francis-Williams line of cases in determining the effect
of procedural defaults. 211 Thus, unless Noia's deliberate bypass doc-
227. Compare HART & WECHSLER, supra note 47, at 256-58 (Supp. 1977), with
Bator, supra note 15, at 442-44, and Hart, supra note 15, at 101-25.
228. See, e.g., Turnbough v. Wyrick, 551 F.2d 202, 204 (8th Cir.) (finding that
case was governed by Francis and Williams rather than Noia), cert. denied, 431 U.S.
941 (1977); Poulin v. Gunn, 548 F.2d 1379 (9th Cir.) (per curiam) (defendant's failure
to object not a deliberate bypass; reliance placed on Noia and Henry without citing
Francis or Williams), vacated mem., 98 S. Ct. 424 (1977); Reese v. Ricketts, 534 F.2d
1180, 1181 (5th Cir. 1976) (district court finding of deliberate bypass not clearly erro-
neous where court had relied "on the waiver by deliberate bypass theory of Fay v.
Noia ... rather than waiver by procedural default, see Francis v. Henderson");
Arnold v. Wainwright, 516 F.2d 964, 967 (5th Cir. 1975) (finding Davis rather than
Noia controlling in context of petit jury challenges), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 908 (1976).
The tension created by the two conflicting lines of cases is perhaps best illustrated
by Gates v. Henderson, 568 F.2d 844, vacated on rehearing en banc, 568 F.2d 830 (2d
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 775 (1978). The original panel reversed the dismissal
of a section 2254 petition, holding that defendant had not been afforded a full and fair
opportunity to litigate his fourth amendment claim in state court, that Stone v. Powell
had not overruled Noia's deliberate bypass test in the fourth amendment context, and,
applying Noia, that defendant's failure to raise the claim with sufficient specificity was
not a deliberate bypass. In the latter connection, the court noted,
[Niothing in either [the Francis or Williams] decision purports to affect
Fay in any way, although the dissenting opinions suggest a sub silentio
modification of Fay ....
It would be inappropriate for us, as a lower court, to speculate
about what Francis v. Henderson "really means" or about what the Supreme
Court may do in the next case. Except as modified narrowly by Francis as
to grand jury challenges, Fay v. Noia remains good law, and, as the Supreme
Court has recently reminded us, "[o]ur institutional duty is to follow until
changed the law as it now is .... "
Id. at 850-51 (citation omitted) (quoting in part Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 518
(1976)). On rehearing en bane, the majority affirmed the district court's dismissal of
the writ, finding, on the basis of additional facts not presented to the original panel,
see Gates v. Henderson, 568 F.2d 830, 840 (2d Cir. 1977) (Oakes, J., concurring), cert.
denied, 98 S. Ct. 775 (1978), that defendant's objection in state court was based on
fifth and sixth rather than fourth amendment grounds and that, in any event, Stone
v. Powell overruled Noia's deliberate bypass test as to fourth amendment claims. In
addition, the majority on rehearing noted that Noia had "recently been severely lim-
ited even in the case of alleged violations of Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights where
the constitutional violation reflects on the reliability of the evidence," and pointed out
that Wainwright v. Sykes, decided by the Supreme Court two months earlier, related
to the voluntariness of a confession. Id. at 838 n.6. Judge Oakes, who had written the
majority opinion for the original panel, concurred in the result on the basis of the newly
presented facts and the intervening Supreme Court decision in Sykes. He reiterated
that, "[uintil the Supreme Court spoke more definitively, we as an inferior court were
[Vol. 62:341
HABEAS CORPUS
trine was explicitly overruled, the Court would be unable to assure
adherence to its views on the availability of habeas corpus in this
context.
A. BACKGROUND OF THE Sykes CASE
Wainwright v. Sykes,2" a case having none of the racial overtones
of Francis, but possessing the virtue of a stipulation in which the
state prisoner withdrew his claim of ineffective assistance of coun-
sel,20 became the Court's vehicle for dispatching Noia's deliberate
bypass test with respect to defaults occurring in the course of the trial
and for reinstating a variant of the adequate state ground rule as a
bar to federal habeas relief.
In January 1972, John Sykes was charged with second degree
murder.21 During the course of his trial six months later,s? the prose-
cution introduced statements made by the defendant at the police
station. Sykes had been given the appropriate Miranda warnings, but
officers testified that at the time of his arrest Sykes had also been
under the influence of alcohol? 3 Notwithstanding a Florida proce-
dural rule authorizing pretrial motions to suppress and trial objec-
tions to the admissibility of illegal confessions,2"' Sykes' attorney, for
reasons that remain unknown, took no action to prevent introduction
of the foregoing statements,35 and no evidentiary hearing was ever
held on their admissibility m Defendant's case consisted of evidence
introduced to prove that the shooting was in self-defense.2 The jury
bound by Fay v. Noia, and thus the panel majority applied the deliberate bypass
standard." Id. at 842.
229. 433 U.S. 72 (1977). The majority opinion was written by Justice Rehnquist.
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stevens wrote separate concurring opinions, but
joined in the majority opinion. Justice White wrote an opinion concurring in the
judgment. Justice Brennan wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justice Marshall
joined.
230. See id. at 75 n.4.
231. Brief for Respondent at 4-5, Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
232. Id. at 5.
233. 433 U.S. at 74-75.
234. Id. at 76 n.5.
235. See id. at 75; id. at 104 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
236. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 528 F.2d 522, 524 (5th Cir. 1976), rev'd. 433 U.S.
72 (1977); Sykes v. Wainwright, No. 73-316 (M.D. Fla., Jan. 22, 1975). af'd, 528 F.2d
522 (5th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), reprinted in Appendix at 23, 24-25,
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Sykes Appendix (federal
district court opinion)]. Sykes contended that, under Florida law, if the accused failed
to move to suppress a confession, the trial judge was nonetheless under an obligation
to conduct a voluntariness hearing. The defendant thus viewed this state law as avoid-
ing any possibility of a procedural default. Brief for Respondent at 11-14.
237. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 7-9, Wainwright v. Sykes,
433 U.S. 72 (1977).
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found Sykes guilty of third degree murder, and he was sentenced to
ten years in prison ms On direct appeal in the state courts, the defen-
dant made no attack on the admissibility of his statements,"' and the
conviction was affirmed. 21 In subsequent state collateral proceedings,
Sykes, for the first time, challenged the voluntariness of his admis-
sions to the police. An intermediate Florida appellate court refused
to consider this claim on the apparently erroneous ground that such
a challenge had been decided adversely to the defendant on direct
appeal. 241 The state's highest court thereafter denied Sykes' petition
without a published opinion.242
Proceeding apace, 43 Sykes filed a federal habeas petition in April
1973, alleging that his statements at the police station were erro-
neously admitted at trial because there had been no Jackson v.
Denno hearing24 as to their voluntariness. Defendant asserted that,
at the time he made these statements, he was intoxicated and there-
fore had no capacity to understand the Miranda warnings or to waive
his rights. 25 Although the habeas case was set for an evidentiary
hearing, Sykes rested on the basis of the state trial transcripts and
other documents in the file, and neither side presented any witnes-
ses. 6 At the same time, defendant withdrew a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel because the federal habeas judge advised that
pressing this claim would require exhaustion of state court reme-
dies.24 The United States District Judge found that the state had not
proved that defendant's failure to raise an objection to introduction
of his statements was a deliberate, strategic decision and stayed fed-
eral proceedings for ninety days in order to allow the state to conduct
a Jackson v. Denno hearing.2" On an appeal by the warden, the Fifth
238. Id. at 9.
239. See 433 U.S. at 75.
240. Sykes v. State, 270 So. 2d 482 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 274 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 1973).
241. See Sykes v. State, 275 So. 2d 24 (Fla. Crim. Ct. App. 1973).
242. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 10.
243. Since Sykes' state court trial took place in June 1972, see id. at 4, and he
instituted his federal habeas action in April 1973, see id. at 10, only ten months had
elapsed, during which he expeditiously exhausted state direct and collateral remedies.
Thus, this is not an instance in which the prisoner delayed in an effort to have the
conviction set aside "at a time when reprosecution might well have been difficult."
Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233, 241 (1973).
244. See note 39 supra.
245. Wainwright v. Sykes, 528 F.2d 522, 523 (5th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 433 U.S. 72
(1977). This contention was alluded to briefly in the Supreme Court opinion. See 433
U.S. at 74-75.
246. Sykes Appendix (federal district court opinion), supra note 236, at 24-25.
247. See 433 U.S. at 105 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
248. See Sykes Appendix (federal district court opinion), supra note 236, at 29-
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Circuit affirmed, holding that the state must provide such a hearing
prior to the admission of any confession, that its failure to do so
precluded a finding of waiver on defendant's part, and that the ab-
sence of an objection by defendant could not be deemed a trial tactic
or deliberate bypass because "no possible advantage" could have
accrued to Sykes as a result of his procedural default. 2' The Fifth
Circuit distinguished Davis v. United Staes on the ground that,
unlike racially discriminatory grand jury selection processes, the
admission of confessions was inherently prejudicial. °
B. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION-"CAUSE" AND "PREJUDICE"
REQUmEMENTS
The Supreme Court reversed. In an opinion by Justice Rehn-
quist, the Court decided that, with respect to procedural defaults
committed by defendant or defense counsel in the course of a state
trial, the "dicta of Fay v. Noia" had been limited by Francis v.
Henderson.' The crucial question in the case was stated and an-
249. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 528 F.2d 522, 527 (5th Cir. 1976), reu'd, 433 U.S.
72 (1977).
250. See id. at 526-27.
251. 433 U.S. at 84-88. The Court added,
We have no occasion today to consider the Fay [v. Noia] rule as applied
to the facts there confronting the Court. Whether the Francis rule should
preclude federal habeas review of claims not made in accordance with state
procedure where the criminal defendant has surrendered, other than for
reasons of tactical advantage, the right to have all of his claims of trial error
considered by a state appellate court, we leave for another day.
Id. at 88 n.12. Thus, the Court appears to have limited Noia's deliberate bypass rule
to the appellate context and to have left open the question of its applicability even
there.
For an opinion indicating that the lower federal courts may not be reluctant to
extend Sykes to appellate contexts, see Ennis v. LeFevre, 560 F.2d 1072, 1075 (2d Cir.
1977) (Meskill, J.), in which defendant's assigned appellate attorney failed to secure
the minutes of an identification suppression hearing or to brief or argue the issue on
appeal. Defendant not only protested counsel's refusal to do so, but also attempted to
have him replaced and filed a pro se supplemental brief on the identification issue. In
the federal habeas action, the prisoner alleged that the state's failure to provide the
minutes of the hearing constituted a denial of equal protection and that he had been
denied effective assistance of counsel.
In affirming the district court's denial of the writ, the members of the Second
Circuit panel wrote three separate opinions. Judge Meskill, relying on Sykes, deter-
mined that the lawyer's decision not to raise the identification issue on appeal was
binding on the defendant and rendered the state's failure to provide the hearing min-
utes harmless error. Judge Meskill found it unnecessary to reach the ineffective assis-
tance claim because the prisoner had not exhausted state remedies with respect there-
to. See id. at 1076-77. Judge Gurfein concurred in the result on the ground that
exhaustion was required with respect to the sixth amendment claim. He found it
unnecessary, however, to reach the issue whether counsel could bind his client as to
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swered: "Shall the rule of Francis v. Henderson . . barring federal
habeas review absent a showing of 'cause' and 'prejudice' attendant
to a state procedural waiver, be applied to a waived objection to the
admission of a confession at trial? We answer that question in the
affirmative. "215
Noting that Noia had painted with an unduly "broad brush," '
the majority declined to give any "precise definition" of the cause
and prejudice requirements other than to observe that it was a
stricter standard than that announced in Noia.1' An inkling of the
Court's perceptions in this regard was provided, however, in its one-
paragraph explanation of the application of the new standard to
Sykes. That paragraph in its entirety states,
The "cause"-and-"prejudice" exception of the Francis rule
will afford an adequate guarantee, we think, that the rule will not
prevent a federal habeas court from adjudicating for the first time
the federal constitutional claim of a defendant who in the absence
of such an adjudication will be the victim of a miscarriage of justice.
Whatever precise content may be given those terms by later cases,
we feel confident in holding without further elaboration that they do
not exist here. Respondent has advanced no explanation whatever
for his failure to object at trial, and, as the proceeding unfolded, the
trial judge is certainly not to be faulted for failing to question the
admission of the confession himself. The other evidence of guilt
presented at trial, moreover, was substantial to a degree that would
negate any possibility of actual prejudice resulting to the respondent
from the admission of his inculpatory statement.55
posttrial decisions. See id. at 1077. Judge Newman, also concurring in the result,
deemed exhaustion unnecessary. Although appellate counsel had apparently never
read the transcript of the identification hearing, Judge Newman stated that he had
reviewed these minutes and that he was "entirely satisfied that while a non-frivolous
challenge could have been made, petitioner's appellate counsel cannot be faulted for
considering the probability of success too slight to merit inclusion in the initial ap.
peal." Id. at 1078. Judge Newman reasoned that appellate counsel "could have learned
the substance of the identification procedures" from other sources. Id.
It should be noted that appellate counsel successfully raised one issue in state
court, resulting in a considerable reduction in sentence; but the identification claim
was apparently the only one that could have resulted in a reversal of the judgment of
conviction. See id. at 1077-78.
252. 433 U.S. at 87. The question, as phrased, can of course only be answered in
the affirmative because it refers to a "waived objection."
253. Id. at 88 n.12.
254. See id. at 87; id. at 99-100 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court adopts
the two-part 'cause'-and-'prejudice' test originally developed in [Davis and Francis].
As was true with these earlier cases, however, today's decision makes no effort to
provide concrete guidance as to the content of those terms.") (citations and footnote
omitted).
255. Id. at 90-91 (footnote omitted).
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On the basis of this somewhat less than expansive interpretation and
application of the new requirements, the Court reversed with instruc-
tions that the petition be dismissed.-
Both Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion and Justice White's
concurrence in the judgment suggested that the actual prejudice test
was similar to the harmless error doctrine.2 ' The latter test requires
the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the constitutional
violation did not contribute to defendant's conviction, so that where
illegal evidence is merely cumulative and there is other overwhelming
proof of guilt, the constitutional error is deemed harmless.2 Al-
though susceptible of this interpretation, the majority's discussion of
actual prejudice, and specifically its use of the phrase "miscarriage
of justice," suggests that the Sykes prejudice test is significantly
less stringent than the harmless error doctrine.2' In Chapman v.
256. See id. at 91. In contrast, the Court in Francis affirmed the decision of the
Fifth Circuit remanding the case for a hearing on the issue of prejudice. See Francis
v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 542 (1976), af'g sub noma. Newman v. Henderson, 496 F.2d
896 (5th Cir. 1974).
257. See 433 U.S. at 98 (White, J., concurring); id. at 117 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing). Justice White believed that the majority in effect found harmless error and that
it was therefore unnecessary to discuss further modification of the deliberate bypass
test in the context of contemporaneous objections. Since, however, the majority had
proceeded to do so, he added his views with respect to the appropriate contents of the
cause and prejudice requirements. See note 267 infra.
258. See, e.g., Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 251 (1969); Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
259. See 433 U.S. at 90-91. The opinion and the briefs in the case disclose the
following evidence bearing on whether there was actual prejudice: the prosecution's
case against Sykes consisted primarily of testimony by police officers who responded
to a telephone call from defendant's wife. This call was made at the request of the
accused. See id. at 74. Upon the arrival of the police at the scene, defendant's wife,
who was hysterical, told the officers that her husband had shot the deceased. See Brief
for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 4-5. Defendant also volunteered the same
information. See 433 U.S. at 74. Thus, the issue was never whether Sykes had commit-
ted the shooting but whether he had done so in self-defense. See Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curiae at 4. But see 433 U.S. at 93 n.2 (Burger, C.J., concurring)
("One is left to wonder what use there would have been to an objection to a confession
corroborated by witnesses who heard Sykes freely admit the killing at the scene within
minutes after the shooting."). The police officers testified that after they arrested the
defendant they took him to the county jail and advised him of his Miranda rights. See
id. at 74. They further testified that defendant thereafter initially made a false excul-
patory statement-that the victim had accidentally shot himself-and then made an
inculpatory statement. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 5. The
officers also stated that Sykes was under the influence of alcohol at the time of his
arrest. See 433 U.S. at 74-75. On cross-examination, defense counsel elicited the infor-
mation that both defendant and the deceased had been intoxicated at the time of the
shooting. The prosecution presented evidence that the deceased was unarmed. Finally.
although Sykes had a cut on his hand, which he later claimed was inflicted by the
victim with a knife, a physician testified on behalf of the state that this wound was
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California,2" the decision announcing the harmless error rule, the
Court reversed a state court determination that, in view of the consid-
erable evidence against the accused, the trial judge's and prosecutor's
comments on defendants' failure to testify did not result in a
"miscarriage of justice" within the meaning of the state constitu-
tion."" Thus, the reference in Sykes to miscarriage of justice may
be implicitly rejecting, at least for purposes of habeas review,
not caused by a sharp blade. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 6-7.
The defendant's case consisted of testimony by Sykes that he had been drinking
during the day and that, while he was having dinner, the deceased, who was his friend
and occasional employer, came to his home. According to the defendant, an altercation
ensued when the victim accused Sykes of lying, picked up defendant's gun, and threat-
ened to shoot the accused and his wife. Defendant further testified that he grabbed
the gun, that the victim reached back to get a knife, and then ran out of the house;
but the victim then turned around and came back toward the dwelling, shouting
threats. Sykes stated that he believed his life to be in danger and shot the victim. At
some point in his testimony Sykes asserted that the victim had attacked him with a
knife and cut him. Defendant also testified that he had prior convictions for assault
with a pistol and unlawful possession of a firearm, that he was employed at the time
of the shooting, and that he had been out of trouble since his release from jail. Mrs.
Sykes testified and corroborated some portions of her husband's testimony. She did
not, however, hear the conversation that immediately preceded the shooting. Several
other witnesses testified that the deceased had in the past carried weapons and threat-
ened to use them. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 7-9.
Based on its assessment of the foregoing testimony and of the record generally,
see 433 U.S. at 91; id. at 97-98 (White, J., concurring), the Sykes majority determined
that there was no actual prejudice. It is possible, however, to conclude otherwise. See
id. at 117 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("I disagree with the Court's appraisal of the
harmlessness of the admission of respondent's confession .... "). It would appear
that the jury believed part of Sykes' testimony or at least considered him less culpable
than the state alleged since the jury found him guilty of murder in the third degree,
FLA. STAT. § 782.04(4) (1973) (a killing "perpetrated without any design to effect
death"), rather than murder in the second degree as charged, id. § 782.04(2) (a killing
"by an act imminently dangerous to another and evincing a depraved mind regardless
of human life"). Had the trial court excluded the false exculpatory statement and the
inculpatory statement made by defendant after receipt of the Miranda warnings, it is
conceivable that the jury would have reduced the charges still further or perhaps
accepted Sykes' claim of self-defense, even if the out-of-court statements could have
been used for impeachment purposes, see notes 276-78 infra and accompanying text.
Since the harmless error rule requires reversal unless the illegal evidence was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, see text accompanying note 262 infra, and since
it is difficult to ascertain how that standard was met in the instant case, it would
appear that the majority was utilizing the miscarriage-of-justice standard to which it
alluded and that such a standard is more difficult for a prisoner to overcome than the
harmless error test.
260. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
261. See id. at 20; c[. Irvin v. Dowd, 359 U.S. 394, 403 (1959), discussed at note
16 supra (state's highest court, in a capital case, was able to conclude that there was
"no miscarriage of justice," notwithstanding inflamed community passions contami-
nating the jury itself) (citing Irvin v. State, 236 Ind. 384, 392-93, 139 N.E.2d 898, 902
(1957)).
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Chapman's admonitions that evidence that "possibly influenced the
jury adversely" is not harmless and that "before a federal constitu-
tional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare
a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." 6 '
The majority's only explanation of the cause requirement was a
footnote citing and quoting Henry v. Mississippi and Estelle v.
Williams for the proposition that defendants are bound by trial judg-
ments of their attorneys." 3 Thus, defendant's personal participation
is no longer a predicate for imposition of a forfeiture, and, in view of
the Court's explicit rejection of the deliberate bypass standard with
respect to trial errors, it is likewise clear that there need be no proof
that counsel's default was either intentional or grounded in trial tac-
tics. Indeed, as part of its discussion of the policy considerations
underlying its rejection of Noia, the Court tacitly abandoned its ef-
forts in Francis and Williams to determine whether, with respect to
the particular type of constitutional claim, there could have conceiv-
ably been a strategic or tactical basis for the default in question.2"4
In its place the Court in effect created a presumption that all defense
attorneys who commit procedural defaults with respect to constitu-
262. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23-24 (1967); cf. LiPuma v. Commis-
sioner, 560 F.2d 84 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 189 (1977). In LiPuma, the United
States District Court had granted habeas relief on the grounds "that it could not
conclude, 'beyond a reasonable doubt' that LiPuma's suppression motion would have
failed had it been made in a timely fashion," and that "there was a clear 'reasonable
possibility of prejudice to petitioner as a result of his counsel's glaring neglect.' " Id.
at 92 (quoting in part the district court opinion). In its decision, rendered eighteen days
after Sykes, the Second Circuit reversed, finding that, since the fourth amendment
claim was not sufficiently supported, failure to make a motion based thereon did not
constitute ineffective assistance, that the reasonable doubt standard was inappropriate
for determination of the probable outcome of the suppression motion, and that
"[tiraditionally, the burden of proof has been on the petitioner in a federal habeas
corpus proceeding to prove, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, that his conviction
must be vacated and his release ordered." Id. The court noted, however, that had the
substantive issue of consent to the search been litigated, "the burden would have been
on the State." Id. at 92 n.4.
263. See 433 U.S. at 91 n.14. Henry and Williams are of course inconsistent with
one another, inasmuch as Henry requires that the default be tactically or strategically
motivated, see 379 U.S. at 451-53, and Williams determined this factor to be irrelevant,
see 425 U.S. at 512.
264. In Francis, the Court quoted Davis in support of the view that
"[s]trong tactical considerations would militate in favor of delaying the
raising of the claim [challenging the grand jury] in hopes of an acquittal,
with the thought that if those hopes did not materialize, the claim could be
used to upset an otherwise valid conviction at a time when reprosecution
might well be difficult."
425 U.S. at 540 (quoting 411 U.S. at 241). Similarly, in Williams the Court noted the
possibility that a defendant might wish to elicit jury sympathy by appearing at trial
in his or her jail uniform. See 425 U.S. at 508.
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tional issues may have done so for the purpose of "sandbagging," that
is, trying to secure acquittal in the state courts and in the event of
conviction proceeding to federal habeas court because "their initial
gamble [did] not pay off."2 05
Thus, all that is known from the majority opinion is that a delib-
erate tactical maneuver will make a showing of cause impossible. It
is unclear, however, whether proof of either recklessness, negligence,
ignorance of the rule, or ineffective assistance on the part of defense
counsel will suffice to establish cause.28 Justice White suggested that
mistakes of counsel based on professional judgment will not consti-
tute cause, unless they amount to "plain error" or errors so blatant
as to constitute ineffective assistance. He also believed that proof of
defense counsel's ignorance of the particular procedural rule would
meet the cause requirement."'7 By a process of elimination, it would
appear that according to Justice White's analysis a showing of negli-
gence on the part of the defense attorney would be insufficient to
excuse the default.
In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Stevens took the posi-
tion that, in view of the equitable nature of habeas relief, a totality-
of-the-circumstances approach was preferable in assessing the effect
to be given procedural defaults. 8 Since competence of defense coun-
sel was one of the factors to be weighed, " Justice Stevens proceeded
to determine whether there was a basis in the record for believing that
the default in Sykes could be the result of a tactical decision by
competent trial counsel. Hearkening back to the Francis- Williams
approach of looking for a possible tactical motivation, he noted that
265. 433 U.S. at 89.
266. See id. at 100 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[Ljeft unanswered is the thorny
question that must be recognized to be central to a realistic rationalization of this area
of law: How should the federal habeas court treat a state procedural default that is
attributable purely and simply to the error or negligence of a defendant's trial
counsel?").
267. See id. at 99 (White, J., concurring). Justice White stated that the burden
of proving cause and of negativing deliberate bypass was on the accused, but he also
observed that "[als long as there is acceptable cause for the defendant's not objecting
to the evidence, there should not be shifted to him the burden of proving specific
prejudice." Id. at 98.
268. See id. at 94 n.1, 94-96. Justice Stevens believed that the majority's holding
was consistent with the manner in which the lower federal courts had been interpreting
Noia. See id. at 94 n.1. He considered that, in any event, requiring the defendant's
personal participation in the context of a contemporaneous objection was unrealistic.
But see notes 283-304 infra and accompanying text. Conversely, Justice Stevens was
of the view that even an express waiver by the defendant may not be sufficient to
excuse a grave constitutional error. See 433 U.S. at 95.
269. The other factors included "the procedural context in which the asserted
waiver occurred, the character of the constitutional right at stake, and the overall
fairness of the entire proceeding." 433 U.S. at 96 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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defendant's confession in many respects corroborated his trial testi-
mony and that, to the extent it was inconsistent with such testimony,
the confession could in any event have been utilized for impeach-
ment . 0 Thus, Justice Stevens theorized that defense counsel may
well have decided not to object to the introduction of material whose
exclusion could at most have been only temporary."'
Since this analysis constitutes the only extensive effort by a
member of the Sykes majority to apply the requirements for imposi-
tion of a forfeiture to the facts of the case, Justice Stevens' reasoning
deserves careful consideration. Notwithstanding the superficial plau-
sibility of his argument in this regard, there are compelling reasons
why competent defense counsel would have been more likely to seek
suppression of defendant's statements even if he or she thought that
their admission would be more helpful than harmful or that the
chances of suppression were negligible. First, had Sykes' attorney
moved to suppress the statements prior to trial, the hearing on the
motion would have afforded an opportunity to cross-examine key
prosecution witnesses, which would in turn have permitted counsel
to determine their strengths and deficiencies as witnesses, thus en-
abling counsel to select the best approach for cross-examination at
trial on the case-in-chief. Second, a pretrial hearing would have given
the defense attorney a possible impeachment tool had inconsistencies
between the trial testimony and the hearing testimony developed.
Third, the pretrial hearing would have permitted limited discovery
with respect to a significant aspect of the state's case.--
270. See id. Justice Stevens observed that
[Sykes'] statement was consistent, in many respects, with the
[defendant's] trial testimony. It even had some positive value, since it
portrayed the [defendant] as having acted in response to provocation ....
To the extent that it was damaging, the primary harm would have resulted
from its effect in impeaching the trial testimony, but it would have been
admissible for impeachment in any event ....
Id. (citation omitted).
271. See id. at 97. Justice Stevens concluded that, since the police had complied
with Miranda and the proceeding was fundamentally fair, there was no basis for
collateral attack. See id.
The majority left open the issue of "whether a bare allegation of a Miranda
violation, without accompanying assertions going to the actual voluntariness or relia-
bility of the confession, is a proper subject for consideration on federal habeas review,
where there has been a full and fair opportunity to raise the argument in the state
proceeding. See Stone v. Powell .... Id. at 87 n.11 (citation omitted).
272. The hearing on a motion to suppress is an excellent disclosure
tool. The scope of the exclusionary hearing is greater than that of the prelimi-
nary hearing and will permit an astute defense counsel to discover facts
beyond the issues of the hearing and relating to the merits which he would
not be able to obtain by other means.
F. BAIL=Y & H. RoTHBLATr, INVESTIGATION AND PREPARATION OF CRIMINAL CASES § 352
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Moreover, even if part of defendant's admission or confession
gave some support to a claim of provocation or self-defense,2 3 its
introduction by the prosecution as part of the state's case almost
inevitably imprinted on the minds of the jurors the notion that the
confession was incriminating since, otherwise, the prosecution would
presumably not have used it.24 Had defense counsel viewed the con-
fession as unqualifiedly advantageous, the appropriate course, after
having obtained an order of suppression, would have been to call the
police officers who secured the statements as witnesses for the de-
fense. Furthermore, had the prosecution been prohibited from intro-
ducing the confession, defense counsel might have decided not to call
the defendant as a witness, given his prior convictions of assault with
a pistol and of unlawful possession of a firearm. Instead, Sykes' claim
of provocation or self-defense might have been established, at least
in part, through the testimony of his wife, who witnessed some of the
events and who did in fact testify on his behalf, and by the testimony
of other witnesses that the victim had in the past both carried weap-
ons and threatened others with their use. 5
Alternatively, if defense counsel thought that as a practical mat-
ter Sykes had to testify notwithstanding his prior convictions, it is
true that under Harris v. New York27 the statements could probably
have been used for impeachment.z7 The prejudicial effect of allowing
(1970); see id. at § 324 ("The motion to exclude or suppress illegally obtained evidence
is crucial to the defense and often helps determine a case. When made before trial,
the ensuing evidentiary hearing is a unique opportunity to gain a decided advantage
over the prosecution .... "); cf. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9 (1970) (prelimi-
nary hearing is a "critical stage" requiring assignment of counsel and an attorney is
essential in order to "expose fatal weaknesses in the state's case ... fashion a vital
impeachment tool for use in cross-examination of the State's witnesses at the trial,
... [and] discover the case the State has against his client.").
273. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 96 n.5 (1977) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring).
274. Cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477 (1966) ("[N]o distinction may
be drawn between inculpatory statements and statements alleged to be merely
'exculpatory.' If a statement made were in fact truly exculpatory, it would, of course,
never be used by the prosecution.").
275. See note 259 supra.
276. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
277. It is possible to distinguish Harris from the present case since Sykes' conten-
tion was that he was so intoxicated that he could not understand the Miranda warn-
ings, and a knowing elicitation of a confession under such circumstances would
render it involuntary. In Harris there was no claim of involuntariness. See id. at 224.
An additional basis for distinction is that the Harris decision focused on prevention of
perjury by defendants. In the case of one who is intoxicated at the time of the original
statement, the contents of such a confession may be too unreliable to afford a basis
for inferring that inconsistent trial testimony is perjurious.
In addition, although impeachment by a prior inconsistent statement can be
extremely prejudicial to the defendant's case, and although such a statement may as
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such impeachment on cross-examination could, however, have been
mitigated by having the defendant himself explain, as part of his
direct examination, any inconsistencies among his various state-
ments to the police and between the latter and his trial testimony.
Indeed, such explanations may have precluded prosecution use of the
statements for impeachment purposes.278 In any event, even if the
district attorney was able on cross-examination to utilize the confes-
sions to impugn defendant's explanations of the reasons for the incon-
sistencies, defense counsel would have undercut the prosecutor by
assuring that his client rather than the state had brought out the
confessions and the reasons for the inconsistencies.
The point is that after endless speculation it remains impossible
to know why Sykes' trial attorney failed to object. Thus, the foregoing
analysis demonstrates the pitfalls in utilizing Justice Stevens' conjec-
tural basis for imputing strategic or tactical motives to attorneys who
have committed procedural defaults with respect to constitutional
claims. If there is no record disclosing the actual basis for defense
counsel's inaction, appellate judges with the benefit of hindsight may
conjure up reasons for the default in an utter vacuum-reasons that
may not bear any relationship to trial realities or to the events that
occurred in the particular case. Moreover, Justice Stevens' approach
is one-sided since it takes into account only possible tactical benefits
without considering the tactical disadvantages of the default. If
courts were instead required to engage in a balancing of tactical bene-
fits and detriments, they might well find that the disadvantages can-
celed or outweighed the advantages. Upon reaching a conclusion of
this sort, appellate judges might feel some inhibition with respect to
engaging in this practice at all or with respect to imputing counsel's
defaults to the accused.
Furthermore, to buttress his conclusion that the default may
have been intentional, Justice Stevens noted that, on the basis of his
assessment of the trial testimony, Sykes' constitutional claim was
"weak." 19 This conclusion amounts to a retrospective determination
a practical matter be considered as substantive evidence by the jury, as a legal matter
it is only to be considered by the jury in assessing the credibility of the accused. In a
close case, that limitation may be of considerable value to the defendant.
278. The rationale of the Harris holding that statements obtained in violation
of Miranda may be used for impeachment is prevention of perjury by the accused. See
id. at 225-26. Since the defendant in the hypothetical situation described in the text
would have made no perjurious statements, Harris would arguably be inapplicable,
and the prior statements of the accused could not be used for impeachment.
279. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 n.6 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring).
Justice Stevens reasoned that defendant's claim of intoxication was "not only implau-
sible, but also somewhat inconsistent with any attempt to give credibility to his trial
testimony, which necessarily required recollection of the circumstances surrounding
19781
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of the merits of the constitutional claim even though no hearing was
ever held on this issue.
In sum, although Justice Stevens espouses a totality-of-the-
circumstances approach, his analysis fails to take into account all of
the relevant considerations for determining whether the default was
deliberate. Moreover, by analyzing only the possible advantages
accruing to the accused as a result of the default, he is able in effect
to make an unsubstantiated inference that defense counsel was com-
petent and to reach a conclusion based on hindsight that the unliti-
gated constitutional claim was probably without merit. Finally, such
an ad hoc, totalities approach does not appear to afford a meaningful
analytical framework for determining when or why federal habeas
should be made available to state prisoners whose attorneys have
committed procedural defaults.
C. THE POLICY UNDERPINNINGS OF THE Sykes DECISION
Although the majority's discussion of the prejudice and cause
requirements was limited, Justice Rehnquist did elaborate on the
policies underlying substitution of these standards for the deliberate
bypass test.280 Justice Rehnquist began his policy discussion by de-
scribing the Florida procedural requirement as a "contemporaneous-
objection rule" that "deserves greater respect than Fay [v. Noia]
gives it."28' The Court then pointed to numerous values enhanced as
a result of contemporaneous trial objections. Such objections would,
in the Court's view, permit constitutional determinations to be made
when the memories of the parties were freshest, assure the existence
of a state court record to guide the federal habeas judge in the event
of subsequent proceedings, contribute to finality in state criminal
litigation, prevent "sandbagging" by defense attorneys, and highlight
the trial as the "main event" in the criminal justice process. 12
The difficulties with these arguments begin in their major prem-
ise, for designating the procedure in question as a "contemporaneous-
objection rule" is misleading. The decision whether to object to
admission of a confession is not a split-second determination that
counsel is required to make in the midst of trial by utilizing arcane
the shooting." Id. It is possible, however, that Sykes could have been too intoxicated
to understand the Miranda warnings in any meaningful sense, but at the same time
able to recall the events surrounding his killing of another human being.
280. As pointed out in Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion, the issue presented
was not whether federal habeas courts possessed power to entertain actions notwith-
standing state court procedural defaults, but rather in which circumstances such
power should be exercised. He noted that Congress could, by amendment of 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 (1970), effectively overrule the Sykes decision. See 433 U.S. at 100 n.2.
281. 433 U.S. at 88.
282. See id. at 88-90.
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knowledge possessed only by members of the legal profession. The
Florida statute is typical of state criminal procedure rules that re-
quire motions to suppress confessions to be made prior to trial and
permit the delaying of such objections until the trial only in excep-
tional circumstances. 83 Therefore, the decision is one concerning
wlich the attorney has ample opportunity to consult with his or her
client."'
Labeling the Florida procedure as a "contemporaneous-objection
rule" is both a reflection of the majority's authoritarian view of the
attorney-client relationship and a means of rendering unnecessary an
analysis of the client's interest in personal participation in the relin-
quishment of a constitutional right. The determination whether to
forgo a constitutional defense has tremendous personal implications
for the defendant. A failure to discuss such a decision with the ac-
cused is virtually inexplicable and of doubtful propriety.,, If on the
basis of trial strategy counsel deems it preferable not to pursue the
constitutional claim, this is surely a matter requiring the client's
understanding and concurrence.286 Moreover, if consultation and
283. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1538.5 (b), (f)-(h) (West Supp. 1977); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 38, §§ 114-11, -12 (Smith-Hurd 1977); N.Y. CRIM. PROc. LAW § 710.40
(McKinney 1971 & Supp. 1977); PA. R. CRla. P. 323.
284. Well before the trial, defense counsel is under an obligation promptly to
interview his or her client, ascertain from the latter what statements, if any, he or she
made to the police, conduct discovery to secure any such statements, engage in legal
research to determine their admissibility, and discuss fully with the client the advisa-
bility of a motion to suppress. See AMERicAN BAR ASSOCIATbON PROJECT ON STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE DEFENSE FUNCTION § § 3.2(a), .8,4.1,
5.1(a), .2(b) (Approved Draft 1971) [hereinafter cited as ABA DEFENSE FUNCTON
STANDARDS]. Indeed, the attorney should promptly "take all necessary action to vindi-
cate" the client's rights and "should consider all procedural steps which in good faith
may be taken, including. . . moving to suppress illegally obtained evidence." Id. §
3.6(a).
285. See id. §§ 3.8, 5.2(b).
286. See id. § 5.2 (emphasis added):
(a) Certain decisions relating to the conduct of the case are ultimately
for the accused and others are ultimately for defense counsel. The decisions
which are to be made by the accused after full consultation with counsel are:
(i) what plea to enter; (ii) whether to waive jury trial; (iii) whether to testify
in his own behalf.
(b) The decisions on what witnesses to call, whether and how to conduct
cross-examination, what jurors to accept or strike, what trial motions should
be made, and all other strategic and tactical decisions are the exclusive
province of the lawyer after consultation with his client.
(c) If a disagreement on significant matters of tactics or strategy arises
between the lawyer and his client, the lawyer should make a record of the
circumstances, his advice and reasons, and the conclusion reached. The
record should be made in a manner which protects the confidentiality of the
lawyer-client relation.
1978]
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agreement take place,27 there is no need to eliminate the deliberate
bypass rule.-1 On the other hand, if counsel's failure to discuss the
issue with defendant stems from the attorney's ignorance or negli-
gence with respect to the constitutional claim or with respect to the
appropriate procedure for asserting the claim, imposition of a forfei-
ture is wholly at odds with the Court's suggestion that the deliberate
bypass rule should be rejected because it encourages "sandbagging"
by defense counsel.
The notion that was implicit in the majority opinion 5 was ex-
plicitly stated in the Chief Justice's concurrence:
Once counsel is appointed, the day-to-day conduct of the de-
fense rests with the attorney. He, not the client, has the immedi-
ate-and ultimate-responsibility of deciding if and when to object,
which witnesses, if any, to call, and what defenses to develop. Not
only do these decisions rest with the attorney, but such decisions
must, as a practical matter, be made without consulting the
client.21
With few exceptions,29' this description of the "realities" of effective
litigation of criminal cases appears to be inaccurate. Basic decisions
concerning trial strategy, witnesses to be called, and defenses, consti-
tutional or otherwise, should be made before trial after complete
consultation and information sharing between attorney and client.,,
The "on-the-spot" trial decisions that concern the Court should, for
the most part, be carefully considered and decided long before the
moment of truth.2 9 3 Indeed, if the Chief Justice's concern is that
287. Although section 5.2 of the ABA Defense Function Standards makes such
tactical decisions "the exclusive province of the lawyer after consultation with the
client," if the latter strongly disagrees, counsel should consider whether he or she is
obliged to withdraw from the case. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONISmILTY DR
2-110(C)(1)(d).
288. This assumes that the decision not to object is based on strategic or tactical
considerations and that the advice given by counsel is within the range of competence
required of criminal defense attorneys. If not, the issue of ineffective assistance of
counsel is presented.
289. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 91 n.14 (1977).
290. Id. at 93 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (footnote omitted). Section 5.2(b) of the
ABA Defense Function Standards, on which the Chief Justice relies, generally supports
his position, with the conspicuous exception that it requires that decisions of the sort
he mentions be made "after consultation" with the client. See note 286 supra.
291. Careful preparation will eliminate the possibility of surprise in many instan-
ces. But, for example, where the prosecution offers unanticipated hearsay testimony
implicating the sixth amendment confrontation and cross-examination rights, counsel
will not have sufficient time to consult with the accused.
292. See Tigar, supra note 119, at 23-24, 27. See generally F. BAILEY & H.
ROTHBLA'rr, supra note 272, §§ 3, 13, 31, 38, 133, 144, 149; I. MENDELSON, DEFENDING
CRIMINAL CASES 51-53 (rev. ed. 1967).
293. See generally Wright & Sofaer, supra note 15, at 895, 972-75. To be sure,
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defendants not interfere with decisions made on their behalf by coun-
sel, it is unclear why he concedes that determinations whether to
waive a jury trial or to testify are decisions "ultimately for the ac-
cused to make" '94 since both decisions are integral to an attorney's
formulation of trial strategy. It is likewise unclear why these deci-
sions are to be considered different in kind from the determination
whether to seek suppression of a confession. Furthermore, if the basic
decision to testify is one that the client must ultimately make, it
should presumably be an informed decision considered in the context
of the other "myriad tactical decisions"' 5 that should also be made
before trial and after consultation between the accused and his or her
attorney.
This paternalistic view of the attorney-client relationship offers
a rather disturbing glimpse of the majority's view of defendants in
criminal cases. There is an underlying assumption that such defen-
dants are incapable of making intelligent decisions concerning mat-
ters deeply affecting their lives-a view that not all members of the
Court espouse when deciding that a confession has been knowingly
and intelligently made to police officers by a defendant who fully
comprehended his or her Miranda rights.96
criminal trials, conducted for the most part without the benefit of liberal pretrial
discovery as in civil cases, offer the potential for uncertainty and unanticipated evi-
dence. To the extent that such unexpected events occur and may necessitate a major
change in defense strategy, a recess could be requested to discuss the matter with
defendant. If a recess is not possible or such surprises are less momentous, the attorney
will necessarily be required to take action without consulting his or her client. In the
latter circumstances, the fairness of imputing counsel's procedural default to the ac-
cused should be considered.
294. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 93 n.1 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
Chief Justice Burger was relying on section 5.2 of the ABA Defense Function Standards
in excepting these decisions from counsel's ultimate control. The text of section 5.2
appears at note 286 supra.
295. 433 U.S. at 93 (Burger, C.J., concurring). The decision by the defendant to
testify cannot be made in a vacuum. If the accused is unaware of the overall trial
strategy, his or her uninformed determination to testify or not to do so can effectively
destroy a successful defense of the case.
296. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 417-20 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissent-
ing). In this 5-4 decision, the majority held inadmissible a confession made by an
escapee from a mental hospital. Defense counsel had made arrangements for the defen-
dant to surrender himself; after arraignment, counsel was refused permission to travel
with defendant when he was being transported from one city to another. The defense
attorney explicitly told the police not to question the accused during this trip, and the
police promised not to do so as part of the original agreement to effect defendant's
surrender. Nonetheless, a confession and the fruits thereof (the dead body of a ten-
year-old girl) were elicited during the journey. In his dissent, the Chief Justice stated,
inter alia,
[Constitutional rights are personal, and an otherwise valid waiver should
not be brushed aside by judges simply because an attorney was not present.
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What amounts to a denigration of human dignity and ability to
make intelligent choices has been successfully obfuscated by the
Court's emphasis on the lawyer's mystique. Only the attorney is
deemed capable of making critical litigation decisions. Such a broad
assumption warrants more careful scrutiny.
The same sort of exalted estimation of oneself and one's profes-
sion is not confined to attorneys. An identical issue is raised in medi-
cal malpractice suits based on the alleged lack of informed consent.
Physicians defend their failure to apprise patients of particular risks
on the basis of the nonprofessional's inability to understand such
esoterica.29 7 Communication of the risks would also allegedly frighten
patients, resulting in their refusal to undergo what the doctor consid-
ers to be necessary medical treatment.28 Physicians therefore urge
that the duty to disclose risks be determined by the prevailing cus-
toms of physicians in the community. Although a majority of jurisdic-
tions still accept this standard,299 a substantial minority have rejected
it, one court articulating the following reasons:
[Ilt is the prerogative of the patient, not the physician, to deter-
mine for himself the direction in which his interests seem to lie. To
enable the patient to chart his course understandably, some famil-
iarity with the therapeutic alternatives and their hazards becomes
essential.
• . . The discussion need not be a disquisition, and surely the
physician is not compelled to give his patient a short medical educa-
tion; the disclosure rule summons the physician only to a reasonable
explanation.
There are. . . formidable obstacles to acceptance of the notion
that the physician's obligation to disclose is either germinated or
limited by medical practice. . . . [T]o bind the disclosure obliga-
tion to medical usage is to arrogate the decision on revelation to the
physician alone.3
The Court's holding. . denigrates an individual to a nonperson whose free
will has become hostage to a lawyer so that until a lawyer consents, the
suspect is deprived of any legal right or power to decide for himself that he
wishes to make a disclosure. It denies that the rights to counsel and silence
are personal, nondelegable, and subject to a waiver only by that individual.
Id. at 419. See generally Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976); Michigan v.
Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
297. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 782 n.27 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
298. See id. at 778; Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 241-42, 502 P.2d 1, 9, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 505, 513 (1972).
299. See Riskin, Informed Consent: Looking for the Action, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 580,
582, 587.
300. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 781, 782 n.27, 783-84 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
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The same court noted, however, that the above test related only to
risk disclosures and did not affect determinations with respect to the
physician's performance of professional duties, which continued to be
governed by "prevailing medical practice" in the community.,,
Similarly, in the case of lawyers, although professional perform-
ance may be tested by prevailing standards in the legal community,32
there should be a duty to disclose all material information and to give
advice concerning the waiver of a constitutional claim.3 3 Indeed,
there may be a greater need for disclosure on the part of attorneys
than there is in the case of physicians since the lawyer must have the
ongoing and informed cooperation of his or her client throughout the
course of litigation."'
Aside from the Court's characterization of the Florida procedure
as a "contemporaneous-objection rule" and its conceptual construct
of the attorney-client relationship, other facets of the majority's pol-
icy analysis in Sykes are at the least problematic. It is true that, as
Justice Rehnquist claimed, a contemporaneous objection will enable
the state trial judge who observes demeanor to hold a hearing on
the constitutional claim when witnesses' memories are freshest, that
the resulting record will be accorded great weight in any subsequent
federal habeas proceeding, and that finality in criminal proceedings
will thus be a more distinct possibility.3 5 Moreover, the state clearly
has a legitimate interest in attaining such goals. These considerations
do not, however, dispose of the issue that was before the Court: what
penalties should be exacted from a defendant whose lawyer, because
of negligence or ignorance, did not make a proper objection?3 6
It is not at all clear that such considerations are inconsistent with
protecting the defendant from the effects of such negligence. For
example, one means of assuring that objections are made at trial is
to require the judge to ask defendant and his or her attorney whether
they are waiving the right to press a constitutional claim. Indeed, the
majority rejected what could have been a fairly simple solution to the
problem of default in this case by refusing to accept Sykes' contention
that Jackson v. Denno required a hearing on the voluntariness of a
denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972) (footnotes omitted).
301. Id. at 784-85.
302. But see text following note 394 infra.
303. Cf. D. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE? 56 (1972) (study
of a sample of personal injury claims in New York City indicates "a significant, posi-
tive statistical relationship between client participation and good case result").
304. Obviously, there are medical contexts in which cooperation by the patient
at all times is imperative, but there are also many medical procedures, such as those
performed after administration of a general anesthetic, during which the patient is only
passively involved.
305. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 88-89 (1977).
306. See id. at 100 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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confession even in the absence of a request from defense counsel.307
By rejecting such an interpretation of Jackson v. Denno, the
majority in effect abandoned the Johnson v. Zerbst standard for pro-
cedural defaults in the assertion of constitutional claims by counseled
defendants, at least with respect to the challenging of confessions. If
the judge is not required to advise a defendant that he or she has a
right to a suppression hearing, which is the constitutionally man-
dated procedural mechanism for vindicating an involuntary confes-
sion claim, that right can be abandoned unknowingly and unintelli-
gently. Thus, in the same way that dilution of the waiver standard
in Estelle v. Williams perhaps necessitated a dilution of the deliber-
ate bypass standard,0 8 the elimination of deliberate bypass and sub-
stitution of a concept of procedural default by inaction in Sykes
create the possibility of, or perhaps necessitate, findings of in-court
waivers of substantive rights by inaction.3 0
307. See id. at 86.
308. See notes 222-25 supra and accompanying text.
309. There were three "waivers" in the Sykes case: (1) The waiver of defendant's
right against self-incrimination by making an out-of-court statement to the police; the
standard for waiver of this federal substantive right is the Johnson u. Zerbst test as
formulated in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)-the intentional relinquish-
ment of a known right. Theoretically, the Sykes decision does not affect this waiver
standard. (2) The waiver of defendant's federal right to challenge the voluntariness of
the foregoing out-of-court statement through a hearing, as required by Jackson v.
Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964); this waiver by Sykes was an in-court waiver of the consti-
tutionally prescribed means of testing the validity of his out-of-court waiver. The
holding in Sykes makes the standard for this in-court waiver inaction rather than a
knowing relinquishment. (3) The "waiver" of defendant's state remedies as a result of
his failure to comply with the state rules establishing how and when the federally
mandated hearing for determination of the voluntariness of a confession would be held.
The Supreme Court ruled that this default by inaction barred Sykes from asserting
his Jackson v. Denno right to a hearing challenging the voluntariness of his confession
in a federal habeas proceeding, absent showings of cause and prejudice. Accordingly,
here, too, Sykes makes the governing standard "waiver" (default) by inaction rather
than knowing and intentional relinquishment (deliberate bypass). Thus, what emerges
from Sykes is a symmetry between waivers of the sort involved in situation 2 and
procedural defaults of the sort involved in situation 3. In fact, it may be impossible to
have different standards for in-court waivers and for procedural defaults under state
law barring federal habeas relief.
For example, if the standard for in-court waiver of a substantive constitutional
right such as trial by jury is knowing relinquishment, see Adams v. United States ex
rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269 (1942), a federal habeas court could not use the Sykes test
of procedural default by omission. If, however, a habeas court did apply Sykes to such
a procedural default, it would in effect be changing the test for in-court waiver of the
right to trial by jury. Thus, assume that a state procedural rule required defendants
represented by counsel to request a trial by jury within ten days after indictment and
further provided that failure to make such a request (an in-court waiver) resulted
in the forfeiture of that right. If a defendant's attorney did not make a proper re-
quest because of ignorance of the rule, negligence, or inadvertence, and if the state
[Vol. 62:341
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It is unclear why the state trial judge was given no responsibility
to assure that the constitutional claim was in fact being waived2 °0 A
mere inquiry by the trial court as to whether the confession claim is
being waived places no great burden on the judge, nor does it interfere
with defense counsel's trial strategy. Moreover, the result would be a
record disclosing that defendant and counsel were aware of the claim
and presumptively waived it. Indeed, this is precisely the direction
in which the Court is moving in guilty plea cases by requiring the trial
judge to ascertain on the record the waiver of constitutional rights,
as well as, at least in some cases, defendant's awareness of the ele-
ments of the crime.3 1 ' The reason therefor is to create a record that
imposed a forfeiture on that basis, the federal habeas court would be confronted with
the issue of the appropriate standard to utilize in determining what effect should be
given to the state procedural default. If the habeas court decided that defendant's state
procedural default was governed by Sykes, then federal habeas relief would be barred
(absent showings of cause and prejudice), and, of necessity, the Johnson v. Zerbst
standard for in-court waiver of jury trials would be inapplicable. Conversely, if the
federal court found that Johnson v. Zerbst must be given effect, it could only do so by
applying Noia's deliberate bypass test rather than Sykes, and the state procedural
default rule would have no effect on the availability of federal habeas review.
If, as Chief Justice Burger stated in his concurring opinion in Sykes, waiver of the
right to trial by jury is a personal right of the accused that only he or she can waive,
see 433 U.S. at 93 n.1, then in this context the Johnson v. Zerbst standard should
prevail, and not the Sykes test. Since, however, the hypothetical state rule governing
waivers of jury trials is similar to the Florida rule for waiver of the constitutionally
mandated mechanism for vindicating fifth amendment rights, it is unclear why Sykes
should apply in one case and Johnson v. Zerbst in the other.
Similarly, if the Court found the hypothetical jury trial waiver rule unconstitu-
tional on the ground that it violated the federal law of waiver with respect to sixth
amendment rights, under what rationale would the Florida procedural rule involved
in Sykes escape constitutional invalidation? Neither rule is irrational since both estab-
lish orderly procedures for assertion of federal constitutional rights and both apply to
counseled defendants. If the Court gave greater deference to the right to jury trial, the
result would be an establishment of a hierarchy of rights in which jury trial, whose
absence does not affect the reliability of the fact-finding procedure, is given priority
over Jackson v. Denno rights, which do. Compare McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S.
528 (1971), with Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
310. Cf. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 243-44 (1973) (Johnson v.
Zerbst standard should not be applied to a noncustodial consent search by the police:
"To be true to Johnson and its progeny, there must be examination into the knowing
and understanding nature of the waiver, an examination that was designed for a trial
judge in the structured atmosphere of a courtroom.").
311. See, e.g., Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976); Boykin v. Alabama,
395 U.S. 238 (1969). In Morgan, the Court observed,
Normally the record contains either an explanation of the charge by the
trial judge, or at least a representation by defense counsel that the nature of
the offense has been explained to the accused. Moreover, even without such
an express representation, it may be appropriate to presume that in most
cases defense counsel routinely explain the nature of the offense in sufficient
detail to give the accused notice of what he is being asked to admit. This
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is, in large part, invulnerable to collateral attack.
There is, of course, good reason for requiring this sort of record
in the guilty plea context since the accused waives almost all rights.
A defendant's decision, instead, to proceed to trial should not, how-
ever, be viewed as disclosing defendant's intention to leave to counsel
all questions concerning whether any constitutional rights should be
asserted. Nor should the election to go to trial militate in favor of a
hands-off policy on the part of the state trial judge in advising defen-
dant of constitutional rights. The only apparent result of not requir-
ing the trial judge to advise defendant of constitutional claims and,
at the same time, imposing virtually absolute forfeitures in the event
of a failure to object is to place a penalty on defendants who refuse
to plead guilty and instead proceed to trial.
From the foregoing, the following observations can be made.
First, based upon a conception of the attorney-client relationship
that is of doubtful validity, the Court has chosen to force the defen-
dant to bear the full weight of his or her attorney's negligence. Sec-
ond, such an imposition was wholly unnecessary, for the Court had
available, indeed explicitly rejected, an alternative solution that
would protect the defendant and achieve the legitimate interests of
the state, without unduly burdening the courts. In addition, it ap-
pears that the specific evils upon which the Court justified its limita-
tions on the availability of federal habeas were largely irrelevant to
the question of whether the defendant should be penalized because
of the failing of his or her attorney.
One such policy ground is Justice Rehnquist's assertion that an
early objection "may force the prosecution to take a hard look at its
hole card" ;311 that is, the prosecutor might decide against using the
contested evidence out of fear of subsequent reversal. Aside from the
obvious unfairness of imposing a penalty upon the defendant as a
means of forcing the prosecutor to evaluate the admissibility of the
state's evidence, the technique is singularly ill-suited to its ends. The
district attorney has a threshold obligation to assure that he or she
is not using constitutionally impermissible evidence. 3 Every confes-
sion case raises a possible issue of involuntariness." ' Therefore, prior
case is unique because the trial judge found as a fact that the element of
intent was not explained to respondent.
426 U.S. at 647.
312. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 89 (1977).
313. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 5.6(b) (Approved Draft
1971) [hereinafter cited as ABA PROSECUTION FUNCTION STANDARDS].
314. Cf. Henry v. Williams, 299 F. Supp. 36, 41 (N.D. Miss. 1969) ("The District
Attorney knew that . . . [the police officer's] testimony as to what he found without
search warrant in the car during. . .[defendant's] absence was 'probably inadmissi-
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to trial the prosecutor will, at least in theory, already have made a
determination that the confession meets all constitutional require-
ments.31 5 If the district attorney decides that the confession was con-
stitutionally obtained, there is every reason to assume that the trial
judge will allow its admission in evidence. Most issues relating to the
voluntariness of confessions turn on the resolution of factual disputes
and therefore involve determinations of credibility by the trial judge.
Thus, unless the court uses an erroneous constitutional standard or
its determination is clearly not supported by the record," ' the district
attorney knows quite well that the possibility of reversal of a volun-
tariness finding by a state appellate court or federal habeas judge is
minuscule. Thus, the prosecution's decision to take a "hard look at
its hole card" is, for the most part, unrelated to the contemporaneous
objection by defense counsel.
The majority's concern with "sandbagging" by defense counsel
represents another policy consideration that affords no basis for the
imposition of a forfeiture on the accused. As Justice Brennan noted,
the defendant has much to gain and nothing to lose by tendering an
objection in accordance with state law.3"7 By doing so, the accused
increases the possibility of acquittal at the trial level or reversal on
appeal in the state courts and, at the same time, assures the preserva-
tion of federal habeas remedies. By opting instead to "sandbag,"
defendant increases the possibility of conviction by allowing the al-
legedly unconstitutional evidence to be admitted, forfeits all state
remedies with respect to the constitutional claim in the absence of
"plain error," precludes direct Supreme Court review because of the
adequate state ground rule, and also forfeits federal habeas relief if
there is a finding of deliberate bypass.' 5
In any event, the sandbagging rationale is inapplicable to attor-
neys who commit defaults as a result of negligence or ignorance.
These lawyers cannot possibly be deterred by the imposition of a
ble' on Fourth Amendment grounds .... To the prosecution's surprise, when answers
respecting the search were elicited, there was no immediate defense objection.").
315. Alternatively, if the prosecutor is uncertain with respect to the admissibility
of the confession, he or she will have made plans based on the contingency that such
evidence will be suppressed.
316. See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
317. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 103 n.5 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing).
318. The only conceivable benefit derived from not asserting a constitutional
objection in state court is the hope that an evidentiary hearing thereon will later be
conducted by a federal habeas court that may be more sympathetic to the claim than
the state court would be. The risks involved, however, in thus circumventing state
court determinations of questions of fact and credibility (namely, possible forfeiture
of all direct state and federal remedies) are so great that no rational attorney would
advise taking such a course of action. See Reitz, supra note 15, at 1369-70.
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forfeiture against their clients. On the other hand, if the default is
intentional, proper application of the deliberate bypass concept
would preclude federal habeas relief in the case of the true sandbag-
ger. 31
9
Justice Rehnquist also evinced a concern that Noia operated to
force state courts to resolve constitutional claims on the merits not-
withstanding defendant's failure to comply with state procedural
rules.3 210 Such compulsion would, in the Court's view, stem from a
desire to avoid the possibility that the federal court would decide the
constitutional question without an initial determination thereof by
the state tribunal. To the extent that the majority was suggesting
that Noia creates a Hobson's choice for the state court, the election
imposed upon the latter is clearly less painful and the consequences
clearly less onerous than the everyday strategic and tactical decisions
that defendants and their attorneys must necessarily make in the
course of criminal litigation.32 ' In fact, most defendants will elect to
utilize state procedures, and the state will not be forced to make this
grisly choice. Those who engage in tactical maneuvers in circumven-
tion of state procedural rules will, as the state court knows, be barred
from securing federal habeas relief under the deliberate bypass rule.
What is left is a residuum of ignorant or negligent defaulters. With
respect to that category of defendants, the state should be encouraged
to decide constitutional claims on the merits.3 22 If the state court
nonetheless decides that its procedural rules are paramount, it has a
perfect right to do so and to impose a forfeiture of state remedies in
this context.2 3 In a federal system, however, the right of a defendant
319. Proper application of the deliberate bypass rule would require findings that
the accused agreed to sandbag and that the attorney's advice to do so, resulting in an
absolute forfeiture, was "within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in
criminal cases." McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970).
320. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 89-90 (1977). But see Reitz, supra
note 15, at 1352:
On the level of sound policy, one very desirable goal is to define the
federal habeas corpus jurisdiction so as to serve as an incentive for improve-
ment of state procedures. Improvement should mean, primarily, an increase
in the number of cases which are heard and determined in the state courts
on the merits of the controversy rather than on procedural issues. It would
obviously reduce frictions if the state courts met and fairly decided the
federal questions arising out of the administration of their criminal laws
because there would be less need and fewer occasions to call upon the federal
courts to vindicate federal rights in this area.
321. See, e.g., United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600 (1976); Brady v. United
States, 397 U.S. 742, 751-53 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 769-70
(1970).
322. See note 320 supra.
323. An argument could be advanced, however, that imposition of a forfeiture
of state remedies on this class of defendants.violates due process or equal protection.
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to assert in a federal forum a constitutional claim that he or she has
unintentionally failed to assert in state court should outweigh the
state's value choice in favor of rigid adherence to its procedural rules.
As a final policy argument, Justice Rehnquist observed that the
availability of federal habeas despite a procedural default would tend
to "detract from the perception of the trial of a criminal case in state
court as a decisive and portentous event."3'' This is simply another
facet of the finality obsession. As pointed out by Justice Brennan, our
judicial system does not view finality as the ultimate virtue.32 The
harshness of the Court's demand in the case of a defendant whose
attorney has mistakenly defaulted seems almost medieval. Moreover,
no matter how liberal the rules for direct and collateral review are,
the trial will always remain the "main event," simply by virtue of the
fact that acquittal at that point is the single most important goal of
the defendant in every criminal case. Indeed, even if the defendant
expects to be and is convicted, the trial is no less "portentous"; the
judgment of conviction carries with it a presumptive validity that
haunts the prisoner throughout all stages of subsequent appellate and
collateral review.
If, however, the Court truly believes that it is of transcendent
importance that the trial be made the focal point of criminal litiga-
tion, the same logic would also restrict access to federal habeas in the
case of defendants whose lawyers have not committed defaults in
state court. Although the majority claimed that its decision did not
change the law with respect to the availability of federal habeas to
nondefaulting defendants, 326 many of the policy arguments in Sykes
are equally applicable in that context. Sykes may therefore be a
portent of further evisceration of the power granted to federal courts
by 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to resolve constitutional claims of state prisoners.
In sum, none of the values served by the so-called contempora-
Although the state is not constitutionally required to provide appellate or collateral
remedies, see Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336 (1965); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
(1956), once having done so, it may arguably not deny such remedies on irrational
grounds, such as defendant's bad fortune in having retained or having been assigned
an ignorant, negligent, or blundering attorney.
324. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977).
325. See id. at 115 (Brennan, J., dissenting):
[I]t should be plain that in the real world, the interest in finality is repeat-
edly compromised in numerous ways that arise with far greater frequency
than do procedural defaults. The federal criminal system, to take one exam-
ple, expressly disapproves of interlocutory review in the generality of cases
even though such a policy would foster finality by permitting the authorita-
tive resolution of all legal and constitutional issues prior to the convening of
the "main event."
326. See id. at 78-81.
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neous objection rule, including the importance of finality in criminal
litigation, justifies the harsh forfeiture rule promulgated in the Sykes
case.
311
III. AFTER SYKES: OF LOST HORIZONS, INEPT
ATTORNEYS, AND IRATE PRISONERS
A. THE ROAD NOT TAKEN32
The decision in Wainwright v. Sykes came, after all, as no sur-
prise. The almost ineluctable momentum of the case law traced in
Part I of this Article virtually assured either continuation for some
time of the covert case-by-case maiming process typified by Francis
v. Henderson and Estelle v. Williams until, by a process of elimina-
tion, the deliberate bypass rule of Fay v. Noia had been gutted or a
more expedited process of evisceration through announcement of a
rule limiting the deliberate bypass doctrine to appellate and other,
narrowly circumscribed, nontrial decisions. The Sykes majority chose
the second alternative and indeed went a step further, confining de-
liberate bypass to the appellate context and leaving in doubt its
viability even there.
As the decisions during the interim between Noia and Sykes
reveal, the Supreme Court, even during the Warren era, was never
altogether comfortable with the deliberate bypass test. Yet, substitu-
tion of the rigid forfeiture rule established in Sykes hardly seems a
felicitous alternative. It would have been far preferable, from the
standpoint of assuring both an even-handed federalism and an
appropriate mechanism for vindication of the federal constitutional
327. Ultimately, all of these limitations on the finality of criminal
convictions emerge from the tension between justice and efficiency in a judi-
cial system that hopes to remain true to its principles and ideals. Reasonable
people may disagree on how best to resolve these tensions. But the solution
that today's decision risks embracing seems to me the most unfair of all: the
denial of any judicial consideration of the constitutional claims of a criminal
defendant because of errors made by his attorney which lie outside the power
of the habeas petitioner to prevent or deter and for which, under no view of
morality or ethics, can he be held responsible.
Id. at 115-16 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
328. I am aware that the proposal outlined in this section may be regarded as
quixotic, if for no other reason than that it would never be accepted by the present
Supreme Court majority. In this connection, I am reminded of an aside by Professor
Edmond Cahn in a jurisprudence course I took from him in the spring of 1964. He
observed that when Justices Murphy and Rutledge died in 1949 civil libertarians
despaired concerning the Court's future; he noted, however, that, looking at the com-
position of the Court in 1964 and the decisions it was rendering, such despair had been
shortlived. The message was clear: the law is not static, and changes and development
will occur, if not now, ultimately. See CAHN, A New Kind of Society, in THE GREAT
RIGHTS 9-12 (E. Cahn ed. 1963).
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claims of defendants in criminal cases, simply to abolish the deliber-
ate bypass limitation and to allow unlimited access to federal habeas
courts by all prisoners who had exhausted state remedies.
At the outset, it should be recognized that the deliberate bypass
rule was neither statutorily nor constitutionally mandated. It was a
narrowly circumscribed, discretionary doctrine created by the Court
as a response to concerns of equity, federalism, and comity.2 9 Indeed,
because the state procedural default already resulted in a total forfei-
ture of the right to assert federal constitutional claims in state court
and in the Supreme Court on direct review, there was good reason not
to impose a further hurdle, no matter how low, to assertion of the
claim in federal habeas court. A federal court finding of deliberate
bypass has a double-or-nothing effect; the defendant who has as-
serted and litigated all conceivable constitutional claims in state
court is entitled to present them anew in federal court and to receive
still another ruling on the merits, °0 while the hapless accused who has
failed to make particular objections in state court loses not only the
right to litigate those issues in that tribunal, but also the right to
secure a decision on the merits of the claims in federal court.
There is nothing inherent in the concepts of either federalism or
comity that required or even made it desirable for the Noia Court to
use the deliberate bypass rule as a means of imposing a forfeiture of
federal remedies. The federal statutory requirement that defendant
exhaust currently available state remedies protects all valid state
interests by compelling defendants to raise their constitutional
claims initially in state court.33' The states thus have the option of
providing collateral remedies for defaulting defendants and using
such proceedings to reach the merits of all constitutional claims as-
serted by state prisoners. The state courts have an added incentive
329. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 433, 438-40 (1963). Professor Reitz viewed
the deliberate bypass rule as a doctrine that would prevent the undermining of the
section 2254 requirement that prisoners exhaust their state remedies. Reitz, supra note
15, at 1315, 1368-70; see AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMI-
NAL JUSTIcE, STANDARDS RELATING TO POST-CONVICTON REMEDIES § 6.1 (Approved Draft
1968) (Professor Reitz was the Reporter to the Advisory Committee on Sentencing and
Review for the report on Post-Conviction Remedies.). Section 6.1 in effect adopts a
deliberate bypass test as the means for determining the availability of state postcon-
viction relief in the event of a procedural default at trial or on appeal.
330. See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 318 (1963).
331. This of course assumes that the statutory exhaustion requirement applies
only to currently available state remedies, as the Court held in Noia. See 372 U.S. at
399, 434-35.
A study of federal habeas actions by state prisoners in Massachusetts during 1970-
1972 disclosed that over fifty percent of such petitions were dismissed for failure to
exhaust state remedies. Shapiro, Federal Habeas Corpus: A Study in Massachusetts,
87 HARv. L. REv. 321, 356 (1973).
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to decide all such claims on the merits: if this is done, it is possible
to develop a record showing that the accused received a full and fair
hearing and that the state's rejection of the constitutional contention
is fairly supported by the evidence. Such a record will ordinarily
defeat a plenary hearing in federal court.12 If a state chooses instead
to deny relief on the basis of a procedural default in order to assure
the orderly utilization of its procedures or to conserve its judicial
resources, the state surely has a right to do so. That calculated deci-
sion by the state to vindicate its particular interests should not, how-
ever, have any effect on the prisoner's right of access to the federal
courts.
To be sure, if the exhaustion doctrine constituted the only barrier
to federal habeas relief, there would be a residuum of federal-state
friction in those states that chose not to provide collateral remedies
for resolution of the underlying constitutional claims on the merits.
In those jurisdictions state prisoners would be free to proceed to fed-
eral court to litigate such claims notwithstanding a state determina-
tion that its ignored procedures are of paramount importance and
that a forfeiture should be imposed. It should be noted, however, that
defendants whose constitutional claims are resolved on the merits
through established state collateral procedures and defendants who
commit no procedural errors and thus receive a hearing on the merits
in state court are nonetheless able to press their constitutional claims
in federal habeas actions-arguably an even greater insult to the
states233 This sort of conflict is inevitable in a federal system in which
power is distributed between the two sovereignties, but in which the
federal courts are given final authority with respect to the meaning
of federal constitutional rights. Through its supremacy clause, the
Constitution decrees that in certain areas ultimate power rests in the
federal government.
332. See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312-13 (1963).
333. In such cases, however, the "insult" to the state is mitigated by the fact that
state court resolution of factual matters will be given great weight by the federal
habeas court. See id.
Indeed, if anxiety over federal-state friction is of paramount concern to the Court,
the miscarriage-of-justice standard alluded to in Sykes might well result in still greater
tension between the two sovereignties. Under Noia and its deliberate bypass test, if
there was a federal habeas hearing notwithstanding a state procedural default, the
state did not lose face as a result of the federal court's deciding a federal constitutional
claim. If, however, as a prelude to such a determination, the federal court must first
rule that the state trial was such a travesty that it resulted in a miscarriage of justice,
this frontal assault on the integrity of the state judicial system can hardly be rational-
ized away as federal dabbling with federal constitutional rights. If the cause and
prejudice requirements are applied in as harsh a manner as the Sykes opinion suggests,
however, this apprehension of increased federal-state tension will undoubtedly be ren-
dered illusory.
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In view of these rather substantial arguments against imposition
of any deliberate bypass rule, one may wonder why the Noia Court
nonetheless spawned a concept that has required so much additional
litigation and caused so much confusion." 4 As originally formulated,
the deliberate bypass rule placed a heavy burden of proof on the
states. This burden would, in many instances, have necessitated fed-
eral court bypass hearings more lengthy than the hearings required
to decide the merits."' Thus, a possible explanation for the rule's
334. For example, in his concurring opinion in Sykes, Justice Stevens stated that
that decision was "consistent with the way other federal courts have actually been
applying Fay," and cited a number of lower court decisions in support of the foregoing
proposition. See 433 U.S. 72, 94 & n.1. Justice Brennan in dissent cited a group of cases
in support of the view "that the bypass formula has provided a workable vehicle for
protecting the integrity of state rules in those instances when such protection would
be both meaningful and just." See id. at 102 & n.4.
Interestingly, six of the cases cited by Justice Brennan were also relied upon by
Justice Stevens. For example, Moreno v. Beto, 415 F.2d 154 (5th Cir. 1969), was cited
by Justice Stevens for the proposition that "even a deliberate choice by trial counsel
has been held not to be a 'deliberate bypass' when the result would be unjust" and
by Justice Brennan as a case in which Noia provided "a meaningful standard govern-
ing the scope of federal collateral review." The Moreno court found no deliberate
bypass in failing to challenge confession on voluntariness grounds, notwithstanding
strategic decision by counsel apparently acquiesced in by the defendant because at
time of trial there was no constitutionally adequate procedure for such a challenge.
United States ex rel. Green v. Rundle, 452 F.2d 232 (3d Cir. 1971), was cited by
Justice Stevens as an example of a case in which defendant's personal participation
was not required and by Justice Brennan as a case in which bypass was found as a
result of the tactical nature of the defense decision. The defense attorney's failures to
object to consolidation of charges and to request cautionary instructions were found
to be tactically motivated, but were not participated in by the petitioner; and this
tactical choice regarding consolidation of charges was made notwithstanding defense
attorney's unawareness that evidence with respect to one of the charges was extremely
prejudicial. The Rundle court nonetheless found deliberate bypass, rejecting defen-
dant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and his claim that his attorney insisted
on a jury trial over his objection.
Paine v. McCarthy, 527 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1975) (per curiam), cert denied, 424
U.S. 957 (1976), was cited by Justice Stevens for the position that "a decision by
counsel may not be binding if made over the objection of the defendant" and by
Justice Brennan as an example of a case allowing federal habeas review where there
was no tactical basis for the default. The Paine court found no deliberate bypass where
defendant requested his attorney to present speedy trial issue on direct appeal and his
attorney advised against doing so. It is conceivable that there was a tactical basis for
not including this contention on appeal, namely that counsel thought that the claim
was frivolous and that it would obscure more meritorious issues.
335. See, e.g., Mottram v. Murch, 330 F. Supp. 51, 55 (D. Me. 1971) (four-day
hearing on the issue of deliberate bypass), rev'd, 458 F.2d 626 (1st Cir.), rev'd per
curiam, 409 U.S. 41 (1972).
In other contexts, the Court has proceeded to decide the merits of claims in order
to avoid more difficult threshold issues. See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families
for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 847 (1977) (refusing to decide whether plaintiffs
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creation is that the Court believed that the states would rarely assert
claims that the defendant deliberately bypassed state procedures
because of the difficult and time-consuming process of proving the
claim or because the state itself desired a federal determination of
the constitutional issue on the merits.3" In addition, the Court may
have thought that state courts would, after Noia, be more likely to
decide federal claims on the merits notwithstanding procedural de-
faults.37 Thus, under this view of the effect of Noia, the bypass re-
quirement would not have constituted a heavy drain on federal judi-
cial resources. Alternatively, because the Court was abolishing its
earlier stringent forfeiture rule, it may have desired to give some
assurance to the states that the federal courts would continue, at
least in certain circumstances, to give a degree of deference to state
procedural defaults and thus assure finality in a limited range of
cases. Finally, the deliberate bypass rule can also be viewed as recog-
nizing a measure of personal accountability by prohibiting the defen-
dant who, after discussion with competent counsel, made a tactical
determination not to assert a particular claim in state court from
nevertheless being able to do so in a federal forum.
Whatever the original motivation for engrafting the deliberate
bypass limitation onto the Noia ruling, the ensuing difficulties in
applying the doctrine could have been obviated and a more workable
solution effected simply by elimination of the bypass rule as a barrier
to federal habeas relief. 38
possessed a liberty interest under the fourteenth amendment); Katzenbach v. Morgan,
384 U.S. 641, 656-57 (1966) (avoiding decision on standing issue).
336. See Kibbe v. Henderson, 534 F.2d 493, 496 & n.4 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd on
other grounds, 431 U.S. 145 (1977).
337. See Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 453 (1965) ("It has been suggested
that . . . [federal-state] friction might be ameliorated if the States would look upon
our decisions in Fay v. Noia . . . and Townsend v. Sain . . . as affording them an
opportunity to provide state procedure, direct or collateral, for a full airing of federal
claims.") (citations and footnote omitted).
338. But see Shapiro, supra note 331, at 346-49. Professor Shapiro found, on the
basis of his study of federal habeas in Massachusetts, that Noia may not have had "as
substantial an impact as has sometimes been suggested . . . . [Ilt has not flooded
the courts with petitioners who have inadvertently forfeited their state remedies." Id.
at 349. The lessened impact resulted from state courts determining federal claims of
allegedly defaulting defendants on the merits and from federal court findings of by-
pass, utilizing Henry v. Mississippi to impute defaults to defendants. Professor Shap-
iro concluded that, to the extent Noia provided an impetus to the states to resolve
federal claims on the merits, such a "'spillover' effect . . . is one of the strongest
arguments in favor of the jurisdiction in its present form." Id. at 348 n.144.
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B. THE INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE Sykes DECISION
1. The Finality Rationale in Light of the State's Role and the
Affected Prison Population
It can fairly be said that abolition of the deliberate bypass doc-
trine as a limitation on federal habeas was not an option that would
have been viewed with great favor by the Burger Court majority.
Instead, the Sykes decision imposed considerably more stringent re-
strictions upon the availability of habeas in the case of state prisoners
who committed procedural defaults in asserting constitutional
claims. The ultimate rationale for the increasingly restrictive ap-
proach taken by the present Court is, in all probability, the need for
assuring finality in criminal cases. 39
To be sure, there can be little doubt about the value of putting
an end to litigation of criminal cases once a defendant's constitu-
tional claims have been fully and fairly adjudicated on the merits. '"
Where finality is insisted upon in the absence of such an adjudication
on the merits, however, a value choice has been made that in a world
of finite resources 3' it is preferable that a matter be resolved quickly
339. According to Justice Brennan, "the only thing clear about the Court's
'cause'-and-'prejudice' standard is that it exhibits the notable tendency of keeping
prisoners in jail without addressing their constitutional complaints." Wainwright v.
Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 116 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
340. There are indications that a substantial minority of federal habeas attacks
by state prisoners do not relate to their state court convictions and thus do not disturb
the finality thereof. Professor Shapiro's study in Massachusetts disclosed that "less
than 60% of the state prisoner habeas applications were attacks on the validity of state
criminal convictions." Shapiro, supra note 331, at 330. The remaining applications
included challenges to indeterminate commitments of sexually dangerous persons,
attacks against excessive bail pending trial, complaints relating to prison conditions,
and parole revocation challenges. See id. at 328-30.
341. The Sykes opinion does not rely on a floodgates argument, but that concern
was evinced in a dissenting opinion in Noia, see Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 445-46
(1963) (Clark, J., dissenting), and it is clear that conservation of federal judicial re-
sources is a continuing concern of the present Court. This concern, however, should
be evaluated in light of the actual number of state habeas petitions filed in the federal
courts.
As of June 30, 1976, there were 140,189 civil cases pending in the United States
District Courts, an increase of 17.1% over the number pending on the same date in
1975. Of these 140,189 civil cases, 3,715 (or 2.65%) were state habeas corpus petitions,
an increase of 13.2% over the preceding year. [1976] U.S. DiRECTOR AD. OFF. OF THE
CouRTs ANN. REP. Table 20, at 181. During the fiscal year 1976, 7,389 state habeas
petitions were filed in the United States District Courts, and the median time for their
disposition was two months. Of the total number filed, 7,080 were disposed of before
the pretrial stage, 106 were concluded during or after pretrial, and 200 were disposed
of by trial. Id. Table C-5B, at 324.
According to a 1969-1970 time study of the United States District Courts con-
ducted for the Federal Judicial Center, state habeas actions comprised 6.704% of the
civil cases filed and occupied 5.195% of the judges' time. By comparison, the major
category of diversity contract actions (entitled "Other Contract Actions") comprised
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than that it be resolved correctly. The mass of defendants surely wish
to avoid default in order to make maximum use of both state and
federal court remedies. If the Court is concerned that federal habeas
will be abused by the wily jailhouse lawyer who slyly waits months
or years to raise constitutional claims, hoping to prevail because ad-
verse evidence relating to the alleged constitutional defect and the
underlying criminal charge will have disappeared,34 ' it is clear that
the class of defendants engaging in such maneuvers is extremely
limited. It is not unreasonable to assume that the overwhelming
majority of prisoners bringing federal habeas actions are anxious to
secure their release as quickly as possible. In any event, the Rules
Governing Section 2254 Cases recently promulgated by the Supreme
Court take care of this problem, for the most part, by inclusion of a
laches provision permittiiig the state to show prejudice as a result of
the prisoner's delay and, in the event of such a showing, requiring
the prisoner to prove that the petition "is based on grounds of which
he could not have had knowledge by the exercise of reasonable dili-
gence before the circumstances prejudicial to the state occurred." 3
Thus, any conceivable problem posed by this category of malingering
Rip Van Winkle claimants is clearly de minimis.
8.265% of the civil cases and took up 10.992% of the judges' time; motor vehicle
diversity tort actions made up 11.841% of civil cases and occupied 9.828% of the
judges' time. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE STATIsncAL REPORTING SERVICE AND GRADUATE
SCHOOL, 1969-70 FEDERAL Dismucr COURT TIME STUDY Table XVII, at 66C-66D (1971).
Thus, the total number of federal habeas petitions by state prisoners is clearly not
overwhelming, either in an absolute sense or relative to other federal civil actions.
Moreover, the vast proportion of the petitions filed are dismissed without hearings.
There are also indications that the hearings that are conducted are of brief duration.
See Shapiro, supra note 331, at 335-37. Furthermore, if the appointment of counsel was
made mandatory, cases could be processed even more expeditiously since many pro se
petitions are unintelligible and since counsel would be able not only to focus the issues
but also to determine whether state court action was either required or would be more
efficacious. See id. at 342-46. Finally, the availability of federal habeas should not be
made dependent on budgetary considerations. The Court should look to Congress for
increased funding rather than looking, consciously or unconsciously, for means of
curtailing federal habeas relief.
342. See Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 540-42 (1976). See also Note, supra
note 15, at 90.
343. R. GOVERNING § 2254 CASES 9(a). It is interesting to note that the Rule as
originally promulgated by the Court included the following provision:
If the petition is filed more than five years after the judgment of conviction,
there shall be a presumption, rebuttable by the petitioner, that there is
prejudice to the state. When a petition challenges the validity of an action,
such as revocation of probation or parole, which occurs after judgment of
conviction, the five-year period as to that action shall start to run at the time
the order in the challenged action took place.
H.R. REP. No. 464, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2485. These provisions were eliminated by Congress. Act of Sept. 16, 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-426, 90 Stat. 1334 (1976). The Rules became effective February 1, 1977.
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The substantially broader class of prisoners adversely affected by
the Court's recent rulings on state procedural defaults are not cun-
ning, longtime writ writers. Rather, they are uninformed, uneducated
individuals who are unrepresented at the time they file their writs."'
In addition, it is possible that such prisoners did not receive the best
of representation prior to conviction,34 5 and they may have been un-
aware of the constitutional rights their attorneys gave up in their
names or of the dire forfeitures resulting therefrom. Moreover, quite
possibly their attorneys failed to assert these rights as a result of
ignorance, inadvertence, or inertia and not as part of a series of canny
strategic maneuvers. To impose forfeitures on this vastly larger group
of defendants is simply an unfair tradeoff of the many for the few.
The state's interest in assuring the finality of its judgments of
conviction should not act as a bar to federal habeas, particularly in
cases such as those involving racial discrimination in grand jury se-
lection where the state itself has established the allegedly unconsti-
tutional process. In effect, the state has taken a calculated risk that,
for a variety of reasons, defendants such as Abraham Francis will not
attack the selection process. It is unclear why this type of tactical
choice by the state, which is the analogue to deliberate, tactical
choices by defendant to forgo constitutional claims, should be any
less binding on the wily state government.
Other constitutional claims, such as coerced confessions, even
though not stemming from a deliberate policy decision on the part of
the state, involve acts by agents of the state who in at least some
cases make deliberate decisions to violate defendant's constitutional
rights, 346 aware that such claims are frequently not litigated because
344. See Shapiro, supra note 331, at 330-31, 342.
345. See id. at 331 & n.54 (noting the frequency of claims relating to ineffective
assistance of counsel).
346. Cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14 (1968) (footnote omitted):
Regardless of how effective the [exclusionary] rule may be where obtaining
convictions is an important objective of the police, it is powerless to deter
invasions of constitutionally guaranteed rights where the police either have
no interest in prosecuting or are willing to forgo successful prosecution in the
interest of serving some other goal.
See also Younger, The Perjury Routine, 3 CmM. L. BuLL. 551 (1967) ("Every lawyer
who practices in the criminal courts knows that police perjury is commonplace.");
N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1977, § A, at 22, col. 1. The New York Times article describes
the arrest and interrogation of a person believed by California authorities to be a mass
killer (the alleged perpetrator of the "trash bag" murders). According to the article,
law enforcement officials in other counties in which the defendant is a suspect have
criticized officials in the arresting county for making a possibly illegal search and
seizure. One such rival official noted, however, that "'[elven if they did foul up the
arrest, I don't think there's a judge in the country who would have the guts to throw a
case of this magnitude out.'" Id. at col. 2.
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of the high percentage of guilty pleas .3  Thus, the state's agent has
taken a calculated risk, and if there are to be imputations of defense
counsel's defaults to the defendant, a fortiori, the misconduct of the
state's agent should be imputed to the sovereign; the latter should
not escape scrutiny as a result of defendant's procedural default.3 1
4
Moreover, the question of imputation must be considered in light of
the equitable nature of the habeas action. In balancing the state's
and society's interest in finality against defendant's and society's in-
terest in vindication of constitutional rights, it should be taken into
account that the state, with its overwhelming power vis-A-vis the
defendant, has voluntarily chosen its agents who have allegedly com-
mitted unconstitutional acts, whereas, in the great majority of cases
with which we are dealing, the indigent defendant has had no oppor-
tunity to select the attorney of his or her choice."' Indeed, defense
counsel is also, in a sense, the state's agent. Thus, one agent of the
state has engaged in an alleged constitutional violation, and another
has committed a procedural default that precludes any court from
determining the merits of the resulting constitutional claim. Accord-
ingly, in terms of access to federal court, there should be a recogni-
tion that imputation is a two-way street and there should, at the
347. See Tigar, supra note 119, at 21. See generally D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE
DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TmIL 3 (1966) ("Roughly 90 percent
of all criminal convictions are by pleas of guilty . . ... "); Alschuler, The Defense
Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179, 1206 n.84 (1975); Finkelstein,
A Statistical Analysis of Guilty Plea Practices in the Federal Courts, 89 HARv. L. REV.
293, 295 & app. I & II (1975). Finkelstein found that the percentage of guilty pleas
in federal district courts other than the District of Columbia in 1974 was 60.5%, the
range among 29 districts being from 35% to 72.6%. On the basis of statistical analysis,
the author was able to conclude that "the pressure on defendants to plead guilty in
the federal courts has induced a high rate of conviction by 'consent' in cases in which
no conviction would have been obtained if there had been a contest." Id. at 295.
348. But see Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493-94 (1976). The Court in Stone
concluded that allowing fourth amendment exclusionary rule challenges in federal
habeas actions would have a minimal incremental deterrent effect. The Court felt that
violations were sufficiently punished by suppression of illegally seized evidence by the
state courts or by the Supreme Court on direct review and that imposition of any
additional sanction via a federal habeas action was unwarranted. On the other hand,
state prisoners whose attorneys have inadvertently defaulted in the assertion of consti-
tutional claims in state court (the analogue of inadvertent fourth amendment viola-
tions by state police officials) now forfeit not only their state remedies and direct
Supreme Court review, but also their federal habeas remedies as well, unless they can
somehow scale the "cause" and "prejudice" wall, the heights of which are currently
unknown. Thus, at least in the case of the fourth amendment, sanctions against the
police end in the state courts, whereas sanctions against those who are charged with
crimes by these same officials and who engage unwittingly in procedural defaults are
applied not only in state court, but in federal habeas courts as well.
349. Alschuler, supra note 347, at 1242.
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least, be great reluctance to hold the defendant accountable for the
defaults of his or her attorney.
In sum, whatever the defects of the deliberate bypass test formu-
lated in Noia, the substitute put forward in Sykes seems far less
satisfactory. Moreover, by reinstituting the adequate state ground
rule as a bar to federal habeas in the absence of cause and prejudice
and by eliminating habeas jurisdiction with respect to those catego-
ries of constitutional claims that allegedly do not affect the funda-
mental fairness of the fact-finding procedure,35 the Court is effec-
tively destroying a number of the practical benefits of federal habeas
jurisdiction.
2. Federal Habeas-Safety Valve or Practical Joke?
One may question the value of the federal habeas jurisdiction in
view of the infrequent occasions on which relief is granted."' Aside
from the obvious usefulness to these rare beneficiaries, however, there
are indications that, even with respect to those petitioners whose
writs are denied or dismissed, substantial advantages accrue as a
result of the availability of the federal writ. According to one au-
thority, institution of the suit sometimes precipitates action by state
authorities that puts "derailed" state processes back in motion;, 2
moreover, even where the state court has already decided the pris-
oner's claims on the merits, "there is value in having independent,
relatively disinterested federal confirmation of the correctness of a
state conviction, in that there is one guaranteed federal review of the
federal questions that are now bound to arise in so many criminal
cases." -"3 A fortiori, where the state courts have refused to consider
the prisoner's federal claim on the basis of a procedural default, the
federal habeas court can play an even more valuable role.
Approached from another perspective, the Court has suggested
350. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 n.11 (1977); Castaneda v. Partida,
430 U.S. 482, 508 n.1 (1977) (Powell, J., dissenting); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387,
413-14 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
351. During the fiscal year 1976, the median time for disposition of section 2254
actions in the United States District Courts was two months, and only 2.7% of such
actions reached the trial stage. [1976] U.S. DIRECTOR AD. OFF. OF THE COURTS ANN.
REP. Table C-4, at 313, Table C-5B, at 324. From these statistics, it is reasonable to
infer that the vast majority of federal habeas actions do not result in dispositions
favorable to the petitioner. See Shapiro, supra note 331, at 335-37.
352. Shapiro, supra note 331, at 342. For example, one "petitioner filed a pro se
state habeas corpus petition in December 1970; it was not acknowledged by the clerk
until October 1971, and nothing further happened until a federal petition was filed in
March 1972. At that point, a state hearing . . . was scheduled . Id. at 341
(footnotes omitted).
353. Id.
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that one value of a guilty plea (which can only be entered knowingly
by the accused personally) is its demonstration that the defendant "is
ready and willing to admit his crime and to enter the correctional
system in a frame of mind that affords hope for success in rehabilita-
tion."35' Unless the Court has accepted the concept of rehabilitation
only as a basis for insulating guilty pleas from attack, presumably
that concept has some applicability with respect to defendants who
are convicted after trial. The extent to which any such rehabilitation
may be achieved in the case of defendants convicted after trial may
depend upon whether the judgment of conviction is perceived as ra-
tional and fair. Such a perception is less likely if the prisoner belat-
edly discovers that state court consideration of his or her constitu-
tional claim on the merits is precluded because defense counsel com-
mitted a procedural default of which the prisoner was unaware and
also learns that conviction might have been avoided entirely or that
conviction of a lesser offense might have been secured had the claim
been properly asserted. In this situation, the availability of a federal
forum to secure a hearing on the merits may aid in deflecting hostility
and in promoting whatever rehabilitative aspects the state correc-
tional system affords. After the Sykes decision, however, there is little
likelihood that the federal courts can play any such role.
Sykes may also be viewed as operating at least partially at cross-
purposes with the Supreme Court's recent ruling that the states have
an affirmative obligation to assure access to courts by providing ade-
quate law libraries or alternative methods of assisting prisoners in the
presentation of claims.3 5 In so holding, the majority noted that 95%
of state correctional officials who responded to a national survey fa-
vored creation and expansion of prison legal services and that "over
80% felt legal services provide a safety valve for inmate grievances,
reduce inmate power structures and tensions from unresolved legal
problems, and contribute to rehabilitation by providing a positive
experience with the legal system."3 ' By assuring prisoner access to
354. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 753 (1970). To be sure, the Court
noted in Brady that many pleas are based on the defendant's wish to minimize punish-
ment. See id. at 752.
The text accompanying this footnote is not intended to endorse the view that
imprisonment is a means of effecting rehabilitation, a concept about which consider-
able doubt has been expressed. See L. WIMUNS, EVALUATION OF PENAL MEAsu s 78
(1969); Bailey, Correctional Outcome: An Evaluation of One Hundred Reports, in 3
CRIME AND JUSTICE 187 (L. Radzinowicz & M. Wolfgang eds. 1971); Hood, Some Re-
search Results and Problems, in 3 CRIME AND JUSTICE 159 (L. Radzinowicz & M.
Wolfgang eds. 1971); Martinson, What Works?-Questions and Answers About Prison
Reform, 35 PUB. INTEREST 22 (1974).
355. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
356. Id. at 829 n.18 (citing Cardarelli & Finkelstein, Correctional Adminis-
trators Assess the Adequacy and Impact of Prison Legal Services Programs in the
United States, 65 J. CalM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 91, 95-98 (1974)). See Symposium-
[Vol. 62:341
HABEAS CORPUS
legal services or law libraries, the Court in effect provides the oppor-
tunity for more meaningful utilization of the writ and may increase
the prisoner's expectations concerning its availability." 7 If, at the
same time, the Court's decisions in fact restrict the availability of
federal habeas, a double bind may be created,35 and the prisoner may
perceive the law as being totally irrational. An inmate who did not
participate in and was wholly unaware of the state court procedural
default is handed the keys to the library and told to scrutinize the
law books with great care, for he or she now has the almost impossible
burden of not only establishing the merits of a constitutional claim,
but also explaining the reason for counsel's inaction and demonstrat-
ing that such passivity resulted in prejudice above and beyond the
possible loss of a constitutional right and the use of allegedly uncon-
stitutional evidence to secure a conviction. At the same time that the
requirement of the prisoner's personal participation in the default is
being eliminated, the defendant, a layperson, is being required to
explain away a lawyer's failures and to prove that this inaction has
resulted in such extreme prejudice that a miscarriage of justice has
occurred.
It is almost as if the Court had advised state prisoners that they
could secure relief, provided they were able to run a mile in under four
Habeas Corpus-Proposals for Reform, 9 UTAH L. REv. 18, 30 (1964) (remarks of Paul
Freund):
I am inclined to believe from the little that I hear about these things that
actually the availability of collateral relief is a very wholesome form of
therapy in the prisons. It keeps the men from planning jail breaks, and the
wardens say, "fine, if you can have a jail delivery by order of the Supreme
Court, we are all with you; just do not use a pick and shovel." It puts them
in the law library at the penitentiary, and we all agree that that is a very
healthy state of affairs. It gives them something to hope for. On balance, I
am inclined to think that it is probably better penology than the strict
closing of doors.
357. The relationship between access to prison libraries and the availability of
federal habeas was tacitly acknowledged in Justice Powell's concurring opinion in
Bounds: "[Tihe holding here implies nothing as to the constitutionally required scope
of review of prisoners' claims in state or federal court." 430 U.S. at 833.
Chief Justice Burger, in his dissenting opinion, stated "that there is no broad
federal constitutional right to. . .collateral attack" in federal court by state prisoners.
Id. at 835. He therefore concluded that the Court's holding implied either that there
was such a constitutional right or that "States can be compelled by federal courts to
subsidize the exercise of federally created statutory rights." Id. at 836.
358. Cf. 2 COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY, Glossary, at 2583 (2d ed. A.
Freedman, H. Kaplan, & B. Sadock 1975) ("Double bind. Two conflicting communica-
tions from another person. One message is usually nonverbal and the other verbal. For
example, parents may tell a child that arguments are to be settled peacefully and yet
battle with each other constantly.").
The law libraries decision does of course have value in other judicial contexts, such
as civil rights actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
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minutes at an event called "the merits race," and the Court further
told inmates that, to prepare for the race, they would be given track
shoes, stop watches, and reasonable access to a well-manicured track.
The prisoner, after extensive training utilizing these facilities, arrives
at the track only to discover a new entrance requirement-he or she
must first perform a seventeen-foot pole vault. To accomplish this
herculean feat, the prisoner is provided with a petrified pogo stick.
3. The Dilemma of Ineffective Assistance
As a result of the decision to scuttle Noia, the Court will be
compelled to deal meaningfully with the issue of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel. 5 Although Noia required consultation with compe-
tent counsel, direct confrontation of that issue could be deflected by
the decision's additional requirements that the default be tactically
motivated and that the accused personally participate in the by-
pass. 31 Sykes effectively eliminates both of these requirements.
Moreover, its cause and prejudice tests inexorably focus attention on
the performance of defense counsel. Thus, the urgency of providing
guidelines for determinations of ineffective assistance will be en-
hanced as more and more habeas petitions are denied because of the
procedural defaults of marginally effective attorneys, consequently
requiring prisoners who are thereby precluded from asserting other
constitutional claims to allege incompetency of counsel, either as a
means of satisfying the cause and prejudice requirements in Sykes36'
359. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 118 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting):
If the scope of habeas jurisdiction previously governed by Fay v. Noia is to
be redefined so as to enforce the errors and neglect of lawyers with unneces-
sary and unjust rigor, the time may come when conscientious and fair-
minded federal and state courts, in adhering to the teaching of Johnson v.
Zerbst, will have to reconsider whether they can continue to indulge the
comfortable fiction that all lawyers are skilled or even competent craftsmen
in representing the fundamental rights of their clients.
360. See Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 517 (1972), discussed at notes 74-85
supra and accompanying text. To the extent that Henry curtailed the personal partici-
pation requirement, it may have focused some attention on the issue of ineffective
assistance. Henry was, however, presumably limited to tactically motivated failures
to make contemporaneous objections, whereas Sykes contains no such limitations.
361. Since the Court did not define either of these requirements, it is unclear
whether a showing of ineffective assistance alone would be sufficient to meet both tests.
In Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976), discussed at notes 131-64 supra and
accompanying text, the Court held that both requirements must be met. Since the
district court in that case had already found the cause requirement satisfied because
of ineffective assistance, the Supreme Court may have been implying that ineffective
assistance alone was insufficient to meet both the cause and prejudice requirements.
The district court had not considered the prejudice issue, however, and the Supreme
Court's remand for a determination of the prejudice question is therefore not conclu-
sive in this regard.
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or as a separate sixth amendment claim.
36 2
Inasmuch as the Sykes majority focused on the possibility of a miscarriage of
justice in its discussion of the cause and prejudice requirements, it may be that a
strong showing of ineffective assistance would be deemed sufficient to satisfy both
tests. It should be noted, however, that the less effective counsel is, the less likely it is
that there will be a record sufficient to disclose "actual prejudice." See notes 380-81
infra and accompanying text. As previously noted, the issue of ineffective assistance
was not presented in Sykes.
It should also be pointed out that, in the event the Court determines that proof
of ineffective assistance will not satisfy both requirements, prisoners are more likely
to abandon attempts to meet the cause and prejudice standards in order to reach the
underlying claim as to which there was a procedural default and will instead simply
elect to assert sixth amendment challenges based on their attorneys' incompetence. In
this connection, a distinction may be drawn between ineffective assistance with respect
to the constitutional claim concerning which the default occurred and ineffective assis-
tance with respect to the entire trial. If the Court determines that ineffective assistance
regarding the defaulted claim satisfies only the cause requirement of Sykes and that
ineffectiveness as to the entire proceedings must be shown in order to meet the preju-
dice test, it seems clear that defaulting prisoners will not bother to attempt to meet
Sykes' dual requirements and will instead make straight sixth amendment attacks.
For instance, in Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 46
U.S.L.W. 3675 (U.S. May 2, 1978), which was argued before the Sykes decision was
rendered, but decided thereafter and without citation to Sykes, the Fourth Circuit
ruled that, in both trial and guilty plea contexts, it was abandoning the farce and
mockery test for determining ineffectiveness and was instead adopting the standard
announced in McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970), with respect to plea
cases, that counsel's performance must be "within the range of competence de-
manded of attorneys in criminal cases." 561 F.2d at 543. In its decision, the court
directed that Marzullo's habeas petition, which was based on a claim of ineffective
assistance, be granted. Interestingly, the sixth amendment contentions dealt with by
the court were predicated on trial counsel's procedural defaults. Defendant was
charged with rape in two separate cases. His trial attorney had (1) failed to seek
exclusion of the prospective jurors although they had witnessed the dismissal of the
first offense charged, (2) relinquished the right to peremptory challenges before the
voir dire examination of these jurors had taken place, and (3) failed to request an
instruction that the jury was not to consider the dismissed rape charge in its delibera-
tions. See id. at 545-47.
In LiPuma v. Commissioner, 560 F.2d 84 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 189
(1977), however, a case decided after Sykes, the court, while apparently accepting the
theory that an ineffective assistance claim could be a basis for defendant's failure to
move for a suppression hearing, id. at 90, went on to state,
The fact that petitioner's claim is ostensibly grounded on the Sixth, rather
than the Fourth, Amendment does not negate Stone's applicability, because
at the heart of this case lies an alleged Fourth Amendment violation. . .
The same remedy of exclusion is now sought by way of a collateral habeas
corpus proceeding, where a Sixth Amendment claim has beeri added for good
measure.
Id. at 93 n.6.
362. See Shapiro, supra note 331, at 349:
[I]t is important to note that had Noia been decided differently, so that an
adequate procedural ground would be a bar to federal habeas corpus, it
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Issues relating to ineffective assistance may be considerably
more difficult to resolve than other due process challenges. One indi-
cation of that difficulty is the Court's diffidence in resolving ques-
tions of incompetence in cases in which the defendant has proceeded
to trial. For example, in Chambers v. Maroney,0 3 a nonplea case
touted in advance as the Court's "vehicle for dealing once and for all
with the question of ineffective assistance," '364 the majority almost
casually dismissed the sixth amendment claim,365 with only Justice
Harlan addressing the issue fully and concluding that defendant was
at least entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the matter."6 In guilty
plea cases, the Court has established a fluid standard of whether
counsel's "advice was within the range of competence demanded of
attorneys in criminal cases."3 7 Although noting that defendants in
felony cases were entitled to "effective assistance of competent coun-
sel," the Court hastened to add that "the matter, for the most part,
should be left to the good sense and discretion of the trial courts. '368
On the other hand, in contested cases, the Court's refusal to grapple
with this issue has resulted in divergent lower court tests, with some
tribunals adhering to the requirement that the trial be a sham or
mockery6 6 and others requiring reasonably competent assistance
would be harder than it is now for a criminal defendant to obtain relief
notwithstanding a procedural default without a showing of ineffectiveness of
counsel; such claims might therefore be even more common than they are
today.
363. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
364. See Bazelon, supra note 153, at 21.
365. See 399 U.S. at 54 ("In this posture of the case we are not inclined to disturb
the judgment of the Court of Appeals as to what the state record shows with respect
to the adequacy of counsel.").
366. See id. at 55-60 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Harlan noted that new counsel for defendant who entered the case immediately
preceding retrial had made no objection to introduction of certain evidence notwith-
standing a possible fourth amendment violation, that his objection as to other evidence
indicated that he did not know the basis for its exclusidn during the first trial, and
that his cross-examination of a prosecution witness suggested that the attorney had
not worked out a trial strategy and was uncertain whether the accused would testify.
367. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970).
368. Id.; accord, Dukes v. Warden, 406 U.S. 250 (1972).
369. See, e.g., LiPuma v. Commissioner, 560 F.2d 84, 90-91 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 98 S. Ct. 189 (1977); United States v. Riebold, 557 F.2d 697, 703 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 186 (1977); United States v. Stern, 519 F.2d 521, 524 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1033 (1975); United States v. Katz, 425 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1970).
LiPuma was a post-Sykes decision adhering to the farce and mockery standard
where defense counsel's alleged ineffectiveness was a failure to make a fourth amend-
ment suppression motion. As an explanation for maintaining this rigorous standard,
the court stated, "[P]etitioners are more likely than not to equate their failure to
escape conviction with their counsel's alleged incompetence, regardless of the evidence
against them and other circumstances attendant upon a particular trial." 560 F.2d at
90.
[Vol. 62:341
HABEAS CORPUS
and looking to the American Bar Association Criminal Justice Stan-
dards37 as guidelines in this regard.37 '
To be sure, in the guilty plea context, the Court may be able to
continue glossing over the issue of incompetence because the almost
ritualistic state court record with respect to entry of the plea will
generally not disclose the deficiencies of counsel;37 at most, the re-
In United States v. Katz, Judge Friendly did not denominate the test applied as
a sham or farce standard, but instead purported to consider whether defense counsel's
conduct prevented the accused "from receiving a fair trial." 425 F.2d at 931. Defense
counsel had advised the trial judge that he did .not want to be on the case and was
simply doing his duty. In the course of doing his duty, Katz' trial attorney fell asleep
during the examination of a witness by another lawyer. Compare United States v.
Easter, 539 F.2d 663 (8th Cir. 1976), in which the court reversed a conviction on
ineffective assistance grounds, where counsel failed to object to evidence whose seizure
involved an apparent violation of the fourth amendment. The Eighth Circuit noted,
As we perceive the standard established in our prior decisions it is that trial
counsel fails to render effective assistance when he does not exercise the
customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would
perform under similar circumstances . . . . When he fails in the perform-
ance of this duty the proceedings may be said to have been reduced to a
"farce" and "mockery of justice."
Id. at 666 (citation and footnote omitted). On retrial, Easter's judgment of conviction
was affirmed. See United States v. Easter, 552 F.2d 230, 235-36 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
98 S.Ct. 145 (1977), discussed at note 409 infra.
370. See note 284 supra.
371. See, e.g., United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1203-04 (D.C. Cir.
1973); Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968). In
the Coles case the Fourth Circuit stated,
Counsel for an indigent defendant should be appointed promptly. Counsel
should be afforded a reasonable opportunity to prepare to defend an accused.
Counsel must confer with his client without undue delay and as often as
necessary, to advise him of his rights and to elicit matters of defense or to
ascertain that potential defenses are unavailable. Counsel must conduct
appropriate investigations, both factual and legal, to determine if matters
of defense can be developed, and to allow himself enough time for reflection
and preparation for trial.
Id. at 226 (footnote omitted).
372. See United States v. Simpson, 475 F.2d 934, 939-40 (D.C. Cir.) (Bazelon,
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 873 (1973). In a per curiam decision, the Simpson
majority refused to set aside the guilty plea of a section 2255 movant whose attorney
had a severe drinking problem, had no office, and whose attendance at the section 2255
proceeding was made possible only by the issuance of a warrant. See id. at 935-36.
Judge Bazelon noted that "the attorney knows that he will not be required to demon-
strate any preparation if his client pleads guilty" and suggested that a mechanism be
established to check the quality of the attorney's assistance in the plea context. Id. at
939-40. Similarly, in McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 763-64 (1970), one peti-
tioner alleged that assigned counsel spoke with him for only ten minutes before a plea
was entered and advised him that his coerced confession claim could be litigated later
by a writ of habeas corpus; another petitioner alleged that his counsel ignored an alibi
defense and erroneously advised him that the plea was only to a misdemeanor.
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cord will reflect a voluntary plea, 373 waiver of the right to trial,374 the
existence of a bargain, 37 5 defendant's admission of the factual allega-
tions underlying the crime charged, 38 and his or her awareness of the
elements of the crime. 77 It will not, however, disclose the amount and
quality of work performed by the attorney, whether there was a sound
basis for deciding to plead guilty rather than to go to trial, or whether
defendant was aware of possible antecedent constitutional defenses
that were lost as a result of the plea. This sparse record by itself will
be insufficient to raise the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
The evidentiary hearing, if any, with respect to that claim will consist
of testimony dehors the record. Basically, this will include defen-
dant's testimony, which is suspect, arrayed against that of his or her
attorney and, perhaps, the prosecutor and trial judge.3 18
With respect to defendants who proceed to trial, however, incom-
petence is somewhat more difficult to bury. Lack of factual investiga-
tion and legal research may be more readily reflected in the record
373. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750 (1970).
374. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
375. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
376. Cf. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) (even though defendant
asserted his innocence, Court upheld guilty plea because the state presented strong
evidence of guilt and because defendant clearly wished to enter the plea at the time it
was made); AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUsTICE,
STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY § 1.6 (Approved Draft 1968)
("Notwithstanding the acceptance of a plea of guilty, the court should not enter a
judgment upon such plea without making such inquiry as may satisfy it that there is
a factual basis for the plea.").
377. See Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976).
378. See, e.g., United States v. Corbett, 405 F. Supp. 473, 476 (W.D. Mo.), aff'd
per curiam, 524 F.2d 234 (8th Cir. 1975); United States ex rel. Johnson v. Mancusi,
401 F. Supp. 531, 533, 535 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem., 535 F.2d 1244 (2d Cir. 1975);
Huffman v. Missouri, 399 F. Supp. 1196, 1202-04 (W.D. Mo. 1975), aff'd per curiam,
527 F.2d 899 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 924 (1976); cf. Blackledge v. Allison, 431
U.S. 63 (1977) (Court set aside the district court's summary dismisshl of the prisoner's
habeas petition, finding, inter alia, that his allegations of an unkept sentencing prom-
ise were buttressed by "specific factual allegations," including "the [exact] terms of
the promise . . . ; when, where, and by whom the promise had been made; and the
identity of one witness to its communication."). But see McAleney v. United States,
539 F.2d 282, 286 (1st Cir. 1976) (where retained trial counsel corroborated his client's
allegation with respect to the terms of the plea bargain, the court stated that the
defense lawyer's competence should be investigated and that "[there is also to be
entertained the possibility of perjury and collusion aimed at upsetting the original
sentence").
Even in nonplea cases, testimony by defense counsel at the habeas hearing has
been viewed with skepticism. As noted by one court, "the evidence at the habeas
corpus hearing. . . consisted entirely of testimony by defense lawyers saying in large
measure what their respective defendants said to them. Though generally not objected-
to, it was largely hearsay and self-serving and of limited probative force." LiPuma v.
Commissioner, 560 F.2d 84, 92 n.3 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 189 (1977).
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of the trial, and such evidence may be more likely to trigger an evi-
dentiary hearing than in the plea context, where defendant is often
relegated to making bald assertions of ineffectiveness unsupported by
any objective extrinsic evidence. In the contested case, the trial re-
cord itself may provide support for defendant's allegations of incom-
petence."'
Paradoxically, in the case of truly inferior representation, the
trial record may be so sparse that defendant may be unable to utilize
it in support of his or her allegations of ineffectiveness.18 If, for exam-
ple, an attorney has failed to locate, interview, and subpoena alibi
witnesses for the original trial, their testimony will necessarily not
appear in the trial transcript. Such individuals may be impossible to
find by the time a federal habeas hearing is conducted,"' and even if
they are located, the passage of time may have dimmed their recollec-
tions and reduced their ability to testify with assurance about the
events in controversy. Moreover, if such deficient representation re-
sults in procedural defaults with respect to constitutional claims,
defendant's unawareness of the existence and loss of the rights in
question will delay assertion of the claims and may in turn feed the
Court's perception of wily defendants asserting stale challenges.
Thus, those prisoners receiving the worst legal assistance may be
least able either to meet.the cause and prejudice requirements of
Sykes or to make independent sixth amendment attacks.
Such cases involving possibly innocent defendants, ambiguous
trial transcripts, and representation of questionable quality are likely
to present severe philosophical problems for the present Court be-
cause of its focus on due process rights affecting the accuracy and
integrity of the fact-finding process," 2 its emphasis on implementa-
379. See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 56-58 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); United States v. Fessel, 531 F.2d 1275, 1278-
79 (5th Cir. 1976); United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 638 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 876 (1975); United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1199-
201 (D.C. Cir. 1973); United States v. Benn, 476 F.2d 1127, 1132-35 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
380. See United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
("[Piroof of prejudice may well be absent from the record precisely because counsel
has been ineffective. For example, when counsel fails to conduct an investigation, the
record may not indicate which witnesses he could have called, or defenses he could
have raised.") (footnote omitted) (citing United States v. Thompson, 475 F.2d 931
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (per curiam) (appellate counsel asserted that trial counsel had failed
to call four witnesses who would have testified on defendant's behalf and submitted
affidavits from these witnesses)); United States v. Benn, 476 F.2d 1127, 1135 (D.C. Cir.
1973) ("Evidence of the inadequacy of trial counsel will often be outside the trial
record-in some cases precisely because counsel has been ineffective.") (footnote omit-
ted).
381. See United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 639-40 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 876 (1975).
382. See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503-05 (1976).
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tion of the reasonable doubt standard,"' and its concern that habeas
be preserved as a vehicle for those making colorable claims of inno-
cence."4 As a result of such factors as bail practices, the likelihood of
reduced sentences, and pressures from defense counsel, an over-
whelming majority of those accused of crime plead guilty.3 The
Court apparently believes that the solemn in-court admissions of
these defendants in fact evidence guilt.38 Thus, their subsequent
claims of ineffective assistance may be deemed less compelling than
those asserted by defendants who proceed to trial. One may reasona-
bly assume that such hardy defendants who refuse to plead either
consider themselves innocent or believe, for a variety of reasons, that
the chances of acquittal are substantial. 8 Accordingly, since at least
some of those who go to trial may in fact be innocent, and since the
right to counsel is designed to assure the accuracy of the fact-finding
process and implicates the reasonable doubt standard, dilution of the
sixth amendment's competency requirement in contested cases
would be at odds with the Court's avowed concern that habeas be
maintained as a means of preventing miscarriages of justice.
Faced with these considerations, if the Court chooses to establish
standards that actually implement the sixth amendment right to
counsel in contested cases,s it may find that a substantial proportion
of the criminal bar is unable to meet them, inasmuch as recent esti-
mates indicate that the average level of performance by criminal
lawyers may be disturbingly low. 89 If that is the case, a large number
383. See Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233 (1977); Mullaney v. Wilbur,
421 U.S. 684 (1975). But see Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
384. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90-91 (1977); Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465, 490-91 (1976). See also Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack
on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142 (1970).
385. See D. NEWMAN, supra note 347, at 3; PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE
SOCIETY 134-36 (1967); Alschuler, supra note 347, at 1206 nn. 84 & 85, 1233-34; Tigar,
supra note 119, at 21.
386. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 757 (1970). But see Finkel-
stein, supra note 347.
387. In some instances, however, defendants may proceed to trial because the
district attorney either is not permitted to or will not offer a plea bargain that the
accused deems sufficiently advantageous. See N.Y. CraM. PROC. LAW § 220.10, Supple-
mentary Practice Commentaries (McKinney Supp. 1977); Memorandum from Richard
H. Kuh, New York County District Attorney, to the Legal Staff of the District Attor-
ney's Office (1974), reprinted in S. KADISH & M. PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
PROCESSES 1241-45 (3d ed. 1975).
388. For example, the ABA Defense Function Standards set forth minimum
standards of competence. See ABA DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARDS, supra note 284.
389. See Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 227, 234
(1973) (footnote omitted):
Many judges in geneial jurisdiction trial courts have stated to me that fewer
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of writs based on ineffective assistance will necessarily be granted. If,
to avoid this possibility, the Court sets more modest standards, it
may nonetheless be surprised to learn that a smaller, though not
insubstantial, percentage of the criminal bar cannot meet even the
lesser minimum requirements.390 In any event, reducing the standard
for effective assistance would water down the sixth amendment right
to counsel and institutionalize existing incompetence.
Even if the Court decides not to adopt stringent competence
requirements, it is highly doubtful that it could accede to the "sham
or mockery" standard in contested cases"9' since the latter is arguably
less rigorous than the test adopted in plea cases. Utilization of such
a lesser standard would in effect penalize defendants who chose to go
to trial rather than plead guilty, thus placing an impermissible bur-
den on the right to trial.392 Furthermore, the sham or mockery stan-
than 25 percent of the lawyers appearing before them are genuinely qualified;
other judges go as high as 75 percent .... It would be safer to pick a middle
ground and accept as a working hypothesis that from one-third to one-half
of the lawyers who appear in the serious cases are not really qualified to
render fully adequate representation.
Accord, United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1202 & n.21 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
Bazelon, supra note 153, at 2 ("[W]hat I have seen in 23 years on the bench leads
me to believe that a great many-if not most-indigent defendants do not receive the
effective assistance of counsel guaranteed them by the 6th Amendment."). But see
N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1978, at 1, col. 3. The Illinois and New Jersey State Bar Associa-
tions have "formally called on Chief Justice Burger to repudiate his contention that
half of American lawyers are not qualified for courtroom appearances, or to back it up
'conclusively' with facts." Id. The article also reports that William B. Spann, Jr.,
President of the American Bar Association, "told a news conference today that he
thought Chief Justice Burger's figures on courtroom incompetence were 'grossly dispro-
portionate.' Mr. Spann said he thought that only about 20 percent of current lawyers
were not qualified for such service." Id.
390. See Bazelon, supra note 153, at 2-3 (giving examples of "walking violations"
of the sixth amendment, that "I come upon . . . week after week in the cases I
review"); cf. United States ex rel. Healey v. Cannon, 553 F.2d 1052 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 98 S.Ct. 221 (1977), in which the court, with one judge dissenting, invalidated
a guilty plea because attorney's advice concerning effect of plea was not within range
of competence required of attorneys in criminal cases. The defendant was on trial for
murdering his wife and attempted to introduce evidence relating to his mental state
and intoxication at the time of the crime. The trial judge denied introduction of this
evidence and also advised that he would not instruct the jury on voluntary manslaugh-
ter. The defense counsel advised client that he could plead guilty and still attack the
judge's rulings on appeal.
391. See United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Judge
Bazelon noted that the older cases requiring defendant to show. that the trial was a
farce or mockery or to sustain a heavy burden of proof of unfairness may have been a
reflection of the fact that an ineffective assistance claim was, during that period,
grounded on due process alone. In view of the subsequent incorporation of the sixth
amendment, Judge Bazelon suggested that more stringent standards were required.
See id.
392. Cf. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968) (statute that authorized
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dard appears to be inconsistent with the constitutional right to proof
of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.393 Indeed, if the "within the range
of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases" '394 standard
set in plea cases means that whatever average standard prevails is
sufficient to meet sixth amendment requirements, then the bar is
permitted to set its own standards as to the quality of representation
that is constitutionally required. If that average is low enough, it
too may be in conflict with the reasonable doubt standard.
Whatever standard is ultimately adopted with respect to con-
tested cases, close scrutiny of the state court trial record will be
virtually mandatory, and testimony at federal habeas evidentiary
hearings is a likely prospect. Thus, claims of ineffective assistance
may well result in a substantial increase of time-consuming tasks for
the lower federal courts and in considerable embarrassment for the
bar.395
Additional problems arise if, in implementing the cause and
prejudice requirements, the Court adopts, as Sykes seems to suggest,
a miscarriage-of-justice or totality-of-the-circumstances test. Since
such a standard appears to involve consideration of the probable guilt
or innocence of the prisoner, the federal courts will be obliged to make
ad hoc, case-by-case determinations with respect to this issue. Deci-
sions of this kind are extremely subjective, and coherent guidelines
for making them are hard to formulate. Such difficulties underlay the
Court's adoption of per se rules in such cases as Gideon v.
Wainwright396 and Miranda v. Arizona.39 , Thus, adoption of the Sykes
only the jury to impose the death penalty is an impermissible burden on the right to
jury trial and thus unconstitutional); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968)
(prosecution may not, at trial, use testimony given by defendant at hearing on unsuc-
cessful motion to suppress evidence because such use deters assertion of fourth amend-
ment defenses).
393. When counsel is truly ineffective and gives only nominal representation, the
result may be a record almost barren of any indication of reasonable doubt. Because
the defense attorney has failed to present available evidence favorable to the accused
or has failed to cross-examine in a manner that discloses weaknesses and inconsisten-
cies in the state's case, it may appear that the defendant is clearly guilty.
394. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970).
395. See Bazelon, supra note 153, at 25 ("[One] reason appellate judges main-
tain a hands-off policy [in ineffective assistance cases] is their reluctance to soil the
reputations of appointed counsel . . . ."). See generally United States v. Katz, 425
F.2d 928, 931 n.3 (2d Cir. 1970), discussed at note 369 supra (court indicates its
gratitude to appellate counsel "for his vigorous'undeftaking of the distasteful task of
criticizing a brother lawyer on Katz' behalf").
396. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
397. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). But see, e.g., Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973)
(determining existence of the right to counsel in parole revocation hearings on a case-
by-case basis, with one of the factors to be considered being a colorable claim of
innocence).
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rule in an effort to conserve judicial resources by eliminating the
necessity for hearings on the merits of constitutional claims ulti-
mately may create substantially more work for the lower federal
courts and result in the elaboration of amorphous rules to determine
the circumstances under which the merits of a constitutional claim
can be avoided.
4. Those Were the Days, My Friend
The overruling of Noia's deliberate bypass test with respect to
trial defaults and the substitution of a variant of the adequate state
ground rule in its place can be seen as a reflection of the yearning for
a return to a bygone era in which state court convictions were argua-
bly subject only to extremely limited review in federal habeas pro-
ceedings. 98 With characteristic grace, Justice Brennan's dissent in
Sykes referred to "the Court's wistfully wishing for the day when the
trial was the sole, binding and final 'event' of the adversarial pro-
cess."' 99 The harsh reality is that this form of judicial nostalgia has
the potential for great danger. The Sykes majority appears deter-
mined to squeeze the more refined and complex due process issues of
the 1970's into a simplistic remedial mechanism that might have
been adequate for the more elementary and readily recognizable due
process claims presented in the first half of the twentieth century, but
which is wholly inadequate for full consideration of the types of con-
stitutional claims likely to be presented in the future.
The cause and prejudice requirements articulated in Sykes seem
to be designed to give recognition to and provide vindication for gross
constitutional violations of the sort that occurred during the 1930's,
1940's, and 1950's.1°0 The present Court has perhaps acquiesced in the
allegedly more sophisticated elaborations of due process rights an-
nounced by the Warren Court by continuing to entertain the latter
claims in the context of direct appellate review.4"' Its restriction of
habeas, however, appears to be a backhanded means of containing
398. For differing views on the historical scope of the writ, compare Fay v. Noia,
372 U.S. 391, 399-426 (1963) (Brennan, J.), with id. at 449-63 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
399. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 115 (1977).
400. See, e.g., Irvin v. Dowd, 359 U.S. 394 (1959); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.
165 (1952); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227
(1940); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45
(1932).
401. See, e.g., Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975); Michigan v. Tucker, 417
U.S. 433, 447 (1974). Although the Court has continued to hear appeals in habeas
actions involving due process rights established by the Warren Court, see, e.g., Brewer
v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977), various members have suggested the possibility that
claims such as those based on Miranda may subsequently be barred in habeas actions,
see, e.g., id. at 413-14 (Powell, J., concurring).
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these rights, either by effectively eliminating whole subject matter
areas from the scope of federal habeas review"2 or by barring habeas
review thereof whenever there is a procedural default.
The merits of the Sykes case, for example, involve giving content
to the requirements for a voluntary waiver of Miranda rights, that is,
determining under what circumstances a person under the influence
of alcohol may be deemed to have waived his or her rights against
self-incrimination.40 3 The imposition of a procedural forfeiture in
Sykes was made much easier because of the majority's disenchant-
ment with Miranda's prophylactic rules,0 4 because the prescribed
warnings were in any event given to the accused,0 5 and because the
elicitation of the confession and the conduct of the trial apparently
comported with the Court's own conception of fundamental fair-
402. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 n.11 (1977); Castaneda v.
Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 508 n.1 (1977) (Powell, J., dissenting); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465 (1976). The Sykes majority stated that it was not considering "in greater detail
. . . three [other] areas of controversy attendant to federal habeas review of state
convictions," 433 U.S. at 81, namely the types of claims cognizable in federal habeas
proceedings, the degree of deference to be given state court resolution of the facts
underlying constitutional issues, and the extent to which exhaustion of state remedies
is required. It raised the latter issues only to demonstrate "this Court's historic willing-
ness to overturn or modify its earlier views of the scope of the writ, even where the
statutory language authorizing judicial action has remained unchanged." Id. In view
of the policy underpinnings of Sykes, particularly its emphasis on the importance of
finality and on the state court trial as "the main event," id. at 88, 90, the Court in
subsequent cases may be willing to make inroads on the proposition that "a state
prisoner's challenge to the trial court's resolution of dispositive federal issues is always
fair game on federal habeas," notwithstanding its explicit disavowal of any such inten-
tion in Sykes. Id. at 79-81.
Perhaps the greatest danger to federal habeas jurisdiction is the possibility that
the Court will find that the suspension clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2, does not
preclude Congress from limiting the scope of habeas so as to deny collateral review
of judgments of convictions by a court of competent jurisdiction. Four members of the
Court have apparently accepted this view. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 835
(1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 384 (1977) (Burger,
C.J., joined by Blackmun & Rehnquist, JJ., concurring in part); Schneckloth v. Busta-
monte, 412 U.S. 218, 252 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
403. See 433 U.S. at 74-76. In a similar manner, the decision in Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. 465 (1976), made it unnecessary for the Court to resolve two important fourth
amendment issues-the extent to which a state court, in a murder trial, may utilize
evidence seized from a defendant arrested pursuant to an allegedly unconstitutional
vagrancy statute and the permissibility of supplementing a defective warrant by pre-
senting facts at the suppression hearing that were not given to the magistrate
issuing the warrant. Id. at 469-71, 474 n.4.
404. See, e.g., Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976); Michigan v.
Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
405. See 433 U.S. at 97 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("[Slince the police fully
complied with Miranda, the deterrent purpose§ of the Miranda rule is inapplicable to
this case.").
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ness.06 If, however, the same procedural default by Sykes' attorney
had occurred after a police officer testified that the confession had
been physically beaten out of the defendant, even though there was
substantial other evidence of guilt, it is unclear whether an absolute
forfeiture would have been imposed so readily."' Indeed, procedural
defaults are less likely to occur when the constitutional violation is
egregious and well-known, for even a relatively ineffective attorney
is likely to object to such gross improprieties. Where, however, the
implicated constitutional right is not well established or its violation
is less shocking, the possibility of a procedural default increases."'
Particularly in the case of marginally effective counsel, the issues
most likely to be preserved for litigation in a federal habeas action
are blatant constitutional violations."9 Thus, the net effect of deci-
406. Id. ("[T]here is clearly no basis for claiming that the trial violated any
standard of fundamental fairness.").
407. In Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958), the Court reversed a murder
conviction on the ground that defendant's confession was coerced. The coercion was
primarily psychological, consisting, for example, of induced fear of mob violence, de-
tention incommunicado, and denial of food for long periods. In response to the state's
contention that there was other evidence of guilt, the Court ruled that "even though
there may have been sufficient evidence, apart from the coerced confession, to support
a judgment of conviction, the admission in evidence, over objection, of the coerced
confession vitiates the judgment" since "no one can say what credit and weight the
jury gave to the confession." Id. at 568.
In Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 n.8 (1967), the Court stated that "our
prior cases have indicated that there are some constitutional rights so basic to a fair
trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless error," and cited Payne for
the proposition that coerced confessions come within the above category.
408. See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976); cf. Friendly, supra note 384,
at 162 (footnote omitted):
With today's awareness of constitutional rights, flagrant cases of police mis-
conduct in search and seizure will rarely escape detection and correction in
the trial or appellate process, even with the most slothful of defense counsel
and the most careless of judges. The non-frivolous fourth amendment cases
likely to give rise to collateral attack are those near the borderline, presenting
hard questions of the meaning or application of Supreme Court decisions.
Yet these are the cases where the deterrent function of the exclusionary rule
is least important . ...
409. In some instances, even arguably flagrant constitutional violations are over-
looked by defense counsel. In United States v. Easter, 539 F.2d 663 (8th Cir. 1976),
the court reversed a conviction for possession of a sawed-off shotgun on ineffective
assistance grounds. Defense counsel had not challenged evidence seized by the police,
who had kicked in the door of defendant's home, although they had no arrest or search
warrant and although their basis for proceeding to the residence was a tip from a man
identified only by his first name.
On retrial, defense counsel's motion to suppress the seized evidence was denied,
defendant was convicted, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed. The appellate court found
that the informant (who disappeared after giving the tip) claimed to be a victim of a
robbery and said that he had followed the robbers fleeing in their car approximately
one-half mile to the residence in question. (The alleged victim was on foot.) Approxi-
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sions such as Sykes appears to be the preservation of federal habeas
as a means of remedying more primitive constitutional errors, and
Justice Rehnquist's reference therein to miscarriages of justice may
be viewed in that context. Thus, limitation of habeas in effect be-
comes a means of diluting not only federal remedies but federal con-
stitutional rights as well. 10
mately twenty police officers and a helicopter gun ship arrived at the scene and sur-
rounded the house. Two officers knocked on the door and identified themselves and
their purpose. After being told to wait a minute so that someone could get a key to
open the door, the officers kept knocking and, after four or five minutes, broke down
the door. Upon entry, they saw the defendant's brother in a bathrobe. The officers
thereafter heard a noise in another room, opened the door thereto, and found defendant
holding the shotgun. Finding exigent circumstances for the search and seizure, the
Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress and affirmed the judg-
ment of conviction, with one judge dissenting. United States v. Easter, 552 F.2d 230
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 145 (1977).
The fact that the Court of Appeals ultimately rejected the fourth amendment
claim on the merits should not be regarded as an indication that that claim was
frivolous. First of all, the court's decision is open to serious question. See United States
v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 418 n.6 (1976); United States v. Easter, 552 F.2d 230, 235-36
(8th Cir.) (Heaney, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 145 (1977). Moreover, had
the default of the original trial counsel been deemed binding, an important question
with respect to the propriety of police conduct would have been left unresolved, and a
judgment of conviction possibly based on unconstitutionally seized evidence would
have been affirmed without ever reaching the merits. Finally, regardless of the out-
come, the court was forced to reach and decide constitutional issues and to articulate,
for better or worse, the reasons for its decision. As a result of such determinations on
the merits, precedents are created that can be either accepted or rejected by other
courts. Furthermore, since the facts relating to police practices must be described and
dealt with in the opinions, courts cannot take refuge in presumptions such as the
asserted lack of deterrent value in the exclusionary rule or the ostensible absence of
shocking police conduct characteristic of an allegedly bygone era.
410. See Bator, supra note 15, at 523-24. Recognizing the relationship between
federal habeas and the expansion of due process rights, Professor Bator stated,
It is natural that, in an era of such rapid growth in the substantive federal
law, there should be a demand that the remedial system keep pace, that
federal supervision be expanded to make sure that the states receive the new
doctrines hospitably. And there is, of course, the underlying suspicion that
in fact the states have not done so, that if we do not keep a sharp eye out,
federal rights will be subtly eroded. ...
Yet we must remember that the remedial system we construct must be
tailored for tomorrow as well as today. It is not fanciful to suppose that the
law of due process for criminal defendants will, in the foreseeable future,
reach a resting point, will become stabilized . . . . And if there is to be a
stabilization of the law, we should be wary about constructing a remedial
system premised on unceasing and revolutionary change.
Id. Professor Bator also rejected the notion that the availability of the writ was essen-
tial because state courts would remain indefinitely hostile to federal rights.
Due process may, however, be viewed without apologies as an unending evolution-
ary process that will require the continuing availability of the remedial function served
by federal habeas. Moreover, it is questionable whether the states are in fact becoming
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If, in the habeas context, the Court tacitly continues to measure
violations of constitutional rights from the historical perspective of
the first half of this century, little growth in the content of due pro-
cess can be expected because, compared to that era, what occurs in
courtrooms today seems, on the whole, to be reasonably fair.", To
judge ourselves and our legal system by Scottsboro criteria may facili-
tate pats on the back, but it is not an appropriate measure of the
extent to which we are a civilized society, and it creates an erroneous
historical marker for determining how far we can and must go in
assuring the fullest potential for vindication of federal constitutional
rights.41 2
more sympathetic to the vindication of federal rights. Indeed, future expansion of due
process may engender correlative state court hostility. If the theory of ongoing growth
of federal constitutional rights is accepted, then broad federal habeas jurisdiction
continues to be an appropriate remedial mechanism for today and tomorrow.
411. Compare cases cited in note 400 supra, with Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S.
135 (1977).
412. This is not to suggest that history is unimportant as a means of measuring
the development of the law, but to emphasize that due process cannot be treated as a
static concept. It is, for example, significant that confessions utilized in state courts
were initially suppressed by the federal courts because they were the products of brutal
physical beatings and torture. See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 281-85 (1936).
Subsequent cases shifted the focus from whether the confession was secured in a
shocking manner to whether the admission of guilt was free and voluntary, thus invali-
dating statements that werd the result of psychological coercion. See, e.g., Spano v.
New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959). Miranda carried the process still farther in an effort
to assure the voluntariness of admissions by the defendant.
It is important to be aware of decisions such as Brown, both as a measure of the
law's growth and as a reminder that such events did in fact take place. At this point,
however, it should be taken as a given that confessions that are not the product of the
defendant's free will are constitutionally impjermissible and that Miranda should be
the springboard for discussion of issues such as the intoxication question involved in
Sykes. If such issues are viewed from the perspective of Miranda rather than Brown,
they appear to involve claims that, far from being unduly refined and technical, are
substantial in terms of a modem definition of "voluntary." Indeed, contemporary
constitutional violations must generally be more subtle in order to avoid the certainty
of reversal. But such "subtlety" scarcely makes the violations less reprehensible. See,
e.g., Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
Thus, the Sykes Court's suggestion that the case involved merely "a bare allega-
tion of a Miranda violation, without accompanying assertions going to the actual
voluntariness or reliability of the confession," 433 U.S. at 87 n.11, assumes sub silentio
that the defendant was not raising a voluntariness issue when in fact he was. See Brief
for Respondent at 31-32, Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). The Court's ap-
proach implies a disdain for Miranda, hearkens back to the pre-Miranda era, and-
exemplifies the majority's predilection to utilize habeas solely for the most blatant
constitutional violations. Indeed, the Court stated that it did not "pause to consider"
whether a Miranda violation alone should be sent the way of Stone v. Powell, see 433
U.S. at 87 n.11, thus highlighting the relationship of state court defaults and piecemeal
amputation of the federal habeas jurisdiction as alternative means of containing the
development of due process rights.
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Viewed in another way, the accessibility of federal habeas was
previously on a parallel track with the development of due process
rights, so that the expansion of due process in the 1960's was accom-
panied by a comparable expansion of the availability of federal ha-
beas. " ' This symmetry, whether purposeful or not, served as a moni-
toring device, assuring equilibrium between input and output. By
providing, in effect, that newly created rights were accompanied by
appropriate federal remedies, the Court assured stability by guar-
anteeing access to at least one forum for vindication of federal consti-
tutional rights. While the content of due process is no longer being
significantly enlarged,"4 and there has been considerable diminution
in some areas," ' the general body of law regarding due process rights
in criminal cases remains in effect-somewhat battered, but not over-
ruled." 6 Thus, the due process prong is still relatively enlarged, while
availability of federal habeas has been substantially constricted, 117 so
413. Cf. Reitz, supra note 15, at 1328-29 (describing the manner in which Moore
v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923), expanded both the content of due process and the
availability of the federal habeas remedy). Compare Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145 (1968); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963);
and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), with Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217
(1969); Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968); Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968);
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963); and Jones v.
Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963).
414. There has, however, been some expansion of the content of due process. See
Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387
(1977); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684
(1975).
415. See, e.g., Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977); Manson v. Brath-
waite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976); Michigan
v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
416. The landmark decisions of the Warren Court, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145 (1968); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961), have not been overruled. For example, the holding in Duncan that the four-
teenth amendment incorporates the right to trial by jury with respect to nonpetty
criminal offenses has been blunted by subsequent decisions authorizing juries of less
than twelve members and nonunanimous verdicts, see Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S.
404 (1972); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972), and "two-tier" trial systems,
whereby the right to trial by jury is limited to "de novo appeals" in which there is a
possibility of imposition of a harsher punishment, see Ludwig v. Massachusetts, 427
U.S. 618 (1976). Duncan, however, remains good law. Similarly, although there have
been severe inroads with respect to both fourth and fifth amendment protections, see,
e.g., Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S.
411 (1976), the Court has made it clear that there are certain points beyond which it
will not retreat, see, e.g., United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977); Doyle v. Ohio,
426 U.S. 610 (1976); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
417. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465 (1976); Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S.
501 (1976); Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973). See also Swain v. Pressley,
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that there is now a skewed relationship between federal rights and
federal remedies. 418
While perfect equipoise in this regard is perhaps not essential,
some sort of balance is. When the Court creates new due process
rights, there must be mechanisms for proper implementation, inter-
pretation, and application thereof. The Supreme Court's limited ca-
pacity to hear cases on direct review is insufficient to fulfill this
function." ' While the Court considers that state tribunals now pos-
sess "appropriate sensitivity" to assure vindication of federal
claims,2 0 such ability and willingness may well depend upon the
ultimate availability of a federal forum and upon the constitutional
right having been in existence for some time and having been inter-
preted by both federal and state judiciaries.2"'
430 U.S. 372, 385 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring in part) ("I do not believe that the
Suspension Clause requires Congress to provide a federal remedy for collateral review
of a conviction entered by a court of competent jurisdiction. . . ."); Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 252-56 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
418. See notes 355-58 supra and accompanying text.
419. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 526 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("The Court does not, because it cannot, dispute that institutional constraints totally
preclude any possibility that this Court can adequately oversee whether state courts
have properly applied federal law, and does not controvert the fact that federal habeas
jurisdiction is partially designed to ameliorate that inadequacy.") (footnote omitted);
Wright & Sofaer, supra note 15, at 897-98; Symposium, supra note 356, at 28 (remarks
of Paul Freund); Burger, Reducing the Load on 'Nine Mortal Justices,' N.Y. Times,
Aug. 14, 1975, at 31, col. 2.
420. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493 n.35 (1976). Relying, inter alia, on
Bator, supra note 15, the Stone majority rejected the argument that federal judges
were better equipped to apply federal law than their state court counterparts. See 428
U.S. at 493 n.35. Justice Brennan responded by noting that
some might be expected to dispute the academic's dictum seemingly ac-
cepted by the Court that a federal judge is not necessarily more skilled than
a state judge in applying federal law. . . .For the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution proceeds on a different premise, and Congress, as it was consti-
tutionally empowered to do, made federal judges . . . "the primary and
powerful reliances for vindicating every right given by the Constitution, the
laws, and treaties of the United States."
Id. at 530 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (emphasis deleted) (quoting in
part Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 247 (1967)). Justice Brennan pointed out that
even if the state courts were generally not antagonistic to federal constitutional rights
and could interpret them accurately, such circumstances did not warrant removal of
federal habeas jurisdiction, for if the state decision was correct it would be upheld; if
not, the writ would be granted. He further suggested that the decision in Stone u.
Powell reflected a "manifestation of this Court's mistrust for federal judges." Id. (em-
phasis in original).
421. For example, in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976), the Court held
that fourth amendment claims of state prisoners were barred in federal habeas actions
if the state "provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation" thereof. This decision
was, however, rendered fifteen years after Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), made
the exclusionary rule applicable to the states. This interim period afforded opportuni-
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The federal courts, through their habeas jurisdiction, have tradi-
tionally served as a backstop, acting as the Supreme Court's surro-
gate in assuring the proper development of due process rights.412 To
be sure, the state courts have important contributions to make along
the same lines, but to the extent that state courts impose procedural
defaults, their capacity to interpret constitutional law is diminished.
Perhaps of more importance, state tribunals may perceive federal
constitutional rights within the context of local concerns, and their
willingness to do so may be augmented by the realization that federal
habeas review is now less likely to be available.2 By definition, how-
ever, the federal courts have a national outlook. The federal interme-
diate appellate courts are multi-state and, generally speaking, will
bring broader perspectives to bear on the development of constitu-
tional rights. Without belaboring the obvious, the primary daily busi-
ness of federal courts is to interpret federal law.*u Since the Supreme
Court is the final expositor of federal constitutional law, preserving
ties for litigation of numerous fourth amendment issues in both state and federal
courts. Thus, in implementing the exclusionary rule, the state courts have been af-
forded a considerable body of precedent, both state and federal, from which to draw.
For purposes of future development, however, removal of habeas jurisdiction with
respect to fourth amendment challenges leaves the state courts able to rely only on (1)
decisions of other state courts, which may be of limited precedential value because of
local procedural rules that become enmeshed with the constitutional principle at issue;
(2) decisions of lower federal courts in federal search and seizure cases, which may be
based on the supervisory power rather than the fourth amendment and which often
involve different types of crimes, as well as law enforcement officials with perspectives,
job qualifications, and internal rules of procedure and practice that vary considerably
from their state counterparts, see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 448-58, 463-64,
483-86 (1966); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 31-34 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643, 657-60 (1961); and (3) Supreme Court decisions, reviewing state and federal search
and seizure claims that, because of the size of the Court's docket and the fact that
fourth amendment claims often turn on the particular factual context, can provide
only limited guidance in this area. The virtual elimination of federal habeas jurisdic-
tion over fourth amendment claims by state prisoners thus limits the ability of each
state court to draw on the federal courts' interpretations of search and seizure issues
arising in its jurisdiction and involving its local police officials. Given the complexity
of the constitutional rights involved and the almost infinite number of possible permu-
tations, the loss is not insubstantial.
422. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 511-12 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
423. Until the millenium arrives, there will presumably be some state courts that
misunderstand and misinterpret Supreme Court decisions and others that are simply
recalcitrant. The existence of federal habeas jurisdiction serves as a reminder that
erroneous interpretations of federal law will not be allowed to stand. See id. at 520-21
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Bator, supra note 15, at 510.
424. See generally AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVSION OF JURISDIC-
TION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 168 (1969) (endorsing the federal question
jurisdiction of the United States District Courts as necessary "to protect litigants
relying on federal law from the danger that the state courts will not properly apply that
law, either through misunderstanding or lack of sympathy").
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the accessibility of the lower federal courts for habeas cases assures
the broadest base from which the Court can seek views, ideas, and
perhaps ideals, in interpreting the Constitution. Conversely, each
contraction of federal habeas diminishes the wealth of perspectives
from which the Supreme Court and, indeed, all federal and state
courts, can draw."'
IV. CONCLUSION
It is, in the end, simply sad that, only fourteen years after its
birth, Fay v. Noia, a decision marked by brilliance and compassion
not only on the part of the majority but also in Justice Harlan's
dissenting opinion," 6 has been replaced by Wainwright v. Sykes, an
opinion that refers to the issue presented as a "simple legal ques-
tion," 12 describes the elements of the deliberate bypass test, insofar
as they related to the trial context, as "the dicta in Fay v. Noia, "4
designates Noia as a decision that painted with an unnecessarily
425. It may be argued that, notwithstanding the Sykes decision, a plethora of
perspectives can be obtained as a result of habeas suits initiated by nondefaulting
prisoners. There are two responses. First, by imposing a forfeiture in the Sykes case
itself, the Court precluded the lower federal courts from examining and resolving an
interesting and important constitutional issue: the circumstances under which an
intoxicated person can voluntarily waive Miranda rights. The issues raised by other
defaulting prisoners are also likely to be of equal import and sophistication. See text
accompanying note 408 supra. Second, Sykes must be viewed in the context of the
Court's general retrenchment in the area of federal habeas. To the extent that other
constitutional claims are Stone v. Powell'ed and to the extent that the policy argu-
ments underlying Sykes may be utilized to deprive nondefaulting defendants of federal
habeas hearings, see note 402 supra, the present plethora of perspectives may become
a paucity of precedents.
For a somewhat more sanguine assessment of recent Supreme Court federal ha-
beas decisions, see Cover & Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the
Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035 (1977).
426. See 372 U.S. 391, 476 & n.28 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("I recognize that
Noia's predicament may well be thought one that strongly calls for correction. But the
proper course to that end lies with the New York Governor's powers of executive
clemency, not with the federal courts.").
Sykes' situation may not be considered as dire as Noia's since Noia's confession
was admittedly coerced, his sentence was life imprisonment, the failure to appeal was
based in part on his fear of the death penalty in the event of reconviction, and his
coperpetrators were free. Because the Court imposed a forfeiture in Sykes' case, how-
ever, it is impossible now to ascertain if his confession was involuntary. Moreover, the
decision applies not only to Sykes, but also to the Abraham Francises incarcerated in
our prisons now and in the future, many of whose situations may be considerably more
compelling than Noia's.
427. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 77 (1977). Elsewhere in the majority
opinion, the Court referred to the basic issues involved in interpreting section 2254 as
"perplexing problems." Id. at 78.
428. Id. at 85, 87.
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"broad brush," '429 and establishes as a substitute for deliberate bypass
the vague dual requirements of "cause" and "prejudice" whose only
"precise content '43 would unquestionably have to include the ele-
ment of harshness.
As part of the policy justification for its apparently rigid forfei-
ture rule, the Sykes Court delivers an encomium for the
"contemporaneous-objection rule" and in effect describes the
attorney-client relationship in a criminal case as one in which the
servant is omnipotent and the master subservient. Reinforcing the
contemporaneous objection requirement with a strong forfeiture rule,
it is said, will accomplish a variety of salutary objectives, such as
deterring "sandbagging," 43' forcing the prosecution "to take a hard
look at its hole card, 432 and assuring that the state court trial is "the
'main event,' so to speak, rather than a 'tryout on the road.' ,,13"
As this Article has attempted to point out, however, not all of
the blessings of Sykes are mentioned in the Court's opinion. The new
rule diminishes the value of federal habeas as a safety valve. It also
skews federal rights and remedies, tends to dilute those rights, and
will significantly curtail the effectiveness of the lower federal courts
as sources for interpreting the due process protections afforded defen-
dants in criminal cases. Sykes may also have a double-or-nothing
effect, barring federal habeas in the case of those defendants who may
have been most poorly represented in state courts and who, as a result
of their attorney's negligence or incompetence, have already commit-
ted procedural defaults that preclude the possibility of relief in state
court. In like fashion, the Sykes opinion should ultimately force the
Court to deal meaningfully with the issue of ineffective assistance of
counsel since every state prisoner who is barred from federal court on
the basis of a procedural default can be expected to return with an
incompetence claim. In short, to use language that the author of the
Sykes opinion might find congenial, the time will come to pay the
piper. 434
429. Id. at 88 n.12.
430. Id. at 91.
431. Id. at 89.
432. Id.
433. Id. at 90.
434. Or in the words of Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 154 (1974) (Rehnquist,
J., plurality opinion), the Court will be required to "take the bitter with the sweet."
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